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Abstract 
 
 
This study aims at measuring the social incidence of indirect taxes in Pakistan 
as a result of the tax reform process specifically carried out in the area of 
indirect taxes (1990-2001). The intention is to analyze how indirect tax reform 
reflects the policy objectives particularly in the light of equity and 
distributional considerations envisaged in the tax reform strategy. Whilst one 
aim is to reflect on the aggregate indirect tax incidence overtime at the 
national as well as the urban/rural level, the second objective is to provide a 
high level of disaggregation of incidence picture in order to explore the 
sensitivity of tax incidence in terms of key commodities. Additionally, this 
study attempts to illustrate the sensitivity of estimated tax incidence results to 
the assumption of zero demand responses and to identify welfare enhancing 
directions of tax reform for Pakistan at the margin by using the marginal 
theory of tax reform. 
 
The findings of this study seem to indicate that a move from dependence on 
trade tax revenues to GST/VAT revenues for Pakistan has made the overall 
indirect tax system a little more progressive. It appears post- reform indirect 
tax incidence is sensitive to taxation of key commodities including sugar, 
edible oils and basic fuel/utilities. Incidentally, taxation of these commodities 
also appears to have strong distributional effects on the poor. Whilst exploring 
the sensitivity of estimated tax incidence results to the incorporation of 
behaviour responses, our estimated results do not appear to be very sensitive 
to this incorporation. Furthermore, directions of welfare enhancing tax reform 
(at the margin) for Pakistan reveal that a reduction in the price of basic food 
(including beef, wheat, milk and pulses) should be welfare enhancing; taxation 
of sugar maybe efficient but not equitable, while only taxation of vegetable 
ghee simultaneously fits both criterion. 
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CHAPTER I: Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Aims of the study 
 
 
This study aims at measuring the social incidence of indirect taxes in Pakistan 
as a result of the tax reform process1 during 1990-2001, focusing on the area 
of indirect taxes. The intention is to analyze whether indirect tax reform 
achieved the policy objectives, particularly in the light of equity and 
distributional considerations envisaged in the tax reform strategy. Whilst one 
aim is to reflect on the aggregate indirect tax incidence overtime at the 
national as well as the urban/rural level, the second objective is to provide a 
highly disaggregated picture of this incidence in order to explore the 
sensitivity of tax incidence in terms of key commodities and to isolate their 
impact on the poor. 
  
The third aim of this study is to illustrate the sensitivity of estimated tax 
incidence results (summarized in terms of tax progression) to the assumption 
of zero demand responses (a special case of partial equilibrium tax incidence 
analysis assumed in some tax incidence studies. For instance see Chen et al., 
2001; Munoz et al., 2003; and Sahn and Younger, 2003, to name but a few). 
The fourth aim of this study is to attempt to move beyond the tax incidence 
analysis by identifying welfare enhancing directions of tax reform for Pakistan 
at the margin by using the marginal theory of tax reform. 
  
This study focuses on the indirect taxes only (which include sales tax, excise 
duties and custom duties) because the focus of this research is the tax reforms 
                                                 
1 Also known as the first generation of tax reform process in Pakistan. 
 2 
(1990-2001) specifically carried out in the area of indirect taxes. Furthermore, 
this focus should not be a surprise as a substantial amount of total federal tax 
revenue in Pakistan is raised solely via indirect taxes. For instance, almost 83 
percent and 67 percent respectively of total federal tax2 came from indirect 
taxes in 1990-91 and 2001-02 respectively. Thus in the case of Pakistan, 
indirect taxes occupy a central place in the federal tax structure and any 
serious evaluation of Pakistan tax structure must begin by looking at indirect 
taxes.  
 
As mentioned earlier Pakistan, like many other developing countries, also 
embarked on significant tax reforms within the area of indirect taxes, mainly 
focusing on replacing trade tax revenues with GST/VAT revenues. While 
revenue mobilization was the key factor behind this reform, ‘equity’ and 
‘distributional’ considerations were the central focus when the overall reform 
strategy was envisaged. This raises an important question of what has 
happened in terms of these policy aspirations or in other words, what was the  
social incidence of this tax reform process. This study will attempt to answer 
this important question by using the partial equilibrium tax incidence approach 
while analyzing tax incidence in terms of tax progression using the average 
progressivity rate. 
 
The analysis holds immense interest for the tax policy and tax reform in 
Pakistan, as the efficiency and distributional impact of this policy reform has 
never been systematically studied. But it can also fit a broader perspective as a 
case study illustrative of the type of reforms carried out in many other 
developing countries as well. Thus, this study will attempt to add to a growing 
but limited research on whether a move from dependence on trade tax 
revenues to GST/VAT revenues for developing countries has made the tax 
                                                 
2 Total federal tax figure here excludes surcharges which averaged around 1.6 and 1.2 percent 
of GDP in 1990-91 and 2001-02 respectively. 
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system (indirect taxes in our case) more progressive (Gemmell and Morrissey, 
2003) or regressive (Emran and Stiglitz, 2005).  
 
It is important to stress that the strength of partial equilibrium tax incidence 
analysis lies in its ability to disaggregate the incidence picture. This is decisive 
because such a high level of disaggregation allows us to explore the sensitivity 
of tax incidence to key commodities and to isolate commodities that may have 
strong distributional effect on the poor. As a result, this could be extremely 
useful information for the policymakers and can add to the growing literature 
on how evidence from tax incidence (in terms of tax progression) can be more 
informative regarding possible impact on the poor (see for instance Bird and 
Zolt, 2005).  
 
One of the core concerns regarding evidence emerging from partial 
equilibrium tax incidence analysis relates to the underlying assumption used to 
constrain demand responses. This approach assumes that tax levied on a 
particular commodity is fully borne by those who consume that item. In other 
words, consumers of the commodity cannot avoid paying the tax on that 
commodity by changing their behaviour. Although this is a simplifying 
assumption nevertheless it is a restrictive one. Thus this study will attempt to 
illustrate the sensitivity of the estimated results to incorporation of demand 
responses. We will do this by estimating own- and cross-price elasticities (for 
a sample of key commodities) for Pakistan using spatial price variations in the 
(HIES 2001-02) survey data. By doing so, this study will attempt to inform the 
literature on tax incidence and price elasticities as well.  
 
This study will also attempt to move beyond tax incidence. We aim to do this 
by trying to identify welfare enhancing directions of tax reform for Pakistan at 
the margin. For a developing country like Pakistan where one third of the 
population lives below the poverty line, improving the welfare of the 
 4 
population in general and of poor in particular is one of the key policy issues. 
This means a core concern of tax policy in such a country (with respect to the 
poor) should be “not to make them even poorer” (Bird, 1974; and Mclure Jr., 
1977) or to focus on “un-taxing the poor” (Bird and Zolt, 2005). We aim to 
identify directions of welfare enhancing reforms for Pakistan at the margin 
using the theory of marginal tax reform (MTR).  The practical appeal of this 
approach for a developing country like Pakistan cannot be exaggerated as 
policymakers in such countries are keenly interested in empirically robust and 
theoretically consistent suggestions for improvements in the status quo 
(Ahmad and Stern, 1987). 
 
 
1.2 Methodology 
 
 
The methodological approach followed in this study for the analysis of 
distributional burden of indirect taxes is a variant of numerical tax incidence 
approach which was first introduced by Nicholson (1964) for the United 
Kingdom and Pechman and Okner (1974) for the United States. According to 
this approach total tax liability for a household is determined by allocating 
total tax revenue collected on a good to household expenditure shares on that 
good, until all revenue is fully exhausted. Although this study also calculates 
tax liabilities based on household (observed) consumption patterns, we make 
no assumption of proportionality between tax burden and tax revenues as 
assumed by the earlier studies. In this sense, this is an improvement on the 
earlier approach as it allows for excess burden and tax evasion. 
 
The data set used for analysis is the Household Integrated Economic Survey 
(HIES) for (1990-91) and (2001-02) which is a cross-sectional data set 
collected by the Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS) Pakistan. This data set is 
the main source for poverty and inequality estimates for the country. It is a 
 5 
nationally representative good quality cross sectional data set that has been  
used extensively (Ahmad and Stern (1987; 1991), Deaton (1987; 1997), 
Deaton and Grimard (1992), Alderman and Garcia (1993); Malik (1988); 
Aamjad, et al. (1997); Jafri (1999); Anwar et al. (2005); Kamal et al. (2003); 
World Bank (1995; 2002); ADB (2006); CRPRID (2003; 2005; 2006). 
Availability of cross-sectional surveys ten years apart allows us to see how the 
distributional incidence of these taxes has changed over time. This study will 
use the most recent survey and will attempt to show information presented in 
the (HIES) is as relevant for tax policy analysis as it is for carrying out poverty 
and inequality estimates. Furthermore, it will show how this information can 
be used for estimating price elasticities and for carrying out tax reform and tax 
planning analysis.  
 
The advantages of such a micro-analysis are well established. It relies on rich 
micro information encompassing several thousand households in order to 
ascertain consumption patterns, demographic characteristics and other 
household characteristics at the national or more local geographic levels. As a 
result, even a complicated indirect tax structure like that of Pakistan can be 
modeled in detail and across various segments of the population. This allows 
us not only to build an incidence picture at the aggregate level but also to 
disaggregate the picture in order to see how this incidence is being generated. 
Such information may be very relevant for the likely impact of key taxes on 
the poor (e.g. taxes on basic fuels, processed food items etc.). 
 
We do accept that the tractability and intuition of partial equilibrium models 
must be balanced against the ‘static’ and ‘closed’ nature of the approach. 
There is no ideal or unique approach to tax incidence analysis (Martinez-
Vazquez, 1991). The superiority of one approach over the other crucially 
depends on what is being asked. Thus, if the aim of the study is to measure the 
distributional effect of taxes, partial equilibrium tax incidence approach is 
 6 
sufficient. More importantly, the partial equilibrium tax incidence approach 
allows us to clearly disaggregate the incidence picture which as mentioned 
earlier is the key to analyzing sensitivity of tax incidence for key commodities, 
and to isolate the effects of commodities that may be having a powerful 
distributional impact on the poor. All this information is very relevant for the 
policy makers and key for identifying impact on the poor.  
 
This study also aims at estimating price elasticities using spatial price 
variation in the survey data (i.e. HIES 2001-02) to estimate demand functions 
by taking unit values (dividing expenditure by quantities) as proxies for prices. 
The basic assumption of this methodology hinges on assuming that households 
belonging to the same cluster face the same prices. Since typically the number 
of households belonging to the same cluster are in single digits and these 
households will be interviewed more or less at the same time (in order to 
minimize time and travel cost), this assumption is quite realistic particularly 
for rural areas. Nevertheless, unit values are not the same as ‘prices’ and 
cannot be directly treated as market prices. But if the appropriate adjustment 
in unit values can be made, the usefulness of information contained in unit 
values cannot be denied, particularly for developing countries where price data 
is so scarce (Deaton, 1988). Thus, this study will attempt to use spatial price 
variation in HIES 2001-02 data set to estimate price elasticities for Pakistan. 
This information will in turn be used to illustrate the sensitivity of partial 
equilibrium tax incidence estimates (for a selected sample of key 
commodities), to incorporation of demand responses as well as to propose 
directions of welfare enhancing reforms at the margin for Pakistan. 
 
 
1.3 The plan of the study 
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This study is organized into eight chapters, each of which is discussed briefly 
below to provide an outline of discussion. The following  chapter begins with 
a detailed description of factors (both internal and external) responsible for the 
initiation of the tax reform process in Pakistan. It goes on to give details of the 
nature and direction of tax reform followed in Pakistan and provides an 
overview of how the structure of direct and indirect taxes has changed 
overtime due to this reform process.  
 
Chapter three presents an analytical framework for evaluating the 
distributional aspects of an indirect tax system. Given the extensive literature 
on tax incidence for developed and developing countries, this chapter will 
focus on approaches that are important for developing countries. Furthermore, 
this chapter will attempt to summarize this evidence of tax incidence in terms 
of tax progression. Chapter four discusses the data and methodology issues 
related to the measurement of household welfare aggregate and the analysis of 
tax incidence.  
 
Chapter five makes up the main body of this study. It establishes the social 
incidence of the GST/VAT in Pakistan in the pre- and post- reform era (at the 
national as well as the urban/rural level). The welfare impact of GST/VAT is 
looked at independently due to the post- reform and future significance of 
GST/VAT revenue in total federal tax revenues of Pakistan. We also look at 
the issue of GST/VAT exemptions in order to evaluate if these exemptions are 
really safeguarding the poor. We use the distributional characteristics of the 
goods approach to determine goods/services that are relatively more important 
for the poor and recommend exemptions that are in line with the government’s 
pro-poor agenda. 
  
Chapter six completes the discussion on the indirect tax incidence in Pakistan 
by evaluating the incidence of overall indirect taxes both pre- and post- reform 
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(1990 – 2001) (at the national as well as the urban/rural levels). We first look 
at the methodology and assumptions, then at the social incidence of custom 
duties and excise taxes respectively. The discussion on the social incidence is 
completed by bringing all of these components together.  
 
Chapter seven broadens the analysis of tax incidence for Pakistan. This 
chapter relies on spatial price variation in the survey data to determine price 
elasticities for 2001-02 along with a detailed discussion of the underlying 
methodology and data used. Estimates of elasticities are pivotal for moving the 
discussion forward towards the analysis of tax reform and planning. This 
chapter also uses this information to evaluate the future direction of welfare-
improving tax reforms for Pakistan at the margin using marginal theory of tax 
reform. Furthermore, this chapter will also try to illustrate if our partial 
equilibrium tax incidence results from the earlier chapters are sensitive to the 
incorporation of demand responses.   
 
The final chapter concludes the study. Along with summarizing the major 
findings, the intention is to broadly talk about the importance and main 
contributions of this research. Furthermore the chapter also provide a brief 
discussion on the qualifications to this work and highlights areas of possible 
future research.  
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CHAPTER II: Taxation in Pakistan (1985 – 2001) 
 
 
2 Introduction 
 
 
Pakistan’s tax system has undergone profound changes since the nineties, but 
despite these changes tax revenue in relation to GDP has remained remarkably 
stable over the last two decades (see Table 2.1). Federal tax revenue as a 
percent of GDP during the last two decades averaged around 13 percent never 
falling below 10 percent of GDP (International Monetary Fund, 2001). The 
overall revenues still appear to be dominated by revenues collected by the 
federal government (see Table 2.2) and these mainly comprise direct taxes 
(income and corporation tax) and indirect taxes (custom duties, sales tax and 
excise duties).  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the structure of the country’s federal 
taxation in conjunction with the reform process, also called the first generation 
of tax reforms, that took place during the 90s in Pakistan. The main focus of 
this reform process was to impose direct taxes as well as replace trade 
revenues with GST/VAT revenues. This process approximately ended in 2001. 
And shortly after, Pakistan initiated the second generation of tax reforms 
which are purely administrative in nature and are not the focus of this study.  
 
This chapter will try to address the following questions: 
 
(a) What were the internal and external factors that impelled the tax 
reform process in Pakistan?  
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(b) What was initially envisaged regarding the nature, shape and scope of 
these reforms, and more importantly, whether this vision translated 
into policy actions or not?  
(c) Who envisaged these reforms? 
(d) How have the overall federal tax structure and its components changed 
during the reform process and what were the major reform steps? 
(e) Were equity concerns considered under the overall reform strategy and 
within its components? And did these concerns translate into 
respective policy actions? 
  
For this purpose, this chapter is divided into four main sections. The first 
section addresses the question of why tax reforms were initiated in the first 
place in Pakistan during the decade of the 90s. The second section talks 
about the overall nature and direction of the tax reform process as foreseen 
by the Resource Mobilization and Tax Reform Commission (RMTRC). 
The third section is divided into several subsections; each analyzing major 
changes that took place in each component of the federal taxation (namely 
income tax, custom duties, sales tax and excise duties) due to this reform 
process and the last section concludes the discussion.  
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Table 2.1: Fiscal Indicators of Consolidated Federal and Provincial 
Governments (as Percent of GDP) 
Expenditure Revenue 
Year 
GDP 
Real 
Growth 
Overall 
Fiscal 
Deficit Total Current Dev.  
Total 
Rev. 
 Tax 
Non- 
Tax /1 
1980-81 6.4 5.3 22.9 13.7 9.3 16.9 13.5 3.4 
1984-85 8.7 7.7 24.7 17.9 5.5 16.4 12.2 4.2 
1987-88 6.4 8.5 26.7 19.8 6.9 17.3 11.9 5.4 
1989-90 4.4 6.5 25.7 19.3 6.5 18.6 12.8 5.8 
1990-91 5.4 8.8 25.7 19.3 6.4 16.9 12.7 4.2 
1991-92 7.6 7.5 26.7 19.1 7.6 19.2 13.7 5.5 
1992-93 2.1 8.1 26.2 20.5 5.7 18.1 13.4 4.7 
1993-94 4.4 5.9 23.4 18.8 4.6 17.5 13.4 4.1 
1994-95 5.1 5.6 22.9 18.5 4.4 17.3 13.8 3.5 
1995-96 6.6 6.5 24.4 20.0 4.4 17.9 14.4 3.5 
1996-97 1.7 6.4 22.3 18.8 3.5 15.8 13.4 2.4 
1997-98 3.5 7.7 23.7 19.8 3.9 16 13.2 2.8 
1998-99 4.2 6.1 22.0 18.6 3.4 15.9 13.3 2.7 
1999-00 3.9 5.4 18.7 16.5 2.2 13.5 10.7 2.8 
2000-01 1.8 4.3 17.2 15.5 1.7 13.3 10.6 2.7 
2001-02 3.1 4.3 18.8 15.9 2.9 14.2 10.9 3.3 
2002-03 4.7 3.7 18.6 16.3 2.3 14.9 11.5 3.4 
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan (various years). 
Note: The base of Pakistan’s GDP has been changed from 1980-81 to 1999-2000, therefore, 
wherever GDP appears in denominator the numbers prior to 1999-2000 are not comparable. 
* Expenditure figures do no include the impact of earthquake spending in this table 
1/ Non-tax revenue also include surcharges on petroleum and as and self financing by 
autonomous bodies.  
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3 Figures of tax revenue from Table 2.1 and 2.2 do not match because formal include both 
federal and provincial governments while latter only includes the federal government.  
Table 2.2: Structure of Federal Tax Revenue3 
 
Tax Revenue Break-up of Indirect Taxes 
Year 
Tax 
Revenue 
(CBR) /1 
 
As % of 
GDP 
Direct 
Taxes 
Indirect 
Taxes 
Custom Sales 
Central 
Excise 
1985-86 72.4 14.1 
10.3 
[14.2] 
62.2 
[85.9] 
29.3 
(47.1) 
4.90 
(7.9) 
15.6 
(25.1) 
1987-88 93.5 13.8 
12.4 
[13.3] 
81.0 
[86.6] 
38.0 
(46.9) 
8.7 
(10.7) 
17.6 
(21.7) 
1989-90 119.4 14.0 
15.7 
[13.1] 
103.7 
[86.9] 
50.7 
(48.9) 
15.6 
(15.0) 
23.3 
(22.5) 
1990-91 
 
1994-95 
 
1995-96 
 
1996-97 
 
1997-98 
 
1998-99 
 
1999-00  
 
2000-01  
 
2001-02 
 
2002-03 
 
 
111.0 
 
226.0 
 
268.0 
 
282.0 
 
293.7 
 
308.5 
 
346.6 
 
392.3 
 
403.9 
 
460.6 
 
 
11.0 
 
12.0 
 
13.0 
 
12.0 
 
11.0 
 
10.0 
 
9.1 
 
9.4 
 
9.2 
 
9.6 
 
 
20.0 
[18.0] 
62.0 
[27.4] 
78.0 
[29.1] 
85.0 
[30.1] 
103.3 
[35.0] 
110.4 
[35.8] 
112.6 
[32.5] 
124.6 
[31.8] 
142.5 
[35.3] 
148.5 
[32.2] 
 
91.0 
[82.0] 
164.0 
[72.6] 
190.0 
[70.9] 
197.0 
[69.9] 
190.4 
[65.0] 
198.1 
[64.2] 
234.0 
[67.5] 
267.7 
[68.2] 
261.6 
[64.7] 
312.2 
[67.8] 
 
50.0 
(54.9) 
77.0 
(47.0) 
89.0 
(46.8) 
86.0 
(43.7) 
74.5 
(39.1) 
65.3 
(33.0) 
61.6 
(26.4) 
65.0 
(24.3) 
47.8 
(18.3) 
59.0 
(18.9) 
 
16.0 
(17.6) 
43.0 
(26.2) 
50.0 
(26.3) 
56.0 
(28.4) 
53.9 
(28.3) 
72.0 
(36.3) 
116.7 
(49.9) 
153.6 
(57.4) 
166.6 
(63.7) 
205.7 
(65.9) 
 
25.0 
(27.5) 
44.0 
(26.8) 
51.0 
(26.9) 
55.0 
(27.9) 
62.0 
(32.6) 
60.8 
(30.7) 
55.6 
(23.7) 
49.1 
(18.3) 
47.2 
(18.0) 
47.5 
(15.2) 
 
Source: Central Board of Revenue 
* Beginning from 1999-2000, Pakistan’s GDP was re-based at 1999-2000 from a two decades old base of 
1980-81. Therefore, wherever GDP appears in denominator the numbers prior to 1999-2000 are not 
comparable. 
Note: Figures in square bracket are as percentage of tax revenue. Figures in parentheses are as percentage of indirect 
taxes. 
1/ in billions of PRs.  
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2.1  Why Reform? 
 
 
The main forces behind the tax reform process - also known as the first 
generation of tax reforms - can be analysed in terms of internal factors (e.g. 
the economy and politics) as well as external factors (e.g. the Gulf war, 
International Monetary Fund programmes etc)  and these are discussed in 
detail below. 
 
 
2.1.1 Internal factors 
 
2.1.1.1  Economic Factors 
 
 
At the time of the initiation of the tax reform process, several economic factors 
dictated the need for serious tax reforms in Pakistan. In order to understand 
this phenomenon the country’s economic history over the last 30 years needs 
to be taken into account, Pakistan’s economic history can be broadly 
categorized into two periods. During the first period which started in 1970 and 
lasted until the middle of the 1980s, Pakistan enjoyed an impressive growth 
performance six-seven percent per annum). Although fiscal and external 
imbalances were not significant at the beginning of this period by the end of 
this period significant imbalances appeared to emerge.  
  
The second stage can be marked from the middle of 1980s till the end of 2000 
during which the growth process started to fade away and ballooning of fiscal 
and current account deficits led to serious deterioration of the debt situation of 
the country (Independent Evaluation Office, 2002). For instance, in (1977-78) 
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debt servicing payments (as a percentage of net revenue receipts) were only 19 
percent but by the end of 1980s these had ballooned to 42 percent. Much of 
the problem according to Pasha et al. (1992) arose from the mounting share of 
current expenditures, which remained in excess of 19 percent of GDP between 
1985-93 as a result of dramatic increase in debt service payments. Together 
with military expenditure, these accounted for 80 percent of current 
expenditures.  
 
Another important economic change which took place during the second 
period were the changes in revenue sharing transfers from federal government 
to provincial governments through the National Finance Commission (NFC) 
Awards4 (see Table 2.3). In May 1991, the sixth NFC award took place after a 
span of 12 years. The May 1991 NFC award significantly increased revenue-
sharing transfers to the provinces. This was made possible by including excise 
duties on tobacco and tobacco manufacturers and sugar in the divisible pool of 
taxes. On the whole, the 1990 NFC award increased the total federal transfers 
to the provinces in (1991-92) by PRs. 25 billion,- an increase of 2.1 percentage 
point in terms of GDP. This put significant additional pressure on an already 
dwindling fiscal stance.   
  
                                                 
4 The National Finance Commission is a constitutional body which is required to meet every 
five years to make recommendations on the distribution of financial resources between 
provinces by the federal government. 
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Table 2.3: Total Federal Transfers to Provinces (under various revenue 
sharing NFC awards) 
Divisible Pool Transfers 
to Provinces (Mill. Rs.)
Divisible Pool 
Transfers as % of Fed. 
Tax Rev*.
Raisman Award 26,750 12.8
NFC (1961-62) 48,015 23.1
NFC (1964) 56,183 27.0
NFC (1970) 69,628 33.4
NFC (1974) 62,028 29.8
NFC (1990) 73,528 35.3
* Gross Revenue including cost of collection
Cited: Table 2, Implication of the New National Finance Commission, SPDC Report, July 1995.
 
The government of the time was not oblivious to these problems:  it did try to 
create some fiscal space on the side of expenditures, but in the face of 
inflexible structures of expenditures (inelastic interest payments and large 
share of military expenditure) the sacrifice had to come from severe cuts in 
development and social spending for example development and social 
spending was 10 percent of GDP in 1992 and this fell to 4.5 percent by 2000) 
(Independent Evaluation Office, 2002). As a result, the inflexible and 
changing nature of expenditures meant that more revenues needed to be found 
urgently. 
  
One possibility was to rely on the existing tax structure to generate additional 
revenues. But given the low resource mobilization potential under the current 
system, this was hardly a viable option. For instance, if we look at Table 2.4 
we can see that the elasticity of tax to GDP ratio for the last three decades 
beginning 1970, which also reflects the efficiency of the tax system, remained 
around 0.80 thus implying inelasticity of the tax system. This stagnant ratio 
meant that for every 10 percent increase in GDP, federal taxes under the 
existing tax structure could only increase by eight percent, since the overall 
efficiency of the tax system depends on the buoyancy (i.e. built-in flexibility 
of tax system and it should be elastic with respect to the base, so that increase 
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in GDP can automatically lead to proportionate increase in tax revenue) of its 
components. Looking at the same table we can see that the buoyancy of 
various tax components (excluding the sales tax) was also quite low (Pasha et 
al., 1992). This implies that the given tax structure as it stood suffered from 
serious revenue mobilisation problems.  
 
 
Table 2.4: Elasticity and Buoyancy of Major Federal Taxes, 1972-73 to 1989-90 
 
Tax  Tax Base Tax / 
Base 
Base / 
Income 
Tax / 
Income 
Income Tax  Non-Agriculture GDP    
 Elasticity  0.88 1.07 0.95 
 Buoyancy  1.00 1.07 1.07 
Import 
Duties 
 Value of Imports    
 Elasticity  0.67 1.06 0.69 
 Buoyancy  1.00 1.06 1.06 
Excise 
Duties 
 Value Added in Large 
Scale Manufacturing 
   
 Elasticity  0.57 1.15 0.66 
 Buoyancy  0.78 1.15 0.89 
Sales Tax  Value of Import + 
Industrial Production 
   
 Elasticity  0.96 1.05 1.01 
 Buoyancy  1.20 1.05 1.26 
All Federal 
Taxes 
 Gross Domestic Product    
 Elasticity  0.80 1.00 0.80 
 Buoyancy  1.07 1.00 1.07 
Source: Qazi Masood and Mohammad Akbar, ‘Elasticity and Buoyancy of Federal Taxes’, 
AERC Working Paper, 1991. 
 
 
2.1.1.2  Political Factors 
 
 
The tax reform process of Pakistan (1990-91) did not arise out of purely 
economic consequences. There were significant political changes that led to 
the initiation of the first generation of tax reform process in Pakistan. The 
period of (1990-91) coincided with the induction of the newly elected 
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Government of Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) led by Mian Nawaz Sharif in 
November 1990. This event was a catalyst for reform process as Nawaz Sharif 
(contrary to his predecessor Benazir Bhutto5) was a capitalist, a political 
moderate and member of a leading industrial family. The IJI had a strong 
industrialist hold and enjoyed thriving urban support. And the party was 
elected with the specific goal of strengthening the economy which included 
reforms in areas of privatisation, deregulation, denationalization, foreign 
exchange and payment, taxation, administration and law. All this made the IJI 
government more forward looking and responsive to the needs of the private 
sector.  
 
This, coupled with the macroeconomic pressure created by the Gulf War, 
(which will be discussed later) made Nawaz Sharif’s government more eager 
to pursue reforms. The seriousness of the commitment to reforms, particularly 
in the area of taxation, can be seen from the fact that within a few months of 
the formation of the new government, the IJI government created a high 
profile Tax Reform Committee (TRC) which was followed by the 
establishment of the Resource Mobilization and Tax Reform Commission 
(RMTRC) in February 1991. This commission was created with the purpose of 
outlining a revenue mobilization strategy as well as improving tax laws and 
procedures6. It would be no exaggeration to add that role of RMTRC in 
formulating the direction and nature of tax reform process in Pakistan was 
pivotal.  
 
 
2.1.2 External Factors 
                                                 
5 Benazir Bhutto is the lifetime chairperson of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). The previous 
government was held by PPP with Benazir as prime minister. The PPP enjoys support in the 
rural areas of Pakistan. 
6 RMTRC’s terms of reference as suggested by an open letter to Prime Minister (August 28, 
1994) by the RMTRC. 
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It will be too naïve to say that Pakistan’s first generation of tax reform process 
was initiated only due to internal pressures. There were some significant 
external forces as well that helped initiate the reform process. 
 
  
2.1.2.1  Gulf War 
 
 
The Gulf war started in August 1990. Although Pakistan was not a direct 
stakeholder in this war, it indirectly put a lot of stress on government finances 
particularly on the budget and the balance of payments. According to Pasha et 
al. (1992) the cost of the Gulf war to the Government of Pakistan (GoP) is 
estimated at around PRs. 3 billion. This cost was incurred because of: (a) a 
higher oil import bill (over $600 million): (b) a decline in home remittances 
from Kuwait and Iraq (approximately $180 million); and (c) a decline in 
custom duties due to an export decline (PRs. 2 billion). These factors caused 
the budget deficit for (1990-91) to swell up to a historic high level of 8.8 
percent of the GDP and also resulted in a jump in inflation from six to 13 
percent. This resulted in a severe macroeconomic shock for the government 
(Pasha et al., 1992). 
  
 
2.1.2.2  International Monetary Fund 
 
 
From (1988-2001) Pakistan has been involved with seven different 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) programmes, four of which were short 
term and three multi-year arrangements (Independent Evaluation Office, 
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2002). The balance of payment crisis triggered by the Gulf war (as mentioned 
earlier) forced the government to borrow again from the IMF, initially under a 
one-year Stand-by Arrangement (SBA) that started in September 19937.  
 
There is no doubt about the fact that various IMF programmes brought 
significant structural adjustment reforms in the areas of tariff liberalization, 
and GST broad-basing that were similar in features to IMF reform 
programmes in other developing countries. As a result, these programmes 
were important to the interlocking tax reforms agenda within the economic 
agenda of various Pakistani governments during the decade of the 90s. 
However, it must be added that the IMF support role in the design and 
implementation of reform process was particularly significant in the design of 
GST/VAT taxation. This is also noted by the (Task Force on Tax 
Administration, 2001) according to which “(like) many developing countries 
the technology of VAT was transferred to Pakistan as a part of IMF 
stabilisation programme. It was exported and implemented in light of its 
advantages, i.e. in terms of “revenue buoyancy, a broad base consisting of 
most goods and services, neutrality as concerns both domestic and 
international trade and difficulties of evasion”.  
 
What is most noteworthy about the decade of the 90s is that it was the most 
politically unsettling decade, or the decade of institutional decay (Hussain, 
2004). Between 1988-2001, nine different governments came to power. Thus, 
what is remarkable and must be acknowledged is that despite political 
upheavals and government shuffling, the tax reform agenda managed to stay 
and run its course. The only plausible explanation for sustaining the reforms at 
such a time (in a country where these reforms have been aborted many times 
                                                 
7 Immediately before this, Pakistan had had two unsuccessful programs with the IMF. The 
first was a three-year Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) signed on Dec. 1988. The second 
was a year-long SBA arrangement which started in Dec. 1988. The first programme was 
completely aborted with zero funds withdrawn, while only 29 percent of total disbursement 
was withdrawn in the second arrangement. 
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for lesser reasons) appears to be the balance of payment crisis, the acute need 
for revenue mobilization and the IMF push factor. 
 
 
2.2 Nature and Direction of Tax Reforms 
 
 
After having discussed  the factors (both internal and external) that forced 
Pakistan to undertake the tax reform process, it is equally important to 
understand why these reforms took this particular form and shape  and what 
was responsible for this. In this regard, the role of the Resource Mobilisation 
and Tax Reform Commission (RMTRC) is pivotal and will now be discussed 
in detail.  
 
The Tax Reform Committee (TRC) (as mentioned earlier) was formulated 
early in 1990 by the government of Nawaz Sharif. However, while the TRC 
was mandated to undertake a comprehensive look at the current situation and 
identify bottlenecks, it lacked the powers to implement the identified reform 
process. The issue of dealing with the tax reform process was taken a step 
further with the establishment of the Resource Mobilization and Tax Reform 
Commission (RMTRC) in February 1991. The RMTRC was created with the 
purpose of not only outlining a revenue mobilization strategy and 
recommending improvements in tax laws but also for implementing these 
improvements.   
  
The commission was different from earlier committees and commissions of a 
similar nature, since it was mandated to work as an advisory group in close 
liaison with the Central Board of Revenue and the Ministry of Finance8. And 
                                                 
8 The Resource Mobilisation and Tax Reforms Commission Report, Government of Pakistan, 
August 1994. 
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by creating the RMTRC, the government had effectively bypassed the tax 
department by giving the responsibility for development of proposals and 
implementation of strategies (via provisions in the Finance Bills) to the 
RMTRC. The actual collection responsibilities were also shifted to the large 
public sector and corporate entities (Pasha, 1995).  
 
The RMTRC term of reference include 9the following objectives: 
 
a. To assist with the implementation of the recommendations of the  Tax 
Reform Committee 
b. To bring structural reforms in the following area(s): 
i. Excise Taxation by developing a workable capacity.  
ii. (to) Establish a fixed, or presumptive, tax system in direct taxes. 
iii. (to) Restructure the Custom Duties Collection system.  
iv. (to) Broaden and increase the tax base. 
c. To improve the overall tax system with the view of minimising 
discretion and simplifying procedures etc. 
d. To formulate other steps that can improve the federal and provincial 
finances. 
 
According to the RMTRC final report (1994) the basic objective of the tax 
reform process was to generate bigger tax resources while the motivation for 
the proposed reform was the acknowledgement from the government that it 
was facing a serious budgetary problem and that there was an urgent need to 
finance that burden. The RMTRC was of the opinion that the government was 
also aware that the best way forward was to increase revenues via domestic 
taxation as other sources of financing (such as seignorage revenue, internal 
and external borrowing) at this time were of limited use or had already been 
utilized to the maximum possible.  
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
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Although, revenue mobilisation was at the core of the tax reform agenda, there 
was an understanding that the resultant tax structure must be efficient, 
administratively feasible as well as equitable. And this was mentioned in 
numerous places in the Commission’s main report i.e. RMTRC (1994). For 
instance: 
 
• “…..above all it is also sought to provide a long-term vision of an 
efficient and just taxation system”10. 
  
• “….while giving due weight to the difficult problem of 
implementability, the Report does not lose sight of the central 
objectives of public policy, i.e. economic efficiency, equity and 
macroeconomic stability—and of the fact that the ultimate purpose of 
any meaningful tax reform is to raise the economic well being of the 
people, especially that of the least privileged in the society”.  
 
• “The central objective of the tax reforms is to raise bigger resources 
than the pre-reform situation so that the large budgetary deficits can be 
reduced in such a manner that the maxims of efficiency and equity are 
met…”  
 
• “While recognizing multiplicity of the sources of financing for public 
expenditure…the report regards taxation to be the basic instrument of 
public policy which alone is consistent with efficiency and equity”. 
 
• “In the field of indirect taxation, the basic objective is to move away 
from trade taxes to domestic taxes in an offsetting manner to prevent a 
                                                 
10  This one is taken from the open letter to the prime minister by RMTRC, Aug. 28, 1994.  
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reduction in public revenue while greater efficiency is achieved….The 
pursuit of these objectives will involve carrying out tariff reform, 
which aims to reduce the dispersion of the rates of nominal tariffs and 
to lower the nominal and effective rates of import tariffs, partly to 
simplify the tax laws and partly to discourage smuggling activity. 
Furthermore, a broad based value added tax imposed at the 
consumption stage should be introduced. And, an effort should be 
made to make indirect taxation relatively more equitable by a highly 
selective exemption of basic necessities, which are mainly consumed 
by the poor, and by taxing luxuries at a higher rate. However, it should 
be understood that indirect taxation is basically inequitable; it is no 
substitute for a properly designed system of direct taxation” 
 
• However, in several other places in the Commission report, there is 
also confusion and doubt about whether equity and efficiency goals 
can be met simultaneously. For instance: 
 “….(although) there is an inevitable trade-off between objectives; but 
in Pakistan’s present situation, what is equitable is also efficient”  
 
Thus, it is not an exaggeration to imply that  the RMTRC vision of tax reform 
for Pakistan included delivering a tax structure that would not only be revenue 
enhancing but one which would also encompass equity as a central pillar of 
reform process along with efficiency and administrative ease. 
  
 
2.3 Trends in Pakistan’s Public Finance: Before and After the Tax Reform 
process 
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2.3.1 Direct Taxes
11
 
 
Pakistan’s direct tax regime mainly comprises income and corporation tax12, 
which together constitute 90 percent of the total direct taxes. This discussion 
therefore will only focus on these two components.  
 
If we look at Figure 2.1, we can see that the contribution of direct taxes within 
total revenues over the years has been minuscule when compared to the share 
of indirect taxes within federal revenues. For instance, between 1980 to 1990 
direct tax shares averaged no more than two percent of GDP. According to the 
IMF (2004), this was primarily due to a narrow base, non-compliance and 
abundant use of tax concessions13. If we look at Figure 2.1 we can clearly see 
that the most significant increase in the share of direct taxes share came during 
the initial period of tax reform i.e. (1990-95) when direct tax share as a 
percentage of GDP increased to a historic high of 3.8 percent and by the time 
reforms ended, it had more or less steadied around this level. Thus on the 
surface it appears that a significant increase in direct tax revenues took place. 
But the real question is, how this increase was made possible.  
                                                 
11 The discussion on direct taxes has been purposely kept brief since the focus of this research 
is indirect taxes.  
12 For the purpose of income taxation, income is classified into six broad categories including 
salary, interest on securities, income (from house or business or profession), capital gains and 
income from other sources. 
13 Pakistan’s economy has a large informal sector estimated to be around at least a quarter of 
GDP. Additionally, service and agriculture sector representing 52 and 23 percent of GDP are 
taxed nominally (International Monetary Fund, 2004).  
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Figure 2.1: Pakistan Tax Revenue (1980-01) as percentage of GDP 
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According to Pasha (1995), at the start of the reform process the government 
was aware that for reforms to be successful this time around, the income tax 
department - which was also the main stakeholder - needed to be bypassed. 
The corruption of income tax officials and the humiliation suffered by tax 
payers at the hands of tax officials were no big secret as these problems had 
already been highlighted in an earlier National Tax and Reform Commission 
(NTRC, 1986) report (known as the ‘Qamar-ul-Islam’). The Qamar-ul-Islam 
report repeatedly stressed the need to create an atmosphere of mutual trust and 
cooperation and took serious note of indignity and humiliation faced by tax 
payers and the high handed behaviour of tax officials. According to this report, 
these problems were the most critical factors behind the underperformance of 
direct taxes and as a result this report called for “….simplifying the existing 
procedures and reducing occasions when the tax payers and the tax official 
came into contact with each other” (NTRC Final Report, 1986). Taking a 
serious note of NTRC (1986) report findings, the government bypassed the 
income tax department by setting up the RMTRC as the main body of reform, 
which was empowered to set up the strategy for revenue mobilisation and was 
also given powers to implement this strategy.  
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The direct tax reform process came in two phases: the first phase (1990-95) 
and the second one (1995-2000). The first phase included: 
  
a. Development of Withholding Taxes (WHT)14 or presumptive tax 
regime. 
b. Reduction in tax rates.  
 
As a consequence, the first stage facilitated the reform agenda by immediately 
incorporating steps that were revenue enhancing (i.e. WHT) and also 
effectively bypassed the income tax department as the collecting agent. The 
commission was aware that increasing the direct tax revenue in this manner 
was not the best way possible. But given the serious administrative 
bottlenecks, this was perhaps the only way to move forward at this time. 
 
Thus, if we look at Figure 2.1 we can see clearly that much of the increase in 
direct tax share during the reform process came during the first phase of 
reforms. According to the (International Monetary Fund, 2001; Pasha, 1995; 
Khan, 1997) the factor responsible for almost the entire increase in the direct 
tax collection over the decade of 1990 has been the steady expansion of the 
WHT collection regime. And this can be more easily identified if we look at 
Table 2.5 which classifies income tax revenues into its three components15. 
The contribution of WHT in the total income tax revenue in (1990-91) was 
only 47 percent; by (1995-96) this had jumped to a staggering 64 percent and 
by the end of the reform process had dropped to 53 percent. While collection 
                                                 
14  Section 50 of Income Ordinance of Pakistan, 1979, contains the provisions for payment of 
tax before assessment. It is called deduction at source and commonly known as withholding 
tax (WHT), (Choudhry, 2001). 
15 Income tax components include: (a) Collection on demand refers to collection made through 
audit; (b) Voluntary payments are made on five different dates i.e. each quarter of the income 
year on the basis of anticipated annual income and final payment at the time of annual return 
of income; (c) Withholding Taxes (WHT) are essentially in the nature of advance tax 
payments (or essentially deduction at source) and very similar to the indirect taxes (since their 
payment constitutes  a final discharge of tax liability).  
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on demand (which actually reflected the department’s own effort) was only 22 
percent in (1990-91), this declined to a historic low of 13 percent by (1995-96) 
and to a mediocre 16 percent by the end of the reform process. The third 
component i.e. voluntary payments failed to offset the decline in collection in 
demand over the years, thus representing another administrative failure.  
 
Table 2.5: Components of Income Tax (as % of total income tax) 
Components of Income Tax  
(as a percentage of total income tax) 
 
 1990-91 1995-96 1998-99 2001-02 
Collection on Demand 22 % 13% 16% 15% 
Payment with Return 31 % 23% 18% 33% 
Deduction at Source (WHT) 47% 64% 66% 52% 
Source: Author’s own calculation using CBR Year Books. 
 
 
 
As described earlier the first phase of direct tax reform process included two 
main steps: (a) extension of the WHT regime; (b) reduction in tax rates (for 
instance see Table 2.7). The major policy shift came during the reform process 
when the government (through the Finance Bill in 1991) for the first time 
announced a tax rate reduction path for the next five years. The main aim was 
to facilitate investors and to make the future timeline known so as to remove 
uncertainty related to tax rates. The strategy was to ultimately reduce all the 
top rates by (1997-98), including the individual maximum income tax rate to 
35 percent; for banking companies the reduction was envisaged from 66 
percent to 55 percent; for public companies 44 percent to 30 percent and for 
other companies from 55 percent to 40 percent. By end of the decade of 1990s 
the rates stood at 58 percent for banks, 47.3 percent for private companies, 
45.2 percent for public companies, 38.5 percent for individuals and 30 percent 
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for individuals with salary-based incomes (International Monetary Fund, 
2001; Pasha, 1995).  
 
 
 
 
The second phase of direct tax reform started in the middle of 1990s and was 
aimed at addressing serious structural weaknesses in the direct tax system. 
According to the RMTRC (1994) the main reform components included: 
 
1. Expanding the tax net by including other activities particularly agriculture, 
capital gains, services, and informal sector. 
2. Eliminating all or most of the tax expenditure and tax holidays. 
3. Moving away from the presumptive taxes to more adequate and systematic 
taxation of personal and corporate incomes. 
 
It has to be admitted that the agenda for the second phase of income tax 
reform was much more complicated as it tried to address issues of reform in 
order to have a long-term impact on revenues rather than the short-term 
revenue mobilisation achieved under the first phase. But reforms during the 
second phase at best remained partial. For instance, although the commission 
did highlight the imperative to extend and broaden the income tax base by 
bringing in agriculture income and corporate gains within the tax net, the 
government found it very hard to carry this through due to political reasons.  
 
In conclusion, direct tax reforms were able to bring an immediate increase in 
tax revenues but most of the increased tax revenue came from the expansion 
of the withholding taxes. For instance, in 1990-91, direct taxes were 
contributing around 1.9 percentage of GDP, this increased to 3.8 percent in 
1995-96 and settled down to 3.7 percent towards the end of decade. Since 
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revenues by WHT are not progressive, this did not add much needed 
progressivity to direct taxes.  
 
Also the envisaged progressivity of the direct tax system failed to materialize 
as the broadening of direct taxes and the expansion supposed to address the 
structural features of the direct tax regime (such as agriculture tax and 
corporate profits etc.) failed to materialize. Thus, even though revenues 
increased in the short run, the direct taxes performance in the long run 
remained lacklustre at best. We can say that the resultant direct tax structure 
failed to adequately address the concerns envisaged by the commission 
regarding enhancing the progressivity of direct tax system. This makes 
distributional concerns related to the incidence of indirect taxation even more 
important because in the case of Pakistan we can no longer rely on the 
conventional wisdom of addressing progressivity issues via direct taxes only. 
  
 
2.3.2 Indirect Taxes 
 
 
Pakistan’s taxation policy over the years can be marked with excessive 
reliance on indirect taxes. For instance if we look at Table 2.2 we can see that 
in (1990-91) almost 82 percent of total federal tax revenues came from 
indirect taxes. By the mid-1990s, indirect taxes contribution to total federal 
taxes slightly reduced to 73 percent and by the end of reform process, indirect 
taxes were contributing around 65 percent of total federal taxes. Not only has 
the contribution of indirect taxes to the overall federal taxes been changing, 
but a significant change has taken place in terms of how this revenue is being 
generated. For instance, in 1990-91 almost 55 percent of total indirect taxes 
were coming from custom revenues followed by excise and sales tax at 28 and 
18 percent respectively. During the middle of the reform process (1995-96), 
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even though custom duties still remained the dominant source of indirect tax 
revenues, this contribution had declined to 47 percent while excises and sales 
tax were both contributing around 26 percent respectively. However, by the 
end of the reform process, revenues from GST had surpassed all the other 
sources. For instance, in 2001-02 GST was contributing an unprecedented 64 
percent of total indirect tax revenues followed by both customs and excises at 
18 percent each. Thus, we can see a remarkable change in how the indirect tax 
revenues were being generated over time and this is discussed in the following 
sections. 
  
 
2.3.2.1  Custom Duties 
16
  
 
 
It would not be wrong to say that Pakistan’s tariff and trade reform process 
started much earlier than the 1990s and it can be divided into two main phases. 
The first phase of import liberalization was initiated in the middle of the 1980s 
with recommendation from National Tax Reform Commission (NTRC), 
(1986) which lasted about ten years and the second phase of reform process 
started in the middle of 1990s with the establishment of Tariff Reform 
Commission (TRC) in 1996 which lasted until 2001-02. 
 
Historically, import taxes in Pakistan were primarily raised for revenue 
generation and to promote industrialization based on import substitution 
policy. As expected, this policy resulted in a large-scale diversion of resources 
and created a strong anti-export bias by creating extremely high and distorted 
                                                 
16 Since import tariff and non-tariff barriers are the prime source of custom duties, discussion 
here only focuses on these taxes.  
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tariff structure that led to rampant smuggling and inefficient resource 
allocation17 (Pasha, 1995).   
 
After 1990, there was a major policy shift in trade policy toward trade 
liberalization and tariff reform was deemed essential for reducing protection in 
the import-substituting industries, as well as for encouraging export promotion 
and reducing smuggling (RMTRC, 1994). Furthermore, compared to the first 
phase of reform, this phase was not envisaged to be revenue neutral as it was 
seen as a part of the overall tax reform strategy where revenue loss from the 
declining importance of trade taxes would be compensated by the increasing 
importance of domestic tax; GST/VAT (RMTRC, 1994). Thus, as a result of 
this reform process, tariff revenue contribution as a proportion of indirect 
taxes exhibited a steep decline during the decade of 1990s (World Bank, 
2004). For instance, tariff revenue as a percentage of indirect tax declined 
from around 46 percent in 1990-91 to only 15 percent in 2001-02. However, 
these tariff cuts were not offset by an increase in the share of imports to GDP 
which maintained more or less the same trend (World Bank, 2004). As a 
result, tariff revenue as a share of GDP also fell from around 5 percentage of 
GDP in 1990-91 to 1.7 percent in 2001-02 (also see, Figure 2.2).  
 
                                                 
17 These issues have been discussed in preceding paragraphs.  
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Figure 2.2: Pakistan Major Tax Components (1980-01) as percentage of GDP 
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
10.0
11.0
1980-81 1984-85 1988-89 1992-93 1996-97 2000-01
Direct taxes Custom Duties Excise Duties
Sales Tax Indirect Taxes
 
 33 
 
 
a. First phase of custom duty reform (1986-1995) 
  
Pakistan pre-reform custom duty structure suffered from very high rates and a 
narrow base. The tariff structure was highly dispersed. For instance, in the 
middle of the 1980s, the structure of ad valorem tariff rate ranged from 10 to 
350 percent. There were 17 different duty slabs; almost 40 percent of imports 
were facing 0-10 percent, 32 percent import under 10-50, 22 percent import 
under 50-100, and 0.6 percent import under 100 plus percent tariff slab 
(NTRC, 1986).  
 
A large number of imported items were also under quantitative restrictions 
(QR) with an equally large number of items placed on an exhaustive negative 
list (i.e. items subject to import ban/quantitative restrictions). For instance, in 
1984-85, there were almost 1,000 items on the negative list: 22 percent items 
classified as totally prohibited; 16 percent as partially prohibited and 10 
percent as restricted items (NTRC, 1986).  
 
The underlying tax base was very narrow due to a plethora of 
exemptions/concessions that existed on the basis of type of end use, 
geographical location or nature of importer. For instance, in 1984-85 despite 
high rates, duty free imports made up almost 45 percent of total imports in the 
country!  
 
Thus, high tariff rates with a narrow tax base meant that tax rates had to be 
further raised in order to meet the revenue requirements. This was done by the 
 34 
introduction of para-tariffs18 (for instance, see Table 2.9). However, this 
cascading effect was leading to even higher tariff rates that was not only 
increasing the cost of imported items but also creating other unintended 
distortions in the economy (such as smuggling19, misreporting of imports etc.) 
(NTRC,1986).  
 
Table 2.6: Para-tariffs (in percentage): A Brief Overview  
 Import Surcharges IQRA surcharge
20
 
 
Import Licensing fee 
 
Total 
1980-81 0 0 2 2 
1982-83 5 0 2 7 
1985-86 5 5 2 12 
1987-88 7 5 4 16 
1990-91 10 5 6 21 
1991-92 10 5 6 21 
1992-93 0 5 6 11 
1993-94 0 5 6 11 
Source: Table 2.11: Import and Iqra Surcharges and Import License Fees (percent of c & f values), 
Kemal et al., 1994 
 
 
Similarly, various ad hoc arrangements adopted haphazardly over time 
resulted in a tariff structure that no longer cascaded (i.e. higher rates of duties 
were not applied with increasing levels of processing) (NTRC, 1986). For 
instance, machinery (mechanical) had an effective rate of 28 percent; iron and 
steel which were the raw material for it, had an accompanied tariff rate of 57 
percent (NTRC, 1986).  
 
                                                 
18 Para-tariffs fall within the category of import surcharges and taxes including internal 
charges and taxes. These are considered as additional charges and taxes not directly related to 
the services rendered in import-export transactions (Hoekman et al., 2000).   
19 Smuggling emerged as a serious problem in Pakistan in the early 1980s as most prohibited 
or non-prohibited items were freely available in the country. This led to a thriving market 
business called BARA market which is an informal name in Pakistan for markets dealing with 
smuggled goods. By middle of 1980s, there were at least 11 BARA type markets in Karachi, 
12 in Balochistan, 16 in Punjab and 14 in NWFP and the adjacent areas (NTRC, 1986).  
20 IQRA surcharge is an import surcharge. It was first introduced under the Finance Act of 
1986. Levy from this surcharge is earmarked for education expenditure (Ahmad and Stern, 
1991).  
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Thus, NTRC (1986) considered it an opportune time to “redefine” the tax 
policy objectives in the area of trade taxes and underlined a comprehensive 
reform strategy 21 mainly focused on the rationalization of the existing 
structure. Some of the salient recommendations of the Commission are given 
below:  
 
• Removal of all exemptions (except charitable exemptions). 
• Reduction in the rates of duty. 
•  A shift should be made from specific to Ad Valorem duty rates 
particularly for those items that are not prone to smuggling and under-
reporting.  
• Tariff structure must be cascaded.  
• All imports and importers must be treated similarly.  
• Duty slabs over time must be reduced to 5 applicable slabs (10, 20, 40, 
80 and 100 percent) with basic rate not exceeding; 20 percent for duty 
on plant, machinery, basic raw materials for capital and consumer 
goods; 40 percent for consumer goods; 100 percent for luxury 
consumer goods; and 40-80 percent for consumer durable items.  
• Custom duty surcharge must be abolished and maybe merged into the 
proposed tariff structure. 
 
However, while trying to achieve these objectives, the process of tariff 
rationalization was somewhat constrained by concerns over limiting the 
revenue impact of tariff changes (ADB, 1999). This was due to the fact that 
tariff reforms after 1990 were simultaneously undertaken with ongoing 
reforms to broaden domestic taxation (GST) and income taxes. As a result 
pace of trade tax reforms largely depended on how quickly these other 
                                                 
21 A large part of first phase of reform was of administrative nature as it dealt with custom 
valuation concepts, procedures and their application to Pakistan. Since administrative reforms 
are not the focus of this study, these are not discussed here.  
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resources could be mobilized (however, by looking at Figure 2.2 we can see 
that income tax mobilization did not happen until middle of 1990s while 
GST/VAT mobilization happened even later than that). As a result during 
early years of 1990 tariff reforms process were mostly put on a hold.  
 
However, some tariff rationalization steps were taken. These included: (a) the 
negative list was drastically reduced to 75 items, as 724 items were removed 
from the negative list from 1983-84 to 1993-94 (Kemal and Siddiqui, 2002); 
(b) removal of most QR by 1993 (Kemal and Siddiqui, 2002); (c) import 
licensing scheme was gradually eliminated by 1993 (World Trade 
Organization, 1995); and (d) by 1992-93 the maximum rate of protection was 
brought down to 80 percent. But on the other side, revenue considerations 
sometimes reversed this process. For instance, during the time when tariff 
rationalization was being undertaken, Paratariffs reached a historic high of 21 
percent in order to mitigate loss of revenues (see for instance Table 2.9).  
 
Thus, tariff reforms during this period made very limited or no headway on 
some critical areas flagged in the NTRC (1986) reform strategy; these 
included exemptions, cascading of tariff structure, smuggling etc. For 
instance, the share of exempted import items within total imports between 
1986 to1991 rose from 45 to 48 percent. Only one SRO relating to public 
transport (the yellow cab scheme) is estimated to cost the exchequer almost 
PRs. 12 billion (Pasha and Iqbal, 1994). Additionally, smuggling still 
remained a massive problem due to high tariff and paratariff structure, 
according to one estimate it was around PRs. 100 billion in 1992-93 (PIDE, 
1993).  
 
 
b. Second phase of reforms 
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The second phase of trade and tariff reforms can be marked with the 
establishment of Tariff Reform Commission in 1996, which was primarily 
established to take forward the reforms agenda highlighted by the NTRC 
(1986) while keeping it in line with the overall tax reform strategy of RMTRC. 
The pace of this reform process was much faster than before due to revenue 
mobilization from the side of direct taxes and GST/VAT. 
 
The tariff reform process followed during this time was “top down” where top 
normal rates are reduced by pushing more and more tariff lines into lower rate 
categories (World Bank, 2004). This resulted in un-weighted average custom 
duty rates coming further down from around 42 percent in 1996-97 to around 
20 percent in 2001-02 (see Figure 2.3). 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Tariff Trend (1980-2001) 
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Additionally, during the same time the number of tariff slabs was drastically 
reduced. Between 1996 and 1998, tariff slabs were reduced from 14 to 6 and 
eventually by 2001-02 to only 4 (World Bank, 2004). Furthermore, along with 
the reduction in the top rates and duty slabs, good progress was made in the 
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reduction of duty rate dispersion (World Trade Organization, 2005); see for 
instance Figure 2.4. Furthermore, 99 percent of remaining tariffs are now ad-
valorem, which are more transparent than other tariffs (World Trade 
Organization, 2005).  
 
Figure 2.4: Distribution of MFN Tariff rate, 1996-97 – 2001-2 
 
 
Similarly, Paratariffs were integrated into the statutory tariff schedule without 
increasing the maximum rate in the later part of the 1990s (International 
Monetary Fund, 2001). According to ADB (1999), the negative list by 2001-
02 was also reduced to 68 items22 (from 214 items in 1989) and the remaining 
import restrictions are mainly based on health, security, environment, and 
                                                 
22 But few items on this list are still maintained to offer protection to local producers. These 
include restriction on textiles (including cotton fabrics, carpets, knitwear, bed linen and other 
textile floor covering) (Asian Development Bank, 1999).  
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religious reasons23. A significant headway has been made in the reduction of 
duty free imports. For instance, from 2001/02 no tariff lines are duty free and 
the lowest tariff rate has been raised to 5 percent (World Trade Organization, 
2005). This is a clear break from the past as prior to this change, in 1996-97,  4 
percent of the tariff lines were duty free and five times more in 1996-97 
(World Trade Organization, 2005).  
 
Thus, at the end we can say that the commission envisaged the declining 
importance of trade taxes within the indirect taxes because these taxes were 
deemed smuggling prone, leading to misallocation of resources and causing 
substantial revenue losses. As a result, substantial reform process that has 
taken place is primarily aimed reducing the role of trade taxes within the 
overall tax revenue of Pakistan. 
 
 
2.3.2.2  Sales Tax 
 
 
Sales tax in Pakistan was introduced in pre-partition time. In the Punjab 
province, it was introduced in 1941 while in the province of Sindh in 1947. 
Initially, it was a provincial tax in accordance with the provisions of the 
Government of India Act, 1935. However, in 1951 sales tax on goods was 
permanently shifted to the federal list. The Sales Tax Act of 1951 which 
replaced the Sales Tax Act of 1948, introduced a single stage manufacturer tax 
imposed on imports and on domestic production with a standard rate of 12.5 
percent (CBR Yearbook, various years). 
 
                                                 
23 According to Asian Development Bank (1999) there are still at least 28 non-trade barriers 
aimed at protecting local producers.  
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During the years before the reform, the sales tax was a minor tax. For instance, 
in 1986-87 sales tax was responsible for less than 10 percent of total federal 
taxes or less than one percent of GDP. The reason for this lacklustre 
performance was that the sales tax regime was riddled with numerous 
exemptions which resulted in a very narrow tax base. For example, according 
to Ahmad and Stern (1991), the number of sales tax exemptions in the mid-80s 
was fairly large as it included around 300 tariff headings and 19 broad 
categories of domestically produced goods. Additionally, the sales tax regime 
was operated much like a surcharge on excise duties or a trade tax with a large 
proportion of sales tax collection coming from the import side. According to 
the International Monetary Fund (2001) this tax was highly distortionary, 
difficult to administer, and unsuccessful in raising much revenue. 
 
The motivation for Sales Tax reform, according to Commission’s (1994) 
report came from: 
 
(a) Need to maintain revenue neutrality as a result of trade and tariff reforms 
(as mentioned in the earlier section). 
(b) Distributional concerns 
(c) VAT superiority over Sales tax 
(d) Export promotion 
(e) Documentation of the economy24 
 
As according to the Commission (1994) report: 
  
• “…furthermore, contrary to popular perceptions, a move away from 
Custom Duties and Excise duties towards a General Sales Tax (GST) 
                                                 
24 Here it means creating more incentive to either keep activities in the formal sector or 
increasing benefit of bringing activities within the formal sector of the economy. 
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or a VAT can contribute to making the tax system less regressive”, (pp. 
31). 
 
• “It has been shown that a VAT imposed at low rates and with 
exemptions accorded to the goods consumed by the poor – and when 
combined with excise duties on luxury goods—will make the tax 
system mildly progressive”, (pp. 47). 
 
• “Tax system in Pakistan is by and large inequitable and violates the 
dictates of horizontal and vertical equity…….furthermore, import 
taxes and excise duties (which are mostly regressive) occupy the centre 
stage in indirect taxation as opposed to sales tax (which are essentially 
neutral with respect of incidence)”, (pp. 37).  
 
• “…in this connection, one of the maxims of optimal taxation may be 
kept in view – given the acceptable level of efficiency cost, taxes 
imposed on income-inelastic items of expenditure produce more 
revenue than those levied on income-elastic items, of course on the 
understanding that the income-inelastic commodities consumed by the 
poor will be exempted from tax. As for the rate structure, the reformed 
tax system will, by definition, carry much lower and undifferentiated 
rates than is the case now”, (pp. 42). 
 
However, some confusion can be seen from commission reports regarding the 
distributional impact of GST. For instance: 
 
• “Introducing a consumption based VAT, its adverse effects on equity 
should be offset by corrective reforms in direct and indirect taxes”, 
(pp. 41). 
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• “VAT of whatever kind is primarily a revenue-raising device, and is 
administratively effective only when its rate structure is by and large 
simple and differentiated. The equity objective will, therefore, be 
mainly achieved by raising a share of genuine direct tax”, (pp. 48). 
 
A major change in the sales tax regime came in 1990-91, with the passage of 
Sales Tax Act of 1990 by the Parliament. This led to the imposition of a 
variant of Value Added Tax (VAT) known as the General Sales Tax (GST)25. 
GST was initially levied at the import and manufacturing stages. The Sales 
Tax Act of 1990 imposed a sales tax at the rate of 12.5 percent on imported 
goods and on the value added at each stage of production, from production 
through retail level and on goods manufactured or sold in Pakistan. Although 
the federal government could only charge sales tax on goods26, this regime 
was extended to incorporate several services. And in some case revenue from 
services subject to central excise duty is collected as it were sales tax27 (State 
Bank of Pakistan, 2005).  
 
The GST regime at the start, like its predecessors (trade and tariff regime) was 
riddled with exemptions28. Thus, even when between 1991-93 GST was levied 
                                                 
25 This included replacement of the traditional administrative structures by separate functions 
of audit, assessment, enforcement, arbitration and monitoring. In addition to this, domestic 
sales tax collection was transferred from central excise collectorates to the newly established 
collectorates for sales tax (Refaqat, 2003). 
26 The Federal Legislative list (item no. 49 of the Fourth Schedule) of the constitution provides 
for levy of tax on sales and purchase of goods, but not on services. The Sales tax act, 1990 
accordingly is applicable only to supply of goods. Services are, therefore, considered to be a 
provincial subject. In the case of eleven services (hotels; caterers; clubs, agents; radio and 
televisions advertisement; custom agents; ship chandlers; stevedores; courier services; beauty 
parlours; laundries, and dry cleaners; Provincial ordinance have been promulgated authorizing 
the Federal Government to collect tax on services as if under the Sales tax Act, 1990 (State 
Bank of Pakistan, 2005). 
27 These include telephone/telegraph/telex/fax; advertisement on TV; travel by air/train; 
shipping agents. 
28 The GST revenues in the early years of reform also did not increase because of a system of 
geographical (i.e. granted on the basis of promotion of selective industries) and developmental 
exemptions (i.e. granted to the backward areas of the country). Geographical exemptions 
included areas such as Special Industrialized Zones (SIZ) encompassing areas such as Gadoon 
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on 59 additional industries the revenue impact of this inclusion and also of 
shifting to the GST regime (for the first three years) was almost negligible 
(Pasha, 1995). The main reason for this was that, at the same time, the 
government exempted 120 additional locally produced goods, including 
agriculture products, raw products, semi-manufactured goods, petroleum, 
electricity, pharmaceuticals, fertilizers, motor vehicles, toys, etc. (International 
Monetary Fund, 2001). A significant step in the right direction was made in 
the budget of 1994-95 when the government eliminated 266 exemptions. 
Further broadening occurred when in August 1999 GST was extended to 
lucrative sectors such as petroleum products, natural gas, and electricity 
(International Monetary Fund, 2001).  
 
It must be added that the initial years GST expansion into the retail sector met 
with fierce resistance (International Monetary Fund, 2001). According to 
International Monetary Fund (2001) during the initial years GST was 
deliberately kept restricted to the manufacturing and import stage for 
administrative and collection ease. Although its extension to the retail sector 
was being contemplated by the middle of the 1990s in order to bring the GST 
in line with the true essence of VAT, the government opted to introduce small 
changes at a time29. In 1996-97, the government announced that the retail 
sector will be brought into the GST net but this announcement was met by 
fierce tax payer resistance. As a result, the government imposed a turnover tax 
                                                                                                                                
and Amazai, and a large part of (province) NWFP and (province) Balochistan. Most of these 
geographical exemptions persisted until the middle of 1990’s but automatically expired by the 
end of the decade of 1990s. But exemptions granted to backward areas such as Provincial and 
Federal Administered Tribal Areas as well as Northern Areas still exist. Thus, the impact of 
gradual elimination of standard, geographical and developmental exemptions along with broad 
basing has been felt within the GST regime over time as GST revenues in the later part of the 
1990s increased sharply. For example, sales tax as a percent of total federal taxes was around 
15 percent in (1990-91). This steadily increased to 19 percent by (1995-96). The real jump 
came in (1998-99) when sales tax revenue as a percent of total federal taxes increased to 23 
percent.   
 
29 For instance, GST broadening in (1994-95) was not without its consequences as inclusion of 
266 additional items within GST net met with strikes by the business community. This forced 
the government to temporarily suspend GST collection from additional items (Ahmed, 1997) 
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of three percent on the retail sector instead. Unyielding tax payer resistance 
and implementation problems forced the government to replace this turnover 
tax in April 1998, with a system of fixed fees, called enrolment certificates, 
which were to be monitored by the retail association themselves. However, 
this move was not effective from a revenue point of view: the government 
abandoned this scheme and again took up the issue of extending GST on the 
retail sector. The second time around ( July 1998), the government legally 
imposed GST on the retail sector, but as a result of massive and expected 
nationwide strikes, postponed enforcement till May 2000. In May 2000 
retailers were granted an option to pay a two percent turnover tax in lieu of 
GST up to (end) June 2001 and this time the government stood its ground.  
 
There is no question that Pakistan has carried successful General Sales Tax 
reform in the past decade or so as at the end of reform process in 2001-02 
revenues from GST as a percentage of federal taxes stood at 41 percent 
compared to 15 percent at the start of the reform process. Thus, as far as the 
issue of maintaining revenue neutrality (due to trade taxes reform) is 
concerned, the sales tax reform filled this gap.  
 
But perhaps a more relevant question here is whether these reforms were 
implemented in keeping with the RMTRC reform agenda or resulted in 
something quite different. There is no question that something close to the 
spirit of VAT was envisaged by RMTRC; a tax that was broad based but fair 
and where fairness issues was explicitly dealt by exempting those goods that 
are predominantly  consumed by the poor and by maintaining a low tax rate. 
These questions can not be answered alone by reviewing the policy documents 
or the overall revenue patterns. Thus, one chapter of this study will try to 
answer all these questions related to GST: (a) Distributional affect of GST in 
post and pre-reform time; (b) What is being consumed by the poor in Pakistan; 
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and (c) How well placed are GST exemptions? And are these really benefiting 
the poor? 
  
 
2.3.2.3  Excise Duties 
 
 
Excise duties have historically been the second largest source of revenue for 
Pakistan after custom duties. In 1985-86, excise revenue was equivalent to 2.5 
percent of GDP and before the start of the reform process excises were 
yielding around 2.2 percent of GDP (see for example Figure 2.2). Excises 
have always been levied on only a limited number of goods and as a result 
revenue pattern has been highly skewed (Iqbal and Pasha, 1994).  
 
According to the RMTRC (1994) report, excise tax reforms attempted to 
broaden the base30 and in some cases increase the tax rates31 32. The reform 
agenda has attempted to introduce capacity taxation in key industries. This 
was done via formulation of a special Capacity Taxation Committee (CTC). 
The move to capacity taxation was expected to stimulate production activities 
in industries33 and to reduce corruption and harassment of tax payers at the 
hands of tax officials (RMTRC, 1994). However, CTC committee found it 
extremely hard to arrive at a consistent formula for fixing the tax base for 
individual units in various industries (Iqbal and Pasha, 1994). As a result, this 
measure was only carried out in the cement industry due to relative 
                                                 
30 Excise duties broad-basing over the years has led to targeting of service utilities (telephone), 
bank advances, unprocessed fiber, sugar and petroleum (RMTRC, 1994; International 
Monetary Fund, 2004). 
31 In 1991-92, specific rate was increased on bank cheques while ad valorem rates were raised 
on hotels and television adds (RMTRC, 1994).  
32 Excise duty rate of 25 percent was levied on telephone bills for this first time in the Finance 
Act of 1991. In 1992, this rate was increased to 60 percent which led to massive loss of 
revenue from this head due to leakage as a result of such high rates. Thus, in 1993 rates were 
again brought down to 35 percent.  
33 As the marginal tax rate in this system with respect to output is zero. 
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homogeneity of output and later it was even withdrawn from this industry 
(Iqbal and Pasha, 1994).  
 
As far as taxation of goods under excises is concerned, over the years a 
conscious policy attempt has been made to limit excises to few revenue heads 
as is the case in most developed countries. The main aim has been to ease 
administration and monitoring burden by focusing on key industries. As a 
result, the excise duty focus with regards to taxation of goods over time has 
been narrowed. For instance, five goods constituted 73 percent of total excises 
in 1990-91 but this increased to 82 percent in 2001-0234. 
 
One specific interesting development over time has been the extension of 
excises to service sector, and particularly to those services where GST/VAT 
extension has not been possible. Along with broad-basing to levy excise duty 
to some services (see Box 2.1), excise duty rates have also gone through 
frequent change over the years, usually announced in Government annual 
budget.  
 
Box 3.1 : Levy of Excise duty on Services 
 
i. Services subject to Central Excise duty: 
This includes advertising, insurance, shipping and travelling agents. 
 
ii. Services subject to Central Excise duty which is collected as if it were sales tax 
This includes domestic travel by air, by train (AC parlour or first class sleeper 
only), carriage of goods by air, telephone/telegraph/telex and fax services etc. 
 
 
                                                 
34 These five goods in 1990-91 and 2001-02 included cigarettes, beverages, POL products, 
cement and sugar (but sugar in 2001-02 was replaced by natural gas) (CBR Yearbooks, 
various years). 
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It would not be wrong to say that the role of central excise duty (CED) under 
the current taxation structure of Pakistan is envisaged to be one that aids sales 
tax extension to service sector (which is not directly possible without 
constitutional amendment). A conscious policy effort over time has been made 
to restrict excise duties to few selected items in order to ease administrative 
burden. These policies have led to a sharp decline in the collection of excise 
duties over time from around 2.2 percent of GDP prior to reform process to 
only 1.7 percent of GDP at the end of reform process.  
 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
 
The main aim of this chapter has been to provide a summary of what has 
happened to the federal taxation structure of Pakistan due to the tax reform of 
the 1990s and also to point out various factors that initiated and helped the 
reform process stay its course along with providing an overview of reform 
agenda particularly with regards to equity and distributional concerns.  
 
Although, Pakistan’s tax system has undergone profound changes during the 
decade of the nineties, despite these changes tax revenue in relation to GDP 
has remained fairly stagnant. For instance, federal tax revenue as percentage 
of GDP in 1990-91 (i.e. also the start of first generation of tax reform process) 
was 12.6 percent and by the end of the reform process in 2001-02, the ratio 
remained almost unchanged.  
 
The type of tax reform followed in Pakistan largely followed from trade 
liberalization and focused on replacing dependence on trade tax revenues with 
domestic taxation such as GST/VAT. It would not be wrong to say that the 
government was able to successfully reduce and replace revenues from trade 
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taxes with GST/VAT revenues, but this led to several problems. First, the pace 
of these reforms led to inherent sequencing problem, as trade and tariff 
reforms were carried out at a faster pace compared to GST reforms. The 
resultant gap was haphazardly filled by (a) increasing reliance on the WHT 
regime of direct taxes35 and (b) by a uniform expansion of GST on all goods 
without undertaking any careful analysis of extension in some cases (such as 
sugar, edible oils, kerosene oil etc.) met with the Commission’s intention of 
introducing an equitable and just reform process. Thus, perhaps Pakistan’s tax 
reform experience highlights the fact that issues related to equity did occupy a 
central place in the stated reform strategy but this concern could not be 
translated into specific actions/measures when policy was actually being 
implemented. Furthermore, it is also highlighted that as far as direct taxes 
were concerned, it appeared that government agenda largely focused on issues 
that addressed short-term revenue needs while more fundamental, structural 
and perhaps painful reforms were largely put off. 
  
Although discussion in this chapter has tried to highlight (where possible) 
where tax reform steps or the resultant changes may not be in line with the 
equity and fairness vision of the tax reform Commission, most of these 
questions cannot be answered only by reviewing the official documents or the 
overall revenue patterns. Although discussion in this chapter has helped set out 
the overall picture, yet a detailed and careful empirical analysis is required to 
answer these questions, which this study intends to do. Moreover, since a 
similar type of reform process was also followed in many other developing 
countries, this study should be considered as a case study of the type of 
reforms carried out in several developing countries. 
  
                                                 
35 According to the Independent Evaluation Office (2002) “while the reduction of tariffs and 
other taxes on international trade was relatively fast, it took much longer for the GST 
instituted in 1990 to yield a comparable revenue” (pp.125). 
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The next chapter will provide an overview of approaches and models that have 
been used to carry out tax incidence analysis particularly in the context of 
developing countries. And it will also try to establish the best possible 
approach that can be used given the question in hand and data availability for 
Pakistan.  
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CHAPTER III:  Literature Review 
 
 
3 Introduction 
 
 
 
One of the essential goals of government policy is to address inequalities in 
the distribution of income and to make an attempt to improve the welfare of 
the poor. Thus, an important part of theory and practice of public finance is 
dedicated to better understanding and measuring of how revenue and 
expenditure side of Government policy affects the distribution of income and 
welfare of households (Martinez-Vazquez, 2007). This is the area of tax 
incidence, which deals with impact of taxes on the distribution of welfare 
within a society, of critical importance within the field of public economics.  
 
It has to be accepted from the start that the analysis of tax incidence is far from 
simple. The diversity and the richness of the problem comes from the fact that 
although tax incidence appears to be a deceptively simple question, as soon as 
we realize that the person who is legally obligated to pay the taxes may not be 
the one who ultimately ends up bearing the burden of the tax complexity 
arises. Because this means in order to ascertain the correct tax incidence we 
need to know how private markets respond to taxes but this knowledge 
requires a vast amount of information on consumers preferences, technology, 
etc. which is not available (Martinez-Vazquez, 2007).  
 
As a result, every tax incidence study varies in complexity depending on what 
is being asked and the set of assumptions used to drive out the key element of 
that study (Martinez-Vazquez, 2007). Even where there is similarity between 
studies in terms of country being assessed the answers tend to vary a great deal 
because of the time at which such analysis was undertaken, data used, tax 
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instruments covered etc. Hence, it can be admitted that generally no two tax 
incidence studies are the same and this makes the job of inferring a conclusive 
theme from such studies in this chapter quite difficult.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of methodological 
view of approaches/measures/other issues related to tax incidence analysis at 
household level in developing countries. The first section will discuss the 
partial equilibrium tax incidence approach, its limitations and how some of the 
fundamental concerns with this approach have been addressed by researchers. 
The second section of this chapter will try to summarize the evidence from tax 
incidence studies. The third and fourth sections of this chapter will attempt to 
highlight how tax incidence analysis has tried to inform policy concerned with 
normative issue of how social welfare should be maximised. The last section 
concludes. 
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3.1 SECTION I:  Partial Equilibrium Tax Incidence Analysis 
 
 
The purpose of this section is to highlight that the choice of the tax incidence 
approach used for analysis fundamentally depends on the question being 
asked. If the question is distributional analysis, partial equilibrium tax 
incidence analysis is adequate. However, this does not mean such is free from 
limitations. Thus, the aim of this section is to show relative difficulty of 
estimating partial equilibrium tax incidence analysis and to show how these 
difficulties have been mitigated (in the light of literature survey) by 
researchers in order to get around some of the fundamental problem of 
difficulties attached to this approach. 
  
 
 3.1.1 Tax Incidence approach but which one? 
 
 
The broad methodology used in the tax incidence analysis can generally be 
divided into three basic approaches; first, partial-equilibrium or micro-data 
based incidence analysis (such as Pechman and Okner, 1974; Musgrave, Case 
and Leonard, 1974), static computable general equilibrium (CGE) models36 
(such as Harberger, 1962; Shoven and Whalley, 1984) and quite recently 
dynamic computable general equilibrium models following either the 
overlapping generation life cycle approach or the neoclassical growth model 
(such as Kotlikoff and Summers, 1987; Kotlikoff, 2001).  
 
                                                 
36 For examples of tax incidence studies using CGE modelling for developing countries see for 
instance, Deverajan and Hossein, (1998) and Hossein, (1995) for Bangladesh; Shah and 
Whalley, (1991) for  Pakistan; Dahl and Mitra, (1991) for Bangladesh, China and India; 
Coady and Harris, (2004) for Mexico; to name but a few. 
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It should not be surprising to know that most frequently used approach for tax 
incidence analysis for developing countries is partial equilibrium incidence 
analysis. This approach examines the incidence of tax within the context of a 
single market and assumes tax imposed in one market does not affect other 
markets in terms of either price changes, factor shares or income (Alleyne, 
2007). Since tax shifting within one market depends on elasticities of demand 
and supply, this issue in partial equilibrium tax incidence models is addressed 
by assuming constant returns to scale; as a result, production in these models 
is pushed into the background. Thus, these models assume producer prices are 
fixed; which in this context means that increase in taxes correspond to an 
equal increase in consumer prices which is a fairly standard assumption also 
adopted in the literature of optimal taxation (see for instance Atkinson and 
Stiglitz, 1980; or Myles, 1995).  
 
As a consequence, tax incidence in partial equilibrium models depend entirely 
on assumption of how consumers will react to the imposition of a tax; 
something which in the context of a perfectly competitive market is dealt by 
assuming different tax shifting assumptions for various types of tax.  
 
There is no hard and fast rule to say whether partial equilibrium or a general 
equilibrium tax incidence approach would be preferable. The superiority of 
one approach over the other crucially depends on what is being asked.  
 
Partial equilibrium modelling of tax incidence is preferable because of its 
tractability and intuition. These models also provide a unique opportunity to 
disaggregate the incidence picture since they are based on rich micro-data and 
this ability to disaggregate is a strength as it can provide very useful analysis 
as far as welfare and equity impact of a particular tax policy or a particular 
feature is concerned. However, such an approach is not free from criticism. 
The most noteworthy criticism of micro-simulation tax incidence approach has 
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come from Shah and Whalley (1991) who have fundamentally criticised this 
approach for not making any sort of attempt to incorporate tax and non-tax 
institutional features of developing countries37 38.  
 
On the other hand, even though institutional features can be better 
accommodated in a general equilibrium type of modelling of tax incidence 
(Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002) these models are also not without serious 
limitations. Whalley (1984) pointed out that the results from computable 
general equilibrium models (particularly within the area of public finance) to a 
large extent appear to be driven by the value of elasticities and other 
parameters used in the model. Thus, it is quite possible in many cases the 
arbitrariness of shifting assumptions used in the partial equilibrium tax 
incidence models is being replaced by the arbitrariness of both the model form 
and its parameter values (Shah and Whalley, 1991). And it is also quite 
possible that in cases where second round effects are not that significant, the 
findings of both type of approaches are quite close (Devarajan et al, 1980). 
 
Thus, there is no ideal or unique approach to tax incidence analysis 
((Martinez-Vazquez, 2007). All approaches have their advantages and 
disadvantages (Fullerton and Rogers, 1991; Devarjan et. al., 1980). However, 
if the aim of the study is to measure the distributional affect of taxes, partial 
equilibrium approach is sufficient (Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002; Alleyene, 
2007) As a result, partial equilibrium tax incidence approach, despite its 
                                                 
37 According to Shah and Whalley (1991), the incidence of import duties may be progressive 
compared to regressive incidence commonly reported by conventional studies if it is assumed 
that incidence is borne by the recipient of higher incomes who are also the main beneficiaries 
of quotas and licences ( see for instance Table 11-10, pp.183).  
38 Shah and Whalley (1991) mentioned that the presence of widespread tax evasion in many 
developing countries can make the assumption of full-forward shifting of direct taxes among 
some workers quite susceptible and the presence of large the informal sectors creates 
opportunities for some workers to reduce the tax burden by either fully or partially shifting to 
this sector. 
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shortcomings, has been quite resilient (Alleyne, 2007). This is the approach 
that will be followed in this study. 
 
 
3.1.2 Conventional Models of Partial Equilibrium Tax Incidence 
 
 
3.1.2.1  Representative or typical household approach 
 
 
This is perhaps one of the oldest approaches used for tax incidence analysis39. 
This approach relies on tax burden computation relying on a relatively small 
number of artificial households, and their composition, expenditure and 
income sources are assumed to be representative of the entire population. It 
would not be wrong to call this approach  more or less a  version of the 
statutory or legal incidence than economic incidence. As a result, this type of 
analysis has been completely abandoned40 in favour of approaches that do not 
ignore individual variations (Bird and De Wulf, 1973, pp. 647). 
 
 
3.1.2.2  Differential incidence approach 
 
 
One possible way to determine tax incidence is by comparing the distribution 
of income resulting from the presence of tax with some initial benchmark or 
counterfactual (Martinez-Vazquez, 2007). In this approach the result of 
income distribution due to taxes is compared with some initial benchmark 
                                                 
39 This approach follows from report of the Committee on National Debt and Taxation, 
minutes of evidence, Vol. 1, 1927 (quoted in Prest (1955), p. 244) and Shoup (1939) for 
developed countries. 
40 Early examples include Adler and Wallich (1951) for El Salvador, Adler et al. (1952) for 
Guatemala, Shoup et al (1959) for Venezuela, and Wasylenko (1986) for Jamaica. 
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distribution of income such as comparison with distribution of tax burden that 
would have taken place if the same amount of taxes were collected from a 
proportional income tax (thus assuming that proportional income tax is the 
most neutral way to collect revenue). However, this approach has not been 
very popular in developing countries41 perhaps because of small role of 
income taxes in the economy and because determining a true counterfactual is 
a tall task (Martinez-Vazquez, 2007)42. 
 
 
3.1.2.3  Numerical Tax Incidence Approach 
 
 
The most frequently used approach for tax incidence analysis is the numerical 
tax incidence approach. This approach is directly adopted from the seminal 
work of Pechman and Okner (1974)43. The objective is to allocate tax burden 
by income groups. The term numerical tax incidence refers to the procedure of 
imputing tax incidence where the total amount of tax revenue collected by the 
Government is allocated to the households grouped by income classes. As a 
                                                 
41 For application, see Sahota (1968) for Brazil, and Sjoquist and Green (1992). 
42 Determining a true counterfactual will require observing an economy without taxes, which 
is not possible (Martinez-Vazquez, 2007).  
43 The origin of large majority of work on tax incidence analysis for developing countries is 
Pechman and Okner, (1974). This study was based on 87,000 income tax return and 30,000 
households from 1966 U.S survey of economic opportunity file. The novelty of the analysis 
was that the incidence analysis was carried out using eight different set of shifting 
assumptions. P&O, for all classes assumed that the burden of personal tax is borne by the 
households and the burden of sales and excise taxes falls on households according to their 
consumption patterns. The employee part of payroll tax remains with the worker. The property 
tax is analysed for cases when it affects either the return to landowners or all capital owners 
while for corporate taxes they assume four different scenarios; where it is shifted to 
shareholders, capital owners, wage earners or consumers. Total tax incidence is calculated 
using effective tax rate (i.e. total tax burden as a proportion of economic income) for each 
household. Interestingly they found US tax system to be “proportional” irrespective to 
whether they use the most-progressive set of assumptions or the least-progressive set of 
assumptions. This analysis has also come to be known as the “proportionality hypothesis” and 
the main conclusion that emerged from this analysis was that the U.S. tax system does not 
redistribute income and this conclusion sparked intensive policy debate within U.S. tax policy 
for many decades to come.  
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result this approach assumes no excess burden or deadweight loss44. Thus, at 
the end the total burden allocated for each tax is equal to the total revenue 
collected45.  
 
Over the years although the gist of analysis is still based on micro-data, there 
have been many additions and changes to this methodology to better fit such 
approaches to the data availability, tax instruments and the country context, 
although it must be admitted that not much has changed in terms of tax 
shifting assumptions46. For instance, in many cases the recent studies using 
this methodology have dropped the proportionality assumption between tax 
burden and tax revenues; thus calculating tax liabilities only in cases where 
actual consumption of the taxed item takes place within the households47. This 
is a much better approach as it allows for both excess burden as well as tax 
evasion. In some cases the tax incidence analysis has focused on calculating 
effective taxes that involves the use of input-output tables for the economy.  
The general idea is to trace taxes on intermediate goods through input output 
table to estimate the implied tax on the final product (Rajemison and Younger, 
1999)48. This allows one to take account of cascading effect of taxes which 
can be important for taxes that fall heavily on the intermediate goods49. 
                                                 
44However, this is an acceptable approach as long as we differentiate between the equity 
impact (tax incidence) and efficiency impact (excess burden) (Martinez-Vazquez, 2007).  
45 For application, see Ghandi (1966) for India, Bird (1970); and Mclure (1971) for Columbia, 
Yukon (1976) for Tanzania, Foxley (1979) for Chile, Lovejoy (1963);  Bird and Miller (1989) 
for Jamaica, Azfar (1974); Jeetun (1978); Kazi (1984); Malik and Saqib (1985); Khalilzadeh-
Shirazi et al. (2001) for Pakistan, Chen et al. (2001) for Uganda and Sonia et al. (2003) for 
Ethiopia. 
46 Issues related to tax shifting assumption are discussed separately.  
47 For application see, Engle, Galetovic and Raddatz (1998) for Chile, Refaqat (2003 ); SPDC 
(2004) for Pakistan, and Martinez-Vanquez (2001) for Mexico, to name a few. 
48 According to Ahmed and Stern (1991), difference between nominal and effective tax rates 
may be quite significant. For instance, for India and Pakistan they found that even when 
nominal tax rates on goods primarily consumed by the poor were zero or negative (i.e. a 
subsidy), many of such goods had positive effective rates.  
 
49 For application see, Heller (1981) for Korea, Ahmad and Stern (1991) for India and 
Pakistan, SPDC (2004) for Pakistan, Engle, Galetovic and Raddatz (1997) for Chile, 
Rajemison and Younger (2001) for Madagascar, and Cho et al. (2003) for Ethiopia. 
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However, this approach is not free from problems even if input-output tables 
are available and readily updated. Estimation of effective tax rates requires 
considerable aggregation across goods as a result reducing the accuracy of 
progressivity comparison (Gemmell and Morrissey, 2003). For instance, in the 
case of Madagascar, use of input-output table reduced the number of goods 
examined from 222 to 30 (Rajemison and Younger, 2001), which is a serious 
loss of information.  
 
 
3.1.3 Tax incidence analysis: other issues 
 
3.1.3.1  Annual or lifetime
50
 Perspective on Incidence? 
 
 
The question of looking at the incidence from lifetime versus annual 
perspective is an interesting one. Theoretically, one would expect annual and 
lifetime tax incidence calculation to vary for several reasons51. For instance, it 
is quite possible that the annual measure of income reflects transitory 
components (such as sickness and unemployment) which are bound to have a 
smaller effect on consumption than when permanent change in income is 
considered. This can be credited to the permanent income hypothesis 
(Friedman, 1957). Second, income measured in a single period differs from 
lifetime income due to age related differences in earnings52 (Lyon and 
Schwab, 1995). Third, consumption of certain items follows life cycle pattern 
which is independent of changes in income (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954).  
 
                                                 
50 lifetime income concept can be defined as present discounted value of earnings plus gifts 
and inheritance received. 
51 For theoretical distinction between annual and lifetime incidence approach see Levhari and 
Sheshinski (1972) and Driffill and Rosen (1983). 
52 Mincer argues that about half of the log variation of earning is attributable to transitory 
components and age related differences (pp. 119). 
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A very few studies have taken a more rigorous approach of trying to estimate 
the lifetime earning capacity of the household and not surprisingly most of 
these are on developed countries (Fullerton and Rogers 1991; 1993, Davies et 
al, 1984). Perhaps surprisingly, the main result of such a carefully done work 
was not much different from results reported by Pechman (1985). Perhaps 
more importantly, the refinement between lifetime and annual perspective may 
carry very little weight as far as developing countries are concerned as life 
expectancies in these countries tend to be relatively short and the level of 
poverty is stark (Bird and Zolt, 2005).  
 
 
3.1.3.2  Tax shifting Assumptions 
 
 
It may not be wrong to say that the role of incidence assumptions is to aid the 
allocation of the tax burden between different income groups (Vazquez, 2007). 
Most of the studies on tax incidence for developing and developed countries 
use the 100 percent tax shifting assumption particularly where indirect taxes 
incidence is concerned; although lesser consensus appears to hold where pass 
through effect of direct taxes is concerned (see for instance Table 3.1). This 
assumption simplifies the analysis since it allows the tax component of the 
retail price of an item to be easily identified on the basis of statutory 
legislation.  
 
In a perfect competitive market under a partial equilibrium tax incidence 
analysis this assumption implies taxes will always be shifted from 0 to 100 
percent while the exact burden lying within this range depends on the relative 
elasticities of demand and supply of an item. Things get slightly complicated 
when market structure other than perfect competition is considered (Besley, 
1989; Delipalla and Keen, 1992; Katz and Rosen, 1985; and Stern, 1987).  
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What has been emerging from this work is that under an imperfectly 
competitive market structure, a variable degree of tax shifting possibilities 
exist and even over shifting becomes a real possibility: see for instance 
Lockwood, (1988) and Stern, (1987a). According to Stern (1987) “100 percent 
shifting is a reasonable intermediate assumption and not a polar case that the 
simple theory makes it appear”.  
 
There are very few studies that have tried to answer the question of tax 
shifting assumptions but most of those studies are limited to analysis of a few 
goods. Sidhu (1971) found evidence of overshifting of sales tax; the same is 
found by Besley and Rosen (1994; 1996)53. Poterba (1996) on the other hand 
found evidence supporting the perfect competition assumption. 
 
There is very limited research within this empirical area for Pakistan and 
where some evidence does exist it is quite simplistic in its methodology and 
often the time period covered is quite limited. Few studies for Pakistan have 
focused on the effect of price shifting due to import taxes. These have 
compared the c.i.f. prices of import with their corresponding wholesale price, 
(Pal, 1964; Alamgir, 1968). This approach concluded that given profit margins 
are so high, small changes in import duties are unlikely to be passed on to the 
consumer. Radhu (1965), on the other hand, related changes in taxes (sales 
and excises taxes) to changes in prices and found taxes are not shifted to 
                                                 
53 Sidhu (1971) analyzed relationship between CPI and sales tax rate in a sample of seven 
cities during (1954-66) and found evidence of over shifting for four out of five categories 
under consideration. Besley and Rosen (1994) examined the impact of state and local sales tax 
on the price of a particular item. Their study also yielded evidence of overshifting.  Poterba 
(1996) study is an empirical analyses that examined city specific price indices for eight cities 
for fifty year period (1947-1977) and fourteen cities during (1925-39). He examined quarterly 
data on tax rates and prices and confirmed evidence of 100 percent tax shifting assumption. 
Besley and Rosen (1996) extended Poterba’s type of analysis using panel of quarterly data to 
12 commodities and 155 cities over the period of (1982-1990). They found for half 
commodities tax shifting occurred almost one to one but for rest of these commodities, there 
was clear and robust evidence of overshifting. 
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consumers. However, subsequent studies that extended Radhu’s work report 
differently. Irfan (1974) and Naqvi (1975) found evidence that taxes are 
shifted to consumers and in some cases evidence of overshifting54.  
 
Given the lack of empirical research in the area of tax shifting assumptions 
even for developed countries let alone Pakistan and other developing 
countries, it may be adequate to assume a full tax shifting assumption for 
(indirect) taxes (Besley and Rosen, 1996) but a cautious interpretation of 
results is necessary (for instance see Table 3.1 to see LDC factors that may 
impact these assumptions more)55. Although incidence results can be sensitive 
to the shifting assumptions, nevertheless there has been wide agreement on the 
assumptions used (Vazquez, 2007). More importantly, in practice these 
assumptions have been justified because the incidence results obtained from 
conventional studies have come out to be quite similar to results obtained with 
more realistic and laborious assumptions (Vazquez, 2007). As a result, this 
study will also follow the assumption that indirect taxes are passed on fully to 
the consumers. 
                                                 
54 The methodology used by Irfan (1974) and Naqvi (1975) is quite simplistic. They directly 
relate changes in prices with changes in taxes making no effort to control for other variables 
such as production cost etc. Irfan (1974) focused on only tobacco and petroleum products 
annual prices during (1953-72) and found evidence of tax shifting. Naqvi (1975) extended this 
work to 12 groups of commodities. She finds that in 50 percent cases taxes are shifted to 
consumers and in some of these cases there is over-shifting. She finds taxes on cigarettes and 
petroleum products resulted into one to one increase in prices while for food products, cotton 
fabrics and misc. products exhibited fifty percent shifting; and taxes on chemicals revealed a 
pattern of over shifting.  
55 The use of full tax shifting assumption in the case of indirect cases goes back to work by 
Samuel (1919). This assumption is used not only in vast majority of incidence work related to 
indirect taxes in developing countries but also developed countries, for instance see Musgrave 
(1964) and Pechman and Okner (1974).  
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Table 3.1: Tax shifting assumptions 
Taxes Assumptions Agreement LDC factors  
not 
incorporated 
that may 
impact 
incidence 
results /1 
Income Tax Paid by the recipient of 
taxes 
YES Tax Evasion 
 
Corporate Tax  1. Shifted 
backward to the 
owners of 
capital 
2. Shifted forward 
to the consumer 
3. Fifty percent 
shifted 
backward and 
fifty percent 
shifted forward 
 
No - 
GST/VAT Paid by the purchaser of 
taxed items 
YES Informal 
Markets 
Trade Taxes 
a. Import 
Duties 
b. Export 
Duties 
 
 
Paid by the purchaser of 
taxed items  
 
Borne by buyer of 
exporting item if  seller 
has monopoly power in 
Int’l market; otherwise 
by seller 
 
 
YES 
 
 
 
NO 
 
- 
 
 
 
Smuggling 
Payroll Taxes Employer contribution 
borne by employer; 
employee contribution 
borne by employee 
YES - 
Source: Shah and Whalley (1992); Table 4: Tax incidence assumptions, 
Morrissey and Gemmell (2003) ;Vanquez (2007): assumptions used in 
conventional models of tax incidence, pp. 7-9. 
Note: 1/ Column 4, Table 4: Tax incidence assumptions, Morrissey and 
Gemmell (2003) 
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3.2 SECTION II: Tax Progression and Evidence56 
 
 
This section summarizes the evidence of tax incidence analysis in terms of tax 
progression. Whilst there may be different ways of considering insight from 
tax incidence studies, it is reasonable to focus on the results that they offer in 
terms of tax progression. Since there are different ways of measuring tax 
progressivity, the first section starts with describing how tax progressivity has 
been measured in tax incidence analysis for developing countries before 
embarking on what can be learned from incidence studies.  
 
3.2.1 What can be learned from evidence on tax progression and 
distribution: some general conclusions
57
 
 
 
It is hard to infer one common conclusion from the tax progression literature 
as far as progressivity, regressivity or neutrality of overall tax system or its 
components is concerned as these conclusions are often country specific 
(Gemmell and Morrissey, 2003). This is perhaps one reason why tax 
progression studies have received a lot of criticism from tax incidence surveys 
such as Bird and De wulf (1973) and De Wulf (1975), as results appear to vary 
not only across countries but also within the same country. Nevertheless, both 
partial equilibrium tax incidence models of tax progression and distribution 
                                                 
56 For a brief discussion on measures of tax progression commonly used in tax incidence 
studies, please see Appendix 3.3. . 
57 This section is not a survey of tax incidence studies. For surveys see Bird and De Wulf 
(1973), De Wulf (1975), Mclure (1977), Jimenez (1986), Shah and Whalley (1991) and more 
recently, Chu ke-young et al. (2000).  
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reveal some interesting general conclusions/themes and some of these are 
summarized below.  
 
The recent evidence on incidence of taxes on consumption reveals this to be 
much less regressive than suggested earlier (Chu et al., 2000; Gemmell and 
Morrissey, 2005). Trade liberalization motivated tax reforms, that have 
replaced import taxes in most developing countries with domestic taxes such 
as sales taxes, have appeared to make the underlying tax incidence a little 
more progressive (Gemmell and Morrissey, 2005). Thus, recent literature has 
underlined the importance of not to pre-judge the incidence, particularly of 
indirect taxes on a priori belief. According to Bird and Zolt (2005), the 
distributional impact of indirect taxes in any particular developing country 
depends on a question of relative quantitative importance of different taxes 
and underlying income distribution patterns in that society. As a result, such 
matters cannot be decided on a priori grounds. 
 
Another important aspect that has emerged from this literature is the 
importance of asking the right questions which such methodology can 
accommodate. One reason why findings of most of tax progression studies are 
at best mixed is because most of these studies have only focused on the 
progressivity, regressivity or neutrality of this or that tax (Bird and Zolt, 
2005). And this is bound to run into inherent problem of identifying a 
distribution of income that is considered to be acceptable to everyone in the 
society. Thus, focusing on the right questions will not only make this research 
more interesting but also meaningful from a policy perspective. For instance, 
recently some studies have started to focus on particular issues such as how 
progressivity of underlying tax system is affected by: (a) replacement of 
general sales tax with excises; (b) reforms that have replaced trade revenues 
with domestic taxes such as GST/VAT or ; (c) focusing on a particular change 
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in the design of indirect taxes that may be more relevant for its potential 
impact on the poor (Bird and Zolt, 2005). 
 
The last point warrants more attention. Although, it is agreed that indirect 
taxes can play a very limited role in redistribution of income that does not 
mean that they do not impact the lives of the poor in a limited but powerful 
way (Bird and Zolt, 2005). Thus, even though the overall incidence of fiscal 
policy is what really matters for redistribution, the policy makers in 
developing countries need to pay close attention to even minor features of 
consumption tax design and implementation as they can have important 
distributive effects (Bird and Zolt, 2005).  
 
One thing that has become evident over the years is that such features can 
easily remain hidden in an aggregate analysis. Thus, detailed micro-analysis of 
expenditure data with close attention to details of tax structure is necessary for 
such conclusions (Bird and Zolt, 2005). Thus, even though most partial 
equilibrium tax incidence literature has been based on rich micro-data, minute 
policy analysis of particular features has not been explored.  
 
For instance, excise duties, like other indirect tax components have been 
analysed in terms of whether these are collectively progressive, regressive or 
proportional. This focus has ended up revealing at best a mixed bag of results. 
Thus, such research has been largely uninformative for policymakers who 
have resorted to levying excises based on conventional wisdom i.e. taxing 
luxuries or taxing those items that have explicit negative externalities attached 
to their consumption. Most studies have not focused on individual excises 
even though excise levies on petroleum, tobacco and alcoholic beverages for 
most developing countries make up almost the entire revenue from this 
heading. As a result, their individual redistributive effects can often be as large 
as any single component of tax system. 
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This issue i.e. determining the incidence of individual excises due to their 
possible effect on the poor has, however received much more attention in 
recent literature using distribution measures such as concentration curve and 
associated welfare dominance technique and some thought provoking results 
for policy makers have been revealed (for instance look at Table 3.2).    
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Table 3.2: Results of welfare dominance for African countries 
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Export N N N - R R - 
Imports N P P P P - - 
VAT/ST N P P P P N P 
Excises N N P P N - - 
Tobacco N N P N P R - 
Alcohol P/N P - P P P - 
Non – alcoholic 
Bev. 
P P - - P P - 
Gasoline P P P P P P - 
Kerosene N R R N R R - 
Transport N N P P - - - 
Autos P/N P/N P - - - - 
Source: Table 2: Results from dominance testing, Gemmell and Morrissey (2005), pp. 138. 
Note: Format of result presentation compared to original source is different. Here, P  means 
progressive; N means neutral/inconclusive and R means regressive. Also, this Table has been 
extended to include Munoz et al. 2003 for Ethiopia. 
 
 
From Table 3.2 we can see that even though it is hard to say anything about 
the overall excises collectively, at best they appear to be neutral or 
inconclusive. But when this information is disaggregated some interesting 
results are revealed. For instance, the incidence of excise duties on car/petrol 
generally appears to be strongly progressive (Gemmell and Morrissey, 2005); 
inconclusive for tobacco, progressive for alcoholic and non-alcoholic 
beverages; and clearly regressive for kerosene. This presents very relevant 
information for the policy makers i.e. rationalization of excises on tobacco or 
alcohol will generally improve efficiency in these countries and would not 
make the poor worse off (Gemmell and Morrissey, 2005). Similarly, taxation 
of kerosene, which is a fuel generally consumed by the poor in these countries 
is clearly regressive and as a result harming the poor. Thus, it should be a 
serious reconsideration for the policymakers with a pro-poor agenda, 
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particularly when it is possible to exempt this tax to help the poor without 
encouraging inefficient substitution between fuel types (Gemmell and 
Morrissey, 2005). 
 
However, despite the voluminous nature of research in the area of tax 
progression, very few tax progression studies have focused on the 
distributional impact of individual excises in developing countries. Issues of 
tobacco taxation and alcohol taxation have received very little attention. 
Exceptions include McLure (1977a), who found the tobacco tax in Jamaica to 
be far the most regressive indirect tax. This is also supported by Cnossen 
(1977) who found tobacco tax to be the most regressive tax in a number of 
countries. In some cases these excises have appeared to be progressive but 
progressivity was mainly due to higher tax on imported cigarettes (DeWulf, 
1974 for Lebanon and Asher and Booth, 1983 for Philippines and India and 
Indonesia). High taxation of alcohol has been supported on social grounds in 
some countries. For instance Bird (1983) and Bird and Wallace (2005) note 
that higher taxation of alcohol in some cases may not be regressive. But 
research in this area is not sufficient and further research in the selective role 
of excises based on detailed micro data is necessary in order to formulate and 
guide tax policy analysis in this area in developing countries (Bird and Zolt, 
2005). 
  
Recent literature on the incidence of GST/VAT appears to indicate that VAT 
in some countries may be more progressive than trade taxes and excise duties 
and in some cases it may be as progressive as income tax (Shah and Whalley, 
1991). This is despite the fact that tax incidence studies using distributional 
measures have generally put VAT on low progressivity ranking compared to 
other taxes (Gemmell and Morrissey, 2005), but generally these are not found 
to be regressive (see Table 3.2). Evidence on this coming from tax progression 
studies is mixed; for instance GST/VAT neutrality is reported for Ghana 
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(Younger, 1996) and Pakistan (Refaqat, 2003) and regressivity of VAT is 
reported for Korea (Heller, 1981) and Pakistan (SPDC, 2004).  
 
Very few studies have explored the explicit issue of replacing GST with VAT 
(which is a very relevant tax reform issue as many developing countries are 
undergoing this transition). This issue is explored for Ethiopia (Munoz et al., 
2003), and Uganda (Chen et al., 2001). Findings so far are mixed since results 
for Uganda shows that although the effective tax after reform is higher, 
perhaps due to better coverage, post- reform tax system appears to be neutral. 
Only results for Ethiopia indicate this reform process having an adverse 
impact on the bottom forty percent of the population. Few studies have also 
indicated that GST/VAT neutrality or slight progressivity conclusion is likely 
to emerge when expenditure is used as a base rather than annual income. But 
on the other hand, this study reveals an interesting point that disaggregated 
incidence picture is not that sensitive to change in base. Thus, a disaggregated 
conclusion regarding particular policy features is important (Refaqat, 2003).  
 
Due to the emerging prominent position of GST/VAT revenues in many 
developing countries, many issues related to this type of taxation have 
received more attention. For instance, the issue of GST/VAT taxation at a 
uniform or differentiated rate is an important issue and has received some 
attention. Ahmad and Stern (1983) noted for India that a shift to a uniform 
taxation would reduce the expenditures of the poorest segment of rural and 
urban households by almost 7 and 5 percent due to increase in the prices of 
many essential items. Similarly, Bird and Miller (1986) using basic micro data 
for Jamaica show that if the current highly differentiated tax system is 
replaced by a uniform General Consumption tax (GCT), it would increase 
taxes on all income groups and also increase the regressivity of the indirect tax 
system. 
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Interestingly, recent research has also pointed out several reasons why 
conventional incidence studies may be overestimating the burden of 
GST/VAT. For instance, Fedeli (1998) pointed out that VAT may make the 
tax system less allocatively distorted as it reduces the pressure on market-
based activities to move into the informal sector. Gemmell and Morrissey 
(2005) have pointed out that VAT may be beneficial for the poor as it 
improves upon serious price distortions as a result of ad hoc array of excises. 
However, more research is required to quantify these issues but they do put an 
interesting contrast to the traditional “regressive” label pre-assigned to these 
taxes.   
 
Some studies on GST/VAT incidence have gone beyond the question of 
progression, regression or neutrality. For instance, some research has focused 
on the possibility of differential taxation58 under GST/VAT due to very 
substantial differences in consumption patterns between income groups in 
developing countries (Bird and Zolt, 2005). Although this issue has not 
received much attention in most conventional progression and distributional 
studies in developing countries, this is a very important issue particularly in 
the context of the poor. For instance,  in most developing countries it is a 
common practice to exempt unprocessed food items from the GST/VAT net. 
This practice is based on the age old a-priori belief that only un-processed 
food items consumption is important for the poor. But recent research has 
challenged this policy stance particularly in some developing countries where 
GST/VAT has been extended to unprocessed food items. For instance, 
disaggregated results for Pakistan, India and Jamaica have revealed GST/VAT 
taxation of sugar has very important implication for the poor (Ahmad, Leung, 
and Stern, 1984 for India and Pakistan; Bird and Miller, 1986 for Jamaica). In 
fact results from the Bird and Miller (1986) study show that that exemption of 
                                                 
58 Differential taxation in the case of GST/VAT may not necessarily mean thinking about 
different standard rates for GST/VAT but may also mean thinking about commodities that 
should face standard VAT rate and those that should be exempted.  
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few processed food items can eliminate almost all of the regressivity of GCT. 
They also found that GST on sugar appeared to be the most regressive tax 
within all taxes. 
  
Thus, it is no surprise to find that these issues have recently received more 
attention in the context of GST/VAT exemptions and in some recent studies 
this issue has been explicitly addressed using the “distributional 
characteristics” measure59 of each good. This measure estimates how heavily 
consumption of a particular item is concentrated on the poor (Sahn and 
Younger, 2003). In this approach the welfare effect of a price change is given 
by the weighted sum of each household’s consumption of the taxed item(s), 
where the weights reflect the social marginal value of consumption by each 
household with higher weights given to the poor households (Sahn and 
Younger, 2003). This has revealed some very strong tax policy results from 
micro-data analysis that are very significant for tax policy reforms of 
GST/VAT in developing countries. For instance, in the case of Papua New 
Guinea, Gibson (1998) noted that exemptions of rice and tinned fish from 
GST is desirable on both “merit good” criterion as well as from poverty 
alleviation objectives. Also, Alderman et al. (1999), found that GST 
exemption of beans, sugar and kerosene in South Africa is desired from equity 
point of view. This type of research has raised a question regarding carrying 
out GST/VAT exemptions under “a-priori” belief particularly as far as 
Government’s pro-poor policy agenda is concerned. 
 
Tax progression evidence on trade taxes has largely focused on import taxes. 
Most tax progression literature finds custom duties as slightly regressive 
(Jeetun, 1978; SPDC, 2004 for Pakistan; Heller, 1981 for Korea to name a 
few, but since import tax incidence estimation from survey data is not straight 
                                                 
59 For application see Gibson (1998) for Papua New Guinea, and Alderman and del Ninno 
(1999) for South Africa59 and Sonia et al. (2003) for Ethiopia 
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forward, tax progression studies have been cautious about these findings). The 
literature using distribution measures has given attention to both import and 
export taxes (primarily due to importance of latter type of tax in Africa) and 
overall results for this study find import duties to be progressive (see Table 
3.2) which is contrast to evidence from tax progression studies. Incidence of 
overall export taxes appears to be neutral/ inconclusive or regressive (see 
Table 3.2). However, where regressivity is reported this is due to one specific 
item (for instance, cocoa export tax for Ghana and coffee tax in Uganda).  
 
 
Another important point highlighted in recent research is the definition of the 
“poor” used in most of these studies. This is an important point since it 
involves understanding the extent and nature of variation among those 
classified as the “poor” (Bird and Zolt, 2005) as these differences can be very 
important for policy decision as far as the poor are concerned.  However, this 
issue has received considerably less attention due to lack of availability of 
surveys that explicitly focus on the poor. However, there are some notable 
exceptions. For instance, Adler, et al., (1952) reports considerable variation in 
families between the same income classes in Guatemala. They find that heavy 
drinkers and smokers probably paid 3 percent of their income in taxes 
compared to 1 percent for moderate consumers and 0 percent for abstainers. 
Bird and Miller (1989) used micro-data from a special survey in Jamaica on 
the poor. They report that effect of taxation may vary more due to 
characteristics of the poor households then to income or expenditure. Perhaps 
more importantly, the gain in vertical equity may  offset increased horizontal 
inequities if such issues are not analysed carefully. Thus, a more detailed focus 
on the characteristics of the poor is essential in order to rightly estimate the 
effect of indirect taxes on the poor as well. 
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In summarizing, this evidence has revealed that generalization regarding 
progressivity, regressivity or neutrality of this or that tax is not helpful (Bird 
and Zolt, 2005). If research in this area is to be more revealing and interesting 
from policy perspective, the right questions need to be asked. Even though 
indirect taxes may have a very little redistribution role,  such impact can be 
very powerful as far as the poor are concerned. Thus, detailed micro-data 
analysis along with information on tax structure is required to fine tune 
particular policy features that may be very important for the poor (such as 
taxes on kerosene, basic fuels, sugar, tobacco, cocoa etc.). Thus, even though 
the incidence of any single tax is less important than the incidence of the fiscal 
system as a whole, nonetheless there is good reason for those concerned with 
distributive issue to pay close attention to the details of indirect tax design and 
administration (Bird, 1987).  
  
 
3.2.2 Pakistan Tax Incidence Studies 
 
 
Most of the literature on incidence of taxation in Pakistan has focused on tax 
progression of overall tax system. Results and overall findings of these studies 
are summarized in Appendix Table 3.1 and 3.2. 
 
One of the earliest studies of tax incidence for Pakistan is Jeetun (1978)60. 
This study was done following the Pechman and Okner (P&O) (1974) 
methodology and almost following the same set of assumptions for allocation 
of taxes. Jeetun’s (1978) results showed that total tax incidence and total 
indirect tax burden exhibited either slight progressivity or a U-curve pattern 
(i.e. implying redistribution taking place from the very poor and the rich 
                                                 
60 One of the earliest study for Pakistan tax incidence is by Jawaid Afzar “Theory and Practice of Tax Incidence in 
Pakistan” (1974) is a PhD dissertation but was not available to us. 
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classes towards the middle income classes). He also found urban classes 
bearing a higher proportion of tax incidence than rural classes. The novelty of 
this study was that it was one of the first studies that covered the issue of tax 
incidence in Pakistan and also provided detailed disaggregated results based 
on incidence of components of tax system. 
  
Kazi (1984) aimed at analysing inter-sectoral tax burden for Pakistan. For this 
reason, although the analysis is similar to conventional P&O type of 
methodology, the expenditure and taxes allocation takes place on the basis of 
sectoral expenditure shares and sectoral population. Their results showed over-
taxation of agriculture when compared with the relative capacity of taxation in 
each sector. They also found that rich farmers in agriculture sector are under-
taxed.  
 
Malik and Saqib (1989), also employ P&O (1974) type of methodology to 
allocate the tax burden. However, tax burden allocation is further refined to 
take  account of cascading effect of taxes by using the input output tables for 
(1975-76). They also explicitly address the question of redistribution of 
income due to taxes using the Suite index. Although they report the entire tax 
system to be regressive (pp.18), the results at best appear to be U-shaped 
particularly at national level.  
 
Shirazi et al., (2001) is perhaps the only study that attempts to ascertain the 
fiscal incidence for Pakistan. They also use P&O methodology to allocate tax 
burdens and expenditure benefits. The shortcoming of this analysis is the 
arbitrary way the expenditure and tax burden is distributed across the 
population. As a result the findings for the poorest cohort look particularly 
dubious.  
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Kemal (2001) reports the tax incidence results for the overall tax system for 13 
years (1987-88 to 1999-00). However, this analysis can be only indicative 
because this study explicitly says nothing about the data, methodology and 
assumptions used in this tax incidence study.  
 
The novelty of Refaqat’s (2003) VAT analysis is that although it uses the 
conventional methodology it drops the assumption of proportionality between 
tax burden and tax revenues. This study shows that GST/VAT appears to be 
slightly regressive when income is used as a base but this regressivity 
disappears when expenditure is used as incidence base. The other important 
aspect of this study is that it provides a comprehensive breakdown of VAT 
incidence on main commodities including important items such as cooking 
oils, kerosene oils, electricity etc. It appears that disaggregated findings are not 
particularly sensitive to the choice of base. It appears tobacco tax, kerosene 
oil, gas-pipe and electricity consumption taxation under GST are highly 
regressive.  
 
SPDC (2004) is another comprehensive look at federal taxation in Pakistan. 
This study also uses the conventional incidence approach but like Refaqat 
(2003) drops the proportionality assumption. This study finds all components 
of indirect tax system along with the overall tax system clearly regressive. The 
study finds if fertilizers and pesticides are exempted from GST net, it will 
make GST incidence slightly progressive. The novelty of the study is to 
attempt to measure effective taxation; however, this study uses 1989-90 input-
output tables for Pakistan and provides no information on how these tables 
were updated for 2001-02, which makes this study quite susceptible.  
 
Thus, it will not be wrong to say that most of the research in Pakistan has 
remained preoccupied with the tax progression issue and as a result most of 
the issues highlighted in the earlier section have very little attention in 
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Pakistan. And this gives current study an opportunity to undertake some of the 
issues mentioned earlier. 
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3.3 SECTION III: Normative Analysis 61 
 
 
In the previous sections we talked about partial equilibrium approach and 
compared results of studies on tax incidence in developing countries on the 
basis of tax progression. The focus on this section and following section is 
how tax incidence studies might inform policy concerned with the normative62 
question of how social welfare is to be maximised. However, much of the 
normative tax incidence literature encompassing the theory of optimal taxation 
and the theory of marginal tax reform (MTR) (discussed in next section) is 
sensitive to the underlying assumptions regarding tax incidence (such as cross 
price elasticities assumption, Ramsey rule etc.). Some of these assumptions 
may or may not be true. This further highlights the importance of partial 
equilibrium tax incidence analysis discussed in the first two sections. 
However, the current and the following section discuss some general lessons 
emerging from this literature that may be very useful for policymakers in 
developing countries along with there limitations.  
  
 
3.3.1 Optimal Taxation 
 
 
                                                 
61 Since the focus of current study is not normative analysis of taxation we do not claim to 
review studies in this area. Our intuition behind this section is to draw upon some reliable tax 
policy recommendations rather than to focus on individual studies. For a comprehensive 
review of normative studies, see the seminal collection in Newbery and Stern (1988).  
62 According to Gemmell, (1987) normative analysis raises the question of which taxes should 
be preferred. In addition to the knowledge of how taxes affect the economy and income 
distribution, they also require knowledge of specific policy objectives such as economic 
growth, fair distribution of resources etc.  
 
 78 
One of the most prominent theories within this area is the theory of optimal 
taxation. The theory of optimal taxation is based on the principle of Pareto 
optimality63 and it uses the tool of welfare economics to pinpoint an allocation 
of resources that will maximize the social welfare function (Gemmell, 1987).  
 
It is true that the starting point of the theory of optimal taxation is the 
breakdown of the basic theorems of welfare economics. The first theorem 
states a competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient and the second theorem 
states that any prescribed Pareto efficient allocation can be achieved as a 
competitive equilibrium if prices are set appropriately and if individual lump-
sum taxes64 or transfers are possible. Since it is not possible to create 
individual specific lumpsum taxes (Mirrlees, 1976) we move into the second 
best world and the need to develop the theory of optimal taxation.  
 
The concept of optimal taxation is not intuitive. However, it is nicely 
summarised by Sandmo (1976) who suggests three criteria to explain optimal 
taxation: 
 
i. A tax system which minimizes the resource cost of assessing, 
collecting and paying taxes. 
ii. Alternate tax system can be ranked following some criteria of 
fairness. 
iii. It is possible to evaluate tax system in terms of economic 
efficiency. 
 
Given individual specific lump-sum transfers are not possible; we move into a 
world of commodity and factor taxes. In its early stages the theory of optimal 
                                                 
63 One allocation is said to be Pareto dominate than other if it makes every consumer at least 
as well off and at least one better off  (Fuente, 2000:369) 
64 Lump-sum tax on an individual is a payment that the individual cannot alter by action 
(Newbery and Stern, 1988: 25). 
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taxation was completely preoccupied by efficiency concerns as summarized 
by Ramsey (1927) who was the first one to provide the solution of raising 
revenue by indirect taxes only in a one person economy when lumpsum 
transfers are ruled out. Assuming a one person economy (or identical 
consumers who can be treated identically) is equivalent to assuming 
distributional concerns that do not matter. Thus, according to the Ramsey rule, 
a given amount of taxes can be raised at minimum cost if taxes as a proportion 
of commodity prices are set inversely proportional to the elasticity of demand 
(Newbery and Stern, 1988). However, this makes this rule rather in-egalitarian 
as it appears to direct commodity taxation towards necessities (Newbery and 
Stern, 1988). Although the Ramsey rule provides general intuition behind the 
optimal taxation framework, it does not give any explicit formula for the 
calculation of optimal taxes.  
 
Much of the extension and development of this theory came during the decade 
of 1970s with seminal contribution by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971a, 1971b) 
who extended Ramsey rule to a many person rule, proved the production 
efficiency theorem
65
, and brought forward a discussion regarding optimum. In 
cases where all cross price effects are assumed to be zero, this leads us to 
derive a well known result known as the inverse elasticity rule. Other 
significant contributions that have moved this theory forward come from 
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972), Deaton (1977), Ray (1986), and Kaiser and 
Spahn (1989). However, the mathematics of optimal tax theory is complex; 
results are often not intuitive and governed by many restrictive assumptions 
regarding the structure of preferences and the set of tax instrument allowed 
(Gemmell, 1987).  
 
                                                 
65 Production efficiency theorem asserts that goods that enter into production processes as inputs and intermediate 
goods must not be taxed. 
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One of the empirical studies that has done away with much of restrictive 
assumptions is by Ebrahimi and Heady (1988) who allow for non-uniform 
preference, non-separability between goods and leisure, and other tax 
instruments. The result emerging from their study is that the cost in terms of 
social welfare of ignoring optimal tax theory recommendations and imposing 
uniformity in the indirect tax structure is fairly small in terms of GNP.  
 
Other important studies that have exposed a vast array of problems in this area 
include Murty and Ray (1987), who show extreme sensitivity of optimal tax 
rates calculations to deviations from leisure and good assumption; Ray (1986) 
who show calculations to be very sensitive to alternate functional form; and 
Deaton and Stern (1986) who shows that incorporating equity considerations 
moves optimal tax rates further from uniformity. Baumol and Bradford (1970) 
and Atkinson and Stiglitiz (1980) criticise the assumption of zero cross price 
effects which according to them translates the general equilibrium analysis 
into a partial one equivalent to the problem of minimising excess burden in 
such a framework. 
 
As a result of difficulties with methodological and practical differences as well 
as problems with restrictive set of assumptions led to the development of 
theory of marginal tax reform (MTR) developed by Ahmad and Stern (1984; 
1987).  
 
However, despite these problems the optimal taxation literature does offer 
some general lessons to tax policy. Newbery and Stern (1988:49) summarized 
these as three general principles which might be very useful for tax policy 
formulation in either developed or developing countries.  
 
i. ‘Tax revenue is raised most efficiently by taxing goods and factors with 
inelastic demand or supply’. This follows from the earlier discussion on 
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the deadweight loss and because effects external to the good or factor 
being taxed are minimized (Gemmell, 1987). Thus, ‘Care should be taken 
with the pattern of complement and substitutes’. 
 
ii. ‘Taxation concerned with distribution and with externalities or market 
failure should as much possible go to the root of the problem’.  
 
iii. ‘We must recognize that it will be impossible to deal perfectly with the 
questions of distribution and market failure directly’. As a result we need 
to carefully ascertain ‘how any particular policy affects all of our 
objectives-including distribution’ since ‘optimal policy for any one tax 
will often by very sensitive to assumptions concerning the availability and 
levels of other taxes’.  
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3.4 SECTION IV: Marginal Theory of Tax Reform: A Bridge 
between Positive and Normative Analysis 
 
 
The theory of “tax reform” is interested in marginal changes from the status 
quo that can be welfare enhancing (Newbery and Stern, 1988). The practical 
appeal of the theory of marginal tax reform (MTR), particularly in developing 
countries, is that the policy makers rarely have the privilege of designing tax 
structure from scratch or of introducing extreme changes in tax structure. 
Thus, in many cases policy makers are interested in knowing empirically 
robust and theoretically consistent suggestions for improvement over the 
status quo. And in this lies the practical appeal of the theory of marginal tax 
reform. The theory of marginal tax reform was developed by Ahmad and Stern 
(1984); it is based on the optimal taxation framework and presents a structure 
for considering beneficial reforms to an existing tax system (Gemmell, 1984). 
 
 
Ahmad and Stern (1984; 1987) developed the methodology for finding 
desirable welfare-improving directions of marginal tax reform from a status-
quo, which need not be optimal. The theory assuming that a government 
maximising a social welfare function W (i.e. Bergson-Samuelson type), under 
perfect competition and constant return to scale in production, ensures that 
indirect taxes are fully passed on in the market price. Consequently, an 
increase in the tax of a commodity, ti, will raise consumer price by an equal 
amount leaving producer prices pi constant. Given that government wants to 
raise one rupee in revenue at a rate ∂R/∂ti; the effect on social welfare will be 
∂W/∂ti.  This effect, λi or the marginal social cost (MSC) can be written as 
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λi = -(∂W/∂ti)/(∂R/∂ti),           R = t·X    3.1 
 
where t is the vector of taxes and X is the aggregate demand vector. Equation 
3.1 shows that a tax reform ∆t will be beneficial as long as it fulfils ∆W>0 and 
∆R ≥0 i.e. welfare increases without decline in revenue. As long as the present 
taxes are not-optimal (i.e. λi’s or the marginal social cost (MSC) are not 
equal), there must be at least one welfare improving tax change (Gemmell, 
1987). The general idea is that tax on the good with a higher MSC should be 
lowered while that on a good which has lower MSC should be raised 
(Madden, 1995). In general we should not expect uniqueness from the whole 
collection of beneficial reforms (Newbery and Stern, 1988). However, if we 
define optimum as a state no beneficial reform can be identified then this 
would mean that all λ’s are the same. Thus, the theories of optimality and the 
theory of marginal tax reform are very close (Newbery and Stern, 1988).  
 
 
According to Ahmad and Stern (1984), it is possible to show that (∂R/∂ti) is a 
function of responses of aggregate demand to changes in ti and the vector of 
tax rates. It was shown by Ahmad and Stern (1984) that aggregate demand 
changes responses must be considered as long as price effects are significant 
and different from zero. Having defined a social welfare function (SWF), 
∂W/∂ti can be estimated using household consumption patterns and welfare 
weights attached to household’s utility in SWF and ∂W/∂ti will be sensitive to 
what is being consumed by the ‘poor’ and the ‘rich’ and value judgements 
related to preferences of equality in the society (Gemmell, 1987).  
 
According to Madden (1995) this approach has considerable advantage over 
the theory of optimal taxation as it does not require the choice of explicit 
utility functions or explicit model of distribution of income. What it requires is 
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information on the actual position of the economy at that time, using actual 
aggregate consumptions rather than individual demand responses. 
 
Ahmad and Stern (1984), using data on household consumption for nine 
consumption goods and taxes for India 1979-80, estimated λi’s for these nine 
groups. They found ranking of λi’s to be very sensitive to the inequality 
aversion parameter used. Under no inequality aversion, they found the existing 
tax structure to be optimal; however when a higher inequality aversion was 
used there was always at least one welfare improving reform.  
 
Ahmad and Stern (1987; 1991) in addition to identifying welfare improving 
direction of reform also provide a methodology for solving the ‘inverse 
optimum problem’66 and this detailed empirical study is extended to Pakistan 
in addition to India. The concept of MTR theory is extended to incorporate 
effective taxes and shadow prices67; which they illustrate by calculating 
effective taxes and shadow prices for 87 sub-sectors for Pakistan and 90 sub-
sectors for India. They calculate marginal social cost (MSC) for nine 
commodity aggregation for India (based on demand system estimates taken 
from the Radhakrishna and Murty (1981) study) and thirteen commodity 
groups for Pakistan (taken from Ahmad, Ludlow and Stern (1988) estimates 
based on food and clothing items categories and other estimates from earlier 
work of Ahmad and Stern (1986), Ahmad, Coady and Stern (1988) and 
Ahmad, Ludlow and Stern (1988)). The demand systems for Pakistan and 
India were both estimated using the linear expenditure system using cross 
sectional data. The main results from the studies are as follows: 
 
                                                 
66 Inverse optimum problem can be defined as computing the set of social welfare weights for 
which the existing tax system would be optimal.  
67 The shadow prices represent the element of tax (or subsidy) in percentage term that each 
good is subject to. Ideally, this price should be set by taking into account tariffs, taxes, 
subsidies and other transfers; all of which contribute to the determination of domestic price of 
a good (Deaton, 1997). 
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• Taxes on fuel, sugar and other food appear to result in consistently 
high social cost. 
• Taxes on milk and milk products, meat, fish and edible oils appear to 
entail low social cost. 
• The author finds λ’s to be very sensitive to the level of inequality 
aversion used.  
• When only efficiency considerations are given prominence results 
appear to support inverse elasticity rule. 
• Solving for inverse optimum problem reveals that Pareto-welfare 
improving reforms are possible and the authors identify two such 
reforms. They also show that marginal tax reform theory results are 
much less sensitive to model specification and parameters estimates 
compared with non-marginal reform68.  
 
Even though the marginal theory of reform provides a unique opportunity of 
ex-ante tax policy planning and reform analysis, its application due to data 
problems has been largely limited to developed countries69. The sensitivity of 
MSC ranking to elasticity parameters like Ahmad and Stern (1984; 1987; 
1991) is also supported by Madden (1989). Cragg, 1991 reports the MSC 
ranking of 10 commodity groups in Canada. He reports that if the Government 
gave more importance to equity; it would be desirable to increase taxation of 
recreation, electricity, tobacco and communication while lowering taxation of 
alcohol, food, fuel, gas and reading materials. The explicit issue of modelling 
externalities in such model is undertaken by Irvine and Sims (1993) for 
Canada. The novelty of the study is calculation of MSC ranking of 19 
alcoholic beverages for different values of the externality corrective charge.  
                                                 
68 Due to its appeal and relatively small informational requirement the theory of MTR has been 
used extensively  for instance see Decoster and Schokkaert (1989) for Belgiam, Madden 
(1989, 1995 and 1997) for Ireland, and Cragg (1991) and Irvine and Sims (1993) for Canada.  
69 For application in developed countries see Madden (1989;1995;1997), Cragg (1991), Irvine 
and Sims (1993), and Kaplaoglou and Newbery (2003a; 2003b). 
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Madden (1995;1997) extends the Ahmad and Stern (1984) model of indirect 
tax reform for Ireland to a corresponding concept of marginal revenue cost 
(MRC) (i.e. reciprocal of MSC). The novelty of this analysis is the inclusion 
of labour supply in the original model so that the underlying consumer 
demand and labour supply responses have to be jointly determined using a 
commodity demand-labour supply model. The important finding is that author 
provides empirical support for Deaton’s (1987) theoretical conjecture, as his 
results show that the recommendation of marginal tax reform theory are less 
sensitive to the assumption of separability compared with those that are 
derived from optimal tax rates70. An important issue of separability of 
consumption patterns between income groups is also assessed by Kaplaoglou 
and Newbery (2003a; 2003b). Estimation is carried out for 12 commodity 
aggregation level. Their findings reveal that consumption patterns in Greece 
are not sufficiently differentiated to allow for an important distributive role to 
the indirect taxes. 
  
We can see from the discussion  above that, except for Ahmad and Stern’s 
seminal work, most of the work on marginal tax reform has largely focused on 
the developed countries. Estimation of consumer behaviour requires accurate 
and robust price information based on historical time series data on prices but 
this information has been generally unavailable for most of the developing 
countries. As a result, some researchers in developing countries have resorted 
to using unit values, ratio of expenditure to quantities, directly for estimation 
of price elasticities (for instance see Deaton, 1988; Timmer and Alderman, 
1979; Timmer, 1981; and Pitt, 1983), while others have relied on using fairly 
restrictive systems such as linear expenditure system (for example Ahmad and 
Stern’s own seminal work). However, both methods are not free from serious 
                                                 
70 Though Madden 1997 reports results do not appear to be sensitive to the inclusion of 
conditioning variable but results do appear to be sensitive to the choice of the conditioning 
variable used.  
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problems. For instance, unit values cannot be directly treated as market prices 
because unit value reflects quality choices as well as the effects of price and 
income of consumers (Deaton, 1988). And using a restrictive demand system 
which assumes preferences to be additive, tax reform prescription tends to be 
quite simple and in most cases “under these assumptions, empirical analysis is 
unnecessary, since the answer is predetermined” (Deaton, 1987).  
 
Although, application of marginal theory of tax reform particularly for 
developing countries is at very elementary stage of development (as 
mentioned above)  use of survey data does provide a unique opportunity to 
move discussion further in the area of ex-ante analysis of price and tax 
reforms in developing countries. Also, marginal theory of tax reforms provides 
some useful theoretical underpinning of this rather than ad hoc tax  reforms 
that have been carried out in many developing countries which have solely 
focused on revenue and administrative aspect while completely neglecting the 
social welfare aspect of these reforms (Gemmell, 1987).  
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3.5 SECTION V: Conclusion 
 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to review range of literature that is important 
for my research. The first section discussed partial equilibrium tax incidence 
approach, its limitations and how some of fundamental concerns associated 
with this approach have been mitigated by researchers. The second section of 
this chapter has tried to show that despite the fact that no two tax incidence 
studies are the same, some inference from partial equilibrium tax incidence 
literature is possible, if evidence is summarized in terms of tax progression. 
The third and fourth sections of this chapter have tried to highlight how tax 
incidence analysis can inform policy concerned with normative issue of how 
social welfare should be maximised. These sections have also tried to show 
sensitivity of normative tax incidence analysis to its underlying assumptions, 
which may or may not be true. And this, we believe further highlights the 
importance of undertaking partial equilibrium tax incidence analysis. 
 
Since the aim of this study is social incidence of indirect taxation in Pakistan, 
given the data availability and our research question, we believe the literature 
survey has highlighted that partial equilibrium tax incidence approach is 
adequate. However, there are some limitations, particularly relating to inability 
of this approach to incorporate certain features of developing countries such as 
informal markets, corruption etc., thus cautious interpretations of the results is 
warranted. 
  
This literature survey has highlighted another important aspect that pre-
occupation with the progressivity, regressivity or neutrality of this or that tax 
has failed to make use of the very feature of partial equilibrium tax incidence 
approach that is also its strength i.e. ability to disaggregate. We believe this 
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survey has highlighted the importance of asking the right questions for 
research, such as impact of particular type of reform process on progressivity 
of the underlying tax structure overtime etc., along with the importance of 
further disaggregating the tax incidence results in order to better inform the tax 
policy decisions. A large literature on tax progression has shied away such 
minute and explicit focus on taxation of particular commodities that may be 
more important for the poor. We believe this further disaggregation is vital 
and must be explored; as a result, this study will follow this approach. 
  
The discussion on normative analysis of tax incidence analysis by 
incorporating the theory of optimal taxation as well as the marginal theory of 
tax reform, has tried to highlight that despite the wider appeal of this 
approach, results are sensitive to the underlying tax incidence assumptions 
which may or may not be true. The prescriptions in optimal tax theory are 
sensitive to assumption about own- and cross- price elasticities, e.g. the 
Ramsey rule is premised on the assumption that cross- price effects are zero. 
We believe this is a critical assumption and more research particularly in the 
developing countries needs to go into the estimation of own- and cross- price 
elasticities, given these estimates are critical for ex-ante tax policy reforms 
analysis. This estimation may also be very important given partial equilibrium 
tax incidence analysis is often criticised for the way demand responses are 
treated i.e. via ad-hoc tax shifting assumptions. We believe estimation of price 
elasticities can really help show how sensitive results from these models really 
are and shed light on further credibility of this approach. Thus, this study will 
attempt to estimate own- and cross- price elasticities to contribute to this 
discussion. 
  
Additionally, although it is evident from the literature on the theory of 
marginal tax reforms in developing countries, that this literature is at its early 
stage of empirical development but literature review has also shown that this 
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area (despite its limitations) provides a unique opportunity for ex-ante tax 
reform analysis and planning. The operational and data requirements of this 
approach are much less intensive than the theory of optimal taxation and 
results may be much more relevant for the policy makers in developing 
countries. As a result, we believe estimation of demand responses is also 
necessary to take debate further from tax progression to analysis of tax reform 
and planning analysis. This study will attempt to do that for Pakistan. 
  
Given that partial equilibrium tax incidence analysis is deemed adequate in the 
light of literature survey for our research question, the next chapter deals in 
detail with the micro-data set that will be used in this study.
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CHAPTER IV:  Data Issues and Methodology 
 
 
4  Introduction 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the data and methodological issues pertaining to 
this study. The primary data source that will be used in this study is the Household 
Integrated Economic Survey (HIES) for 1990-91 and 2001-02 both of which are 
micro cross-sectional data sets collected by the Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS) 
Pakistan. These data sets provide extensive information on household income and 
expenditure patterns in Pakistan. As already discussed (in the previous chapter) given 
the aim of this study, partial equilibrium tax incidence approach appears to be 
adequate. Thus, this study will proceed with tax incidence analysis at micro level and 
issues related to data set are discussed in this chapter. 
  
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section presents an overview 
of the underlying data source. The second section talks about how information present 
in the HIES data set is used to construct a household expenditure aggregate and 
discusses other methodological issues related to this calculation. Section three 
presents the estimates of household welfare in the pre- and post-reform era followed 
by, section four which presents a disaggregated view of household expenditures in 
(1990-91) and (2001-02). The aim is to show how expenditures have changed over 
time and identify various expenditure categories (based on expenditure patterns) as 
necessities or luxuries. Section five concludes the discussion. 
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4.1 Data and related issues
71
 
 
 
The Household Integrated Economics Survey (HIES) has been conducted by the 
Federal Bureau of Statistics (FBS) Pakistan, with some breaks from time to time since 
July 1963.  It is the main data source for: (a) providing data on household income and 
expenditure; and (b) for estimating household saving and liabilities (Asian 
Development Bank, 2006). HIES survey prior to 1998-99 used to be an independent 
survey but in 1998-99 it was merged with Pakistan Integrated Economic Survey 
(PIHS)72 and as a result the last two HIES surveys- 1998-99 and 2001-02- were 
collected together with PIHS survey.  
 
The HIES 1990-91 and PIHS/HIES 2001-02 sample consists of 6,516 and 14,713 
households respectively and this ample is considered to be sufficient to give estimates 
of key variable at national and provincial level at 95% level of confidence interval 
with 5-7 percent margin of error (FBS, HIES 01-02, pp. 21 and FBS, HIES 90-91, pp. 
15) 73. Further information on sample size and allocation is given in Table 4.1 below. 
 
                                                 
71 For detailed information on the HIES design and sampling methodology, please see Appendix 4.1. 
72 The PIHS was first started in (1995-96) with an intention of providing estimates to monitor 
Government social action program (SAP).  
73 For HIES (1990-91) and (2001-02), 123 and 90 households respectively could not be enumerated for 
various reasons (FBS, HIES 1990-91, pp. 16; FBS, HIES 2001-02). 
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Table 4.1: Household Distribution (both Survey’s) 
Total Households: (1990-91)  Total Households (2001-02) 
Punjab 3,192 50% 6,313 43%
Urban 1,258 39% Urban 2,544 40%
Rural 1,934 61% Rural 3,769 60%
Sindh 1,663 26% 3,707 25%
Urban 837 50% Urban 1,533 41%
Rural 826 50% Rural 2,174 59%
NWFP 905 14% 2,668 18%
Urban 390 43% Urban 842 32%
Rural 515 57% Rural 1,826 68%
Balochistan 633 10% 2,025 14%
Urban 233 37% Urban 621 31%
Rural 400 63% Rural 1,404 69%
6,393 14,713
Urban 2,718 43% Urban 5,540 38%
Rural 3,675 57% Rural 9,173 62%
Source: Authors own calculation using HIES (1990-91) & (2001-02).  
 
Accordingly, this translates into following distribution of population for these years: 
 
Table 4.2: Distribution of Population (as % of total Population) 
Urban Rural Total
Punjab 0.17 0.43 0.60
Sindh 0.10 0.14 0.24
NWFP 0.02 0.11 0.13
Balochistan 0.01 0.03 0.04
Total 0.29 0.71 1.00
Punjab 0.17 0.46 0.63
Sindh 0.11 0.12 0.23
NWFP 0.02 0.09 0.11
Balochistan 0.01 0.02 0.03
Total 0.31 0.69 1.00
2001-02
1990-91
Source: Authors own calculation using HIES (1990-91) & (2001-
02).  
 
Thus, according to Table 4.2, in 1990-91, 69 percent of population resided in the rural 
areas while 31 percent of population lived in urban areas. In terms of distribution of 
total population on provincial basis, 63 percent of total population lived in Punjab, 23 
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percent in Sindh, 11 percent in NWFP and around 3 percent in Balochistan. 
According to HIES (2001-02) estimates, surprisingly the rural share of population 
slightly increased to 71 percent while urban share declined to 29 percent. On 
provincial basis, population slightly declined in Punjab while it slightly increased in 
all other provinces.  
 
If we compare this with Population Census for Pakistan (1981; 1998), according to 
the census estimates the share of urban population in Pakistan increased from 31 
percent to 33.6 percent while rural population on the other hand decreased from 69 
percent to 66.4 percent respectively. Thus, although, 1990-91 HIES survey population 
distribution estimates are quite accurate, it appears 2001-02 HIES survey is slightly 
over-estimating rural population and under-estimating urban population overtime74. 
This is quite surprising given the migration and urbanization that has been taking 
place in Pakistan. This anomaly according to ADB (2006) is related to the urban 
sampling frame of HIES (2001-02) survey. The problem is that although the rural 
sampling frame (as mentioned earlier) has been updated but the urban sampling frame 
has not been updated since 1995. As a consequence HIES (2001-02) survey appears to 
overestimate the rural population (World Bank 2002; ADB 2006).  
 
 
4.1.1 HIES (1990-91) and (2001-02): Developments over time 
  
 
Although various HIES surveys are collected by the same organization intended to 
capture the same information yet over the years there have been some changes in data 
collection methods and questionnaire design. These include: 
  
                                                 
74 Arif (2003) also reports a slight decline in percentage of households or individuals in urban areas 
based on the results of HIES and PIHS for (1995-96) and (2001-02).  
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(a) HIES (1990-91) survey like its predecessors was collected by a single male 
enumerator interviewing only the male members of the households but after the 
PIHS/HIES merge75, subsequent HIES surveys have been collected by a mobile team 
of male and female enumerators under day to day management of a team supervisor 
which allowed the team to interview both the male and the female members of the 
households. This has definitely improved the quality of data collection overtime since 
in Pakistan, females members are at the centre of day to day household management. 
  
(b) After PIHS/HIES merge, minor expenditure categories that were considered 
obsolete were either removed or merged with other categories. It is generally agreed 
that such minor changes should not effect the direct comparability between both the 
HIES survey (FBS 2001 and World Bank 2002). 
 
 (c) There has been a change in the recall period of some categories (see for instance 
Table 4.3). In HIES (1990-91) all food expenditure items were recalled on monthly 
basis while in HIES (2001-02) most of these are recalled on fortnightly basis. 
Although this can possibly have some affect on comparison of both surveys it is not 
likely to be too dramatic. For instance, according to Deaton (1997, pp26) “we should 
perhaps not be too concerned with the discrepancies that are attributable to differences 
in reporting periods, at least over the practical range”.  
 
(d) It is also argued by Kemal (2003) that HIES and PIHS surveys understate the 
income accruing to the highest income group. In some cases it is also reported that 
poorest households are also inadequately represented or systematically excluded 
particularly those that are homeless and illiterate (Zaidi, 1992; Gazdar, 2000); while 
some have pointed towards possible underreporting at both tails (Jehle, 1990). 
However, this issue is not just an issue pertaining to HIES but it is often argued that 
this is a common observation about large surveys in general (ADB, 2006).  
 
                                                 
75 i.e. HIES (1998-99) and (2001-02). 
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Thus, it must be mentioned here that most of the issues mentioned above are not that 
serious particularly in the context of this study, which is interested in measurement of 
tax incidence not poverty or inequality since data comparability requirements for 
latter types of analysis are much more stringent. 
  
Additionally, it needs to be mentioned that HIES survey overall is very good quality 
cross sectional data source. Over the years this survey has been used intensively by 
domestic and foreign scholars, and government and multilateral agencies. For instance 
see, (Ahmad and Stern (1987; 1991), Deaton (1987; 1997), Deaton and Grimard 
(1992), Alderman and Garcia (1993); Malik (1988); Aamjad, et al. (1997); Jafri 
(1999); Anwar et al. (2005); Kamal et al. (2003); World Bank (1995; 2002); ADB 
(2006); CRPRID (2003; 2005; 2006), to name but a few.  
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Table 4.3: Expenditure questionnaire of HIES (1990-91) and (2001-02) 
 
Expenditures 1990 - 91 2001-02 
 Frequency Respondent Frequency Respondent 
1. Food items 
 
a. Milk and milk products 
b. Meat and fish 
c. Poultry 
d. Fresh fruits 
e. Vegetables 
f. Dry fruits & nuts 
g. Condiment and Spices 
h. Sugar, honey and sugar preparation 
i. Non-alcoholic bev. 
j. Ready made food and drinks 
 
k. Cereals 
l. Pulses (split & whole) 
m. Edible Oils & fats 
n. Tea and coffee 
o. Baked and fried products 
p. Misc. food items 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Monthly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Monthly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Male 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Male 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fortnightly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Monthly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Female 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Female 
 
2. Tobacco and chewing products 
 
Monthly Male Monthly Male 
3. Fuel and lighting 
 
Monthly Male Monthly Male 
4. Misc. expenses 
a. Personal care articles 
b. Personal care services 
c. Household cleaning articles 
d. Recreation and reading 
e. Personal transport and travel 
f. Other misc. household expenses 
 
 
Monthly 
 
 
 
 
Monthly 
 
Male 
 
 
 
 
Male 
 
Monthly 
 
 
 
 
Monthly 
 
Female 
 
 
 
 
Male 
 
5. Apparel, textile, footwear and personal 
effects 
 
Annual Male Annual Male 
6. Housing 
a. House Rent and Housing expenses 
b. Chinaware, earthenware etc. 
 
Annual Male Annual Male 
7. Misc. Expenditure Non-Durables 
a. Medical Care 
b. Recreation 
c. Transport and Travel 
d. Educational and Professional expenses 
e. Other misc. expenses 
 
 
Annual 
 
Male 
 
Annual 
 
Male 
8. Household Durable Expenses Annual Male Annual Male 
Source: HIES questionnaires 1990-91 and 2001-02 
 
 
We now move to talk about other methodological issues pertaining to measurement of 
household welfare aggregate.  
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4.2  Issues in Constructing Household Welfare Aggregate using HIES data 
 
 
4.2.1  Unit of Analysis  
 
 
 The term unit of analysis refers to the unit with reference to which the welfare and 
tax analysis will be undertaken. This study takes household as the basis of 
measurement76. Thus, by doing so we are implicitly assuming that all household 
resources are pooled and shared equally among all household members. This is a 
simplistic assumption not necessarily a realistic one (Blundell et al., 1994; Creedy 
1998; Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995). 
 
 
4.2.2 Per Capita or Adult Equivalent 
 
It is important to point out that the welfare as well as tax incidence analysis in this 
study uses the ‘per capita’ (i.e. dividing by family size) basis insread of the ‘adult 
equivalent’ basis. This is because, in the case of Pakistan, there is no single official 
definition of adult equivalent which makes such analysis difficult. 
 
 
4.2.3 Measurement of Household Welfare 
 
 
                                                 
76 According to the FBS, a ‘household’ is defined as either a single person household or a multi-person 
household. A single person household is one where the individual makes provisions for his/her own 
food and other essentials of living, without combining these resources with any other person and has no 
usual place of residence elsewhere. A multi-person household on the other hand is defined as a group 
of two or more person who make some common provision for food or other essentials of living and 
which has no usual place of residence elsewhere. Thus, the persons constituting the group may pool 
their incomes and have a common budget to a greater or lesser extent; they may be related or unrelated 
or a combination of both... 
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Since the aim of the present research is to evaluate the indirect tax system, its 
progressivity, etc. the issue of measurement of welfare is required for ranking 
households in terms of welfare. Thus, even though measurement of welfare is not 
central to this research, adequate approximation of welfare is required to carry out tax 
incidence analysis in this study. However, it may not be wrong to say that our concern 
regarding welfare is primarily concerned with measuring the economic component of 
standard of living Deaton and Grosh, 2000). Thus in doing so we do not claim to 
cover any non-economic components of living standards, such as health, education, 
political freedom etc., which can be equally important but cannot be adequately 
captured by any simple monetary measure (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002). Our discussion 
here will mainly focus on two most prominent and commonly used indicators of well-
being; income and consumption77.  
 
The choice between annual income and consumption as an indicator of welfare is a 
frequently debated and discussed issue. It would not be wrong to say that both are two 
different concepts not just two different ways of measuring income (Deaton and 
Grosh, 2000). For instance, income together with assets measures a person’s or 
household’s potential claims on the economy while consumption measures what 
people actually acquired (Deaton and Grosh, 2000). However, both can be defended 
as approximation to utility; and as a result has been extensively used for analysis.  
 
There is no doubt that average income in the long-run is the most appropriate 
indicator of living standard (Anand and Harris, 1990). In longer term, such as 
lifetime, the average level of consumption (including bequests) must be equal to the 
average level of income (including inheritance); thus the choice between the two, 
does not matter (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002). However, over a shorter reference period 
such as one year, there is reason to believe that short-run income may be a poor proxy 
of long term income. The main problem with using annual income data is that on a 
                                                 
77 The aim of this section is not to provide exhaustive survey of this argument but only to highlight 
some of the main points. For an exhaustive survey, see e.g. Anand and Harris (1990), McGregor and 
Borooah (1992).  
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short term it can suffer from high fluctuation and sometimes this variability is present 
even across years. (Deaton, 1997).  
 
In the view of such criticism current consumption has received much attention as a 
better indicator of welfare particularly for developing countries: (a) there is 
substantial evidence that even where income fluctuates a great deal in short term, 
consumption is relatively smoother and less variable than income (Chaudhuri and 
Ravallion, 1994); (b) there is empirical evidence supporting income smoothing in 
poor agricultural societies with limited ability to borrow (Paxson, 1992;1993; Deaton, 
1997) ; (c) in countries with substantial agriculture sector, self-employment and 
informal sector, it is impossible to get a credible income measure without multiple 
seasonal visits to the households; something that is rarely done (Deaton and Zaidi, 
2002;; Havinga et al, 1989; Malik 1991; and Younger, 1999); (d) consumption of 
certain items follows life cycle pattern which is independent of changes in income 
(Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954) and ; (e) for evaluating the impact of price, subsidy 
and taxation policies where the main concern is the price changes caused by policy 
changes; consumption data is invaluable (Deaton and Grosh, 2000). Since all these 
issues are very important particularly for developing countries, this study like many 
others has opted to using current consumption as a measure of welfare. 
 
 
4.2.4  Measurement of Household Consumption aggregate? 
 
 
After having decided (based on discussion in the preceding section) that this study 
will use consumption as measure of household welfare, we are now in a position to 
move this discussion forward on how this study will construct the real value of total 
household consumption that will be used as the indicator of households standard of 
living. 
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4.2.4.1  What is included in Household Consumption aggregate? 
 
 
Since this study uses expenditure as an indicator of household welfare it is important 
to explicitly address the question what this indicator includes. The HIES survey 
consists of expenditure on food, non-food, durable and non-durable items (for 
example see Table 4.3 for further detail). Essentially total household  expenditure 
must contain all types of expenditure brought to a common frequency (annual in our 
case) with a few exceptions78. Another important aspect is the types of expenditures. 
HIES survey contains information on two broad types of expenditures; namely paid & 
consumed and unpaid & consumed 79. Such distinction in consumption type can be of 
importance for developing countries. Thus, although both types of expenditure are 
included while calculating the household welfare indicator, tax liabilities are 
calculated only with reference to the market purchased expenditures. 
 
 
4.2.4.2  Dealing with Household durable expenses 
 
                                                 
78 Exceptions normally followed are: (a) Expenditure on levies and taxes (such as house and property 
tax, annual license fee for arms, fines, birth/marriage taxes and annual registration fees) are not 
included in the welfare indicator since these are essentially not part of consumption but rather a 
deduction from income (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002). (b) Certain type of health expenses (such as medical 
fees paid to doctor/specialist and hospitalisation charges) are also excluded from the welfare indicator 
given if included they will appear to increase the welfare of the household where as in reality opposite 
has happened (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002). (c) Lumpy expenditures (such as expenditure on food and 
drinks on birth/marriage/death ceremonies are excluded) because these are “lumpy” and “infrequent 
expenditures” and ideally should be “smoothed” out but since such information is not available it 
would be better to leave them out (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002). For instance, Howes and Zaidi (1994) 
report for PIHS (1991) that less than 8 percent households reported making a dowry payment during 
the past 12 months but these expenses made up almost 20 percent of their total annual consumption. 
All of the above expense categories are also not included in our household welfare indicator.  
79 paid & consumed refers to a formal market transaction where an item is directly purchased from the 
market by paying for it and unpaid & consumed refers to informal transaction where an item is 
consumed either via own production, barter exchange, or gift/assistance. 
 102 
 
The issue of dealing with household durables expenditures while constructing a 
household welfare indicator based on consumption is an important and problematic 
one. It is problematic because for major durable items in short run, consumption and 
expenditure are not closely related to each other; as a result, expenditure is a very 
poor guide to their consumption as consumption of durable items must be linked to 
their stock not to purchases (Deaton and Grosh, 2000).   
 
Empirically, this issue has been treated broadly in three different ways. (a) 
Expenditure on durable items is treated no differently from other expenditure as a 
result no adjustment is made (Goodman and Webb, 1995); (b) expenditure on the 
lumpiest items such as cars, home repair is excluded, while other durables are 
included (Deaton et al, 1989; World Bank 2002); and (c) only expenditure on non-
durable items is included (Prais and Houthakker, 1971).   
 
However, for studies explicitly interested in tax incidence analysis, this issue is more 
complicated because taxation of durable items such as TV, cars, electric fans etc. may 
constitute a very important part of consumption taxes such as VAT. As a result some 
proxy of durable good consumption needs to be imputed in order to get the correct tax 
incidence picture. As a consequence, some studies explicitly dealing with tax 
incidence analysis have made a specific attempt of imputing flow of durable good 
consumption from their stock. These studies have made a simplifying assumption that 
households in a given year only consume ten percent of the current value of the stock 
of durable items (e.g. Johnson et al., 1989; Younger et al., 1999; Refaqat, 2003) we 
also follow this procedure80.  
  
 
4.2.4.3  Cost of living adjustment 
 
                                                 
80 Though it must be admitted that use of such a depreciation/proxy measure is fairly arbitrary.  
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This brings us to another important issue of cost of living adjustment across 
household survey. In developing countries the main issue pertaining to the use of 
household survey data appears to be spatial price variation i.e. people in different 
parts of the country pay different prices for consuming the same goods which also 
depends on inflation and seasonality. In many cases spatial price variation tend to be 
quite large in both the relative and absolute price differences and must be accounted 
for (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002). In comparison this issue tends to be much less 
pronounced in household surveys of developed countries because well developed and 
inexpensive transportation and distribution systems (for most consumer goods) appear 
to minimize the spatial price variation (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002).  
 
 
In order to make nominal consumption aggregates comparable across time and space 
one can use Paasche index (i.e. current weighted), and Laspeyres price index (i.e. base 
weighted)81. We use the Paasche price index because even though both indexes are 
weighted average of price ratios, the former is weighted by expenditure in the current 
period while the latter index is weighted by expenditure at the base period. As a 
result, Paasche index is a preferable price index to adjust cost of living differences 
(Deaton and Zaidi, 2002).  
 
Following Deaton and Zaidi (2002) we can write the household money metric utility 
function as:  
h
P
h
h
p
hh
h
m
P
x
p
qp
u =≈
.
       4.1 
 
Where hmu  represent the minimum cost of reaching utility level 
hu at prices 0p   
                                                 
81 Recently a superlative price index i.e. the Fisher Ideal index (which is a geometric mean of 
Laspeyres and the Paasche index) has also been used for deflation of nominal aggregate but such 
refinement may make more sense in poverty analysis. 
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Where Paasche index, 
h
hh
h
p
qp
qp
P
.
.
0
=     4.2 
 
Or we can rewrite equation (4.2) intuitively in terms of how actually it will be 
calculated using household survey data 
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wP      4.3 
 
where ikw  is the average budget share of item k in the primary sampling unit i; 
ikp  is the median price of item k in the primary sampling unit i; 
kp0  is the national median price of item k. 
 
The Paasche price index using equation 4.3 is constructed at the level of primary 
sampling unit (PSU) compared to the household level. According to the World Bank 
(2002), this is a preferable method because it helps avoid the effect of outliers in some 
households and also of cases in which household consumes most of its budget by 
eating outside. Furthermore, the price ratio is constructed using median prices, this 
according to Deaton and Tarozzi (2000), preferable to using average prices because 
they avoid the effect of outliers.  
 
Additionally, some extra qualifications are required to understand how equation 4.3 is 
estimated. Although, estimating ikw  (i.e. is the budget share of item k in the PSU i), is 
fairly straight forward from survey data but the calculation of price ratio is not. 
According to Deaton and Grosh (2000), LSMS and other surveys contain three 
possible sources of prices: (a) survey itself, since household survey in many cases 
report both quantities and expenditures for most food items. Thus, we can estimate 
unit values i.e. dividing expenditures by quantities; (b) prices collected along with the 
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household survey) and; (c) other official sources for price data such as Government 
price surveys. 
  
For our estimation, price ratio in equation 4.3, is estimated using unit value (i.e. 
dividing expenditure by quantities) for food items from survey data which is a widely 
acceptable and followed method82. However, it is important to keep in mind that unit 
value is not the same as ‘actual prices’, without adjustment for quality differences in 
purchases across household and measurement error correction (Deaton, 1997). 
However, spatial variation of unit value has been found to be closely related to the 
actual price variation especially when averaged over households in a cluster/PSU 
(Deaton and Zaidi, 2002).  
 
Additionally, it must be mentioned that  Paasche index is calculated from unit values 
for food items only. Thus, this procedure makes an implicit and simplifying 
assumption that the household cost of living is exactly proportional to standard of 
living, it is adequate in the presence of unavailability of information on quantities for 
non-food items (World Bank, 2002).  
 
Finally, we calculate Paasche price index at primary sampling unit (PSU) level in 
order to remove price differences between urban and rural areas and between 
provinces. These indexes are given in Table 4.4. 
                                                 
82 Additionally, other price sources mentioned above were of limited or no use. For instance price data 
from community questionnaire was not available for Pakistan. And using price data from government 
price survey according to Deaton and Zaidi (2002; 40), should be a last resort because such data is 
often thin on ground and for many households the nearest observed price is so far away that it is 
irrelevant.  
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Table 4.4: Paasche Price Index at Primary Sampling Unit (PSU) level 
 2001-02 1990-91 
Regions   
Urban 1.15 1.00 
Rural 1.00 0.92 
Provinces   
Punjab 1.03 0.90 
Sindh 1.10 0.97 
NWFP 1.15 0.97 
Balochistan 1.16 1.05 
Source: Author’s own calculation using HIES (1990-91) and (2001-02) 
  
 
4.2.4.4  Inflation adjustment between Surveys 
 
 
Given we are also comparing two surveys over time we need to make some 
adjustment in need to ensure that the welfare comparison between two periods are not 
driven as a result of inflation. We use consumer price index (CPI) to infer how much 
prices have changed between the two surveys and adjust our estimates accordingly. 
  
 
4.2.4.5  Total Sample Size 
 
 
FBS ensures the overall quality of HIES data by providing researcher with “clean data 
set” i.e. pre-checked for consistency, elimination of gross outliers and coding errors. 
As a result, almost all studies (mentioned earlier) have opted to work with the full 
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sample83. However, nine households were removed from HIES (2001-02) sample 
since there was no reported expenditure on any fortnightly items which is the most 
basic category dealing with food necessities.  
 
 
4.3 Household Expenditure Analysis (1990-91 & 2001-02)
 84
 
 
4.3.1 National Expenditure Comparison
85
 
 
 
Table 4.5 and Figure 4.1 present estimates for household welfare (measured in terms 
of annualized total household per capita expenditure as discussed in the previous 
chapter) at national level. Perhaps a relevant point before embarking on welfare 
analysis is to determine what proportion of population in both years can be designated 
as ‘poor’. It appears in 1990-91 almost thirty percent of national population was 
below the official poverty line86 and consequently can be termed as the poor, while 
the incidence of poverty for Pakistan significantly increased over the decade of 1990s 
as by 2001-02 almost 40 percent of the total national population was below the 
official poverty line. 
 
This is in line with the national poverty trends during the decade of 1990 for Pakistan. 
For instance, Jafri (1999) and World Bank (2004) estimate head count poverty ratio 
for Pakistan for 1990-91 to be 27 percent and 34 percent respectively while for 2000-
01, World Bank (2004), DFID (2003) and CRPRID (2003) estimate head count 
                                                 
83 Only exception is Cheema (2005), who provides official poverty line estimates for Pakistan. After 
carrying out minute and careful analysis of HIES (2001-02) data set, this study removed only 16 
households or 0.1 percent of sample size.   
84 ‘Expenditure’ or ‘consumption’ referred to anywhere in the chapter refers to household annual per 
capita (pc) expenditures unless mentioned otherwise. 
85 Deciles here are based on household ranking in terms of annual pc expenditures.  
86 The Government of Pakistan official poverty line estimates for (2000-01) is PRs. 725 per month. 
This line (adjusted for inflation rate) is used in this study to identify households falling below poverty 
line for (1990-91) and (2001-02). 
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poverty ratio for Pakistan to be 37 percent, 34 percent and 38.5 percent respectively. 
According to World Bank (2002) growth and consumption poverty appear to be 
strongly linked. For instance according to the same source, between (1990-94) the 
average annual per capita GDP growth was around 2 percent while poverty declined 
by 5 percentage point. In contrast, during (1993-99) when per capita GDP grew only 
at an average annual rate of 1.4 percent, poverty increased by 4 percentage point. 
Furthermore the largest increase in poverty took place between (1996-99), when per 
capita GDP grew at a rate of less than 1 percent. However, slow per capita GDP 
growth was not the only reason for increase in poverty in Pakistan during the 1990s. 
For instance, according to World Bank (2002) skewed pattern of landownership, poor 
access to education and health facilities, lack of critical infrastructure and restrictive 
social grouping, all exacerbated poverty during this period. 
 
If we look at household welfare, during 1990-9187 it is estimated that Pakistani 
household on average (at per capita and annual level) was consuming around PRs88. 
13,140 while the average consumption of the poorest and the richest ten percent of 
population was PRs. 5,243 and PRs. 37,628 respectively. By 2001-02 it appears that a 
Pakistani household on average was consuming (at per capita and annual level) 
around PRs. 11,218 while the poorest and richest ten percent of population during this 
year were consuming PRs. 4,367 and PRs. 32,782 respectively.  
 
A quick look at household welfare comparison over time reveals that household 
welfare in 2001-02 relative to 1990-91 at national level (for instance see Figure 4.1) 
fell across all segments of population!89 It appears a Pakistani household at national 
level on average experienced almost 16 percent decline in welfare compared to 1990-
91 level. Furthermore, estimates reveal that over time the highest decline in welfare in 
2001-02 relative to 1990-91 was experienced by the poorest segment of the 
                                                 
87 All 1990-91 estimates are presented in 2001-02 prices. 
88 PRs.: Pakistan rupee.  
89 ‘Welfare’ is being measured in terms of household total annualized per capita consumption. Please 
see Chapter 3; Data Issues and Methodology for a detailed discussion.  
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population which experienced an almost 20 percent decline in welfare compared to 15 
percent decline experienced by the richest segment of population. 
 
Figure 4.5: Welfare Comparison (1990-2001) 
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Table 4.5 also presents the share of market and non-market90 transactions within total 
household expenditures. This estimate is very important given it is the transaction 
carried out in the formal market that are consequently taxable. It appears in 1990-91 
the share of informal market transactions (as percentage of total household 
expenditure) for an average Pakistani household was around 16 percent; by 2001-02 
this had increased to 19 percent. It appears in 1990-91 the poorest ten percent of 
households on average carried out 15 percent of their total household transactions in 
the informal market, this significantly increased to 22 percent by 2001-02. In 
comparison in 1990-91 the richest ten percent of population carried out 12 percent of 
transactions in the informal market. This, however, more or less remained at the same 
level over time. Thus it appears over time there was a significant increase in the share 
of informal expenditure for the poorest segment of population but same is not true for 
the most affluent segment of population. Although it is difficult to gauge why this has 
happened, one possible contributing factor could be GST broad-basing over time.  
 
 
4.3.2 Rural and Urban Expenditure Comparison 
 
 
Table 4.5 also presents welfare estimates for rural/urban households over time. It 
appears in 1990-91 a urban household on average (in terms of annual per capita 
expenditure) was consuming around PRs. 15,543 while in comparison household in 
the rural areas on average was consuming PRs. 12,07191. This meant rural households 
on average were consuming 33 percent less than their urban counterparts. In 1990-91 
almost thirty percent of urban population and forty percent of rural population was 
below the poverty line for that year92.  
                                                 
90 ‘Non-market’ here implies to household consumption made possible through barter exchange, gift or 
assistance.  
91 Urban deciles here are based on urban household ranking in terms of annual per capita expenditures 
while rural deciles are based on rural households ranking in terms of annual per capita expenditures.  
92 This is supported by urban and rural poverty estimates for Pakistan. For instance, the urban poverty 
estimates place incidence of urban poverty at the beginning of 1990s to be around 20 percent (for 
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In 1990-91 the poorest ten percent of households in the rural and urban area on 
average were consuming PRs. 5,148 and PRs. 5,424 respectively while the richest ten 
percent households in rural and urban area respectively were consuming around PRs. 
29,908 and PRs. 51,238 respectively. According to these estimates there was a clear 
welfare gap existing between the poorest and the richest segment of population. For 
example, in rural areas the poorest decile households’ proportionate consumption was 
only 18 percent of the richest decile in the same region. This was even worse for 
urban areas at 11 percent only.  
 
Another interesting piece of information is to compare welfare levels of the same 
decile households in the urban and rural areas which gives an idea of how well similar 
segments of population are doing when compared against each other. By doing this 
we find poor to middle decile households in urban/rural areas fairing better when 
compared to each other (as compared to how the affluent decile households were 
doing). For instance, rural poorest ten percent of population in terms of their urban 
counterparts was almost 94 percent; this fell to 89 percent for the middle decile 
households but to only 58 percent for the most affluent decile.  
 
In 2001-02, a rural and urban household on average was consuming (per annum per 
capita basis) around PRs. 9,718 and PRs. 14,832 respectively. During the same time 
the poorest ten percent of population in the rural and the urban areas was consuming 
PRs. 4,288 and PRs. 4,521 respectively while the richest ten percent of population in 
the rural and the urban area was consuming PRs. 21,877 and PRs. 50,201 
respectively. We can see from the shaded region in Table 5.1 that in 2001-02 almost 
30 percent of urban and forty percent of rural population was below the official 
poverty line or ‘poor’. 
                                                                                                                                            
instance see Amjad and Kemal, 1997 and Ali and Tahir, 1999) and 22-25 percent for the end of 1990s 
(see for instance FBS ,2001; and World Bank, 2002). Similarly, rural poverty incidence at the 
beginning of 1990s is estimated to be around 19-26 percent (see for example Amjad and Kemal, 1997; 
Ali and Tahir, 1999; and Jafri, 1999) while that for end of 1990’s is estimated to be around 35-40 
percent (see for example FBS, 2001; World Bank, 2002; Arif et al, 2001). 
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During this time, the poorest ten percent of population in the rural area was enjoying 
only 20 percent of consumption level being enjoyed by the richest ten percent of 
population in this region. However, situation was much worse in the urban areas 
where the urban poorest ten percent of population enjoyed only 9% of consumption 
level being enjoyed by their richest counterparts. Thus, it appears that although this 
gap had slightly decreased for the rural population but increased for the urban 
population.  
 
If we compare same segments of population in both regions, we find trends similar to 
that for 1990-91. For instance, the rural poorest ten percent proportionate 
consumption in terms of same segment of population in the urban areas was around 
95 percent (almost the same level as in 1990-91). This, however, fell to 78 percent for 
the fifth decile households (compared to 89 percent in 1990-91) and to only 65 
percent (against 58 percent for 1990-91) for the richest ten percent households. Thus, 
it appeared that in 2001-02 middle decile households in the rural areas fell further 
behind their urban counterparts compared to 1990-91. 
  
Table 4.5 also presents the share of market and non-market transactions carried out by 
the rural and the urban areas over time. In 1990-91, 96 percent of the total 
transactions of an average urban household were carried out in the formal market 
compared to 79 percent by the rural households. By 2001-02, little had changed for 
the urban areas as an urban household on average still carried out 94 percent of total 
transactions in the formal market compared to 75 percent for the rural area. 
  
However, this difference was more apparent for the poorest and richest ten percent of 
population in the urban/rural areas. For instance, in 1990-91 the poorest ten percent of 
households in the urban (rural) areas carried out 96 (83) percent of total transactions 
in the formal market while by 2001-02 this changed to 91 (74) percent respectively. 
Similarly the richest ten percent of population in the urban (rural) areas in 1990-91 
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were carrying 95 (81) percent of total transactions in the formal market but by 2001-
02 this changed to 95 (and only 75) percent. Thus, although share of formal market 
transactions in the urban areas did not change much, things changed considerably for 
the rural areas.   
 
 
4.4 Selected Commodity Expenditure Analysis (1990 – 91) & (2001 – 02) 
 
 
This section will briefly look at the main expenditure categories emerging from the 
HIES (1990-91) and (2001-02) survey. This will enable us to look at household 
expenditure patterns at a disaggregated level and allow us to characterize various 
expenditure patterns as necessities or luxuries based on the overall population 
expenditure patterns. This information is important because this analysis will not only 
help us identify categories that are more important for the poor, but this information 
will come handy when attempting to disaggregate the GST incidence picture in the 
later section.  
 
If we look at Table 4.6 we can see household disaggregated expenditure patterns at 
national level both for (1990-91) and (2001-02) [please see Appendix 4.3 for 
disaggregated expenditure patterns for the urban and the rural areas]. If we look at 
Table 4.6 we can see that in 1990-91 the most important expenditure category for a 
Pakistani household on average was food items on which households on average were 
spending around 53 percent of total household expenditure. The second important 
expenditure category for households on average appeared to be housing expenditures 
(15 percent), this was followed by clothing items (8.5 percent), fuels/utilities (6.0 
percent), transport and travelling group (4.0 percent), health (3.1 percent), tobacco 
(2.2 percent), education (1.7 percent), and durable expenses (0.52 percent). It is quite 
important to note that three particular food items namely milk, sugar and cereals 
individually were as significant (in terms of expenditure shares) for households as 
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many other non-food expenditure items as households on average were spending 10.8 
percent on milk, 10.1 percent on cereals, and 4.8 percent on edible oils.  
 
Another interesting piece of information is the general trend of these expenditure 
categories. For instance, we find expenditure on food, clothing and (surprisingly) fuel 
/utilities as a percentage of total household expenditure decrease as households 
become affluent, thus these appear to be necessities. On the other hand, proportionate 
expenditures (as a proportion of total household expenditure) on transport and travel 
group, education, and housing increase as population becomes more affluent. As a 
result these appear to be luxuries. However, expenditure share on Tobacco group 
appears to be  inverted U-shaped (it is relatively more important for the middle classes 
compared to the tails). Lastly, it was not possible to make any clear cut expenditure 
pattern across population on health and durable goods. 
  
If we look at Table 4.6 we can also see significant differences in expenditure shares 
on important expenditure categories for the poorest ten percent and the richest ten 
percent of population. For instance, in 1990-91 if we rank top three important 
categories for the poorest ten percent of population, these are food expenditures (61 
percent), clothing (9.5 percent) and housing (9.2 percent), while the top three 
expenditure categories for the richest ten percent of population are also food 
expenditures (40 percent), housing (21 percent), and transport and travel group (8.08 
percent). Thus, even though the top two expenditure categories are the same across 
both segments of population the poor are spending almost fifty percent more on the 
food items while the richest ten percent of the population is spending almost double 
on housing expenses.  
  
By 2001-02, food expenditure still remained as the most important expenditure 
category with a Pakistani household on average spending around 48 percent of total 
household expenditure on food. This is followed by housing which retains its position 
as the second most important expenditure category (on which households on average 
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are spending around 13 percent of total household expenditure). This is followed by 
fuels/utilities (8 percent), clothing (7 percent), education and travel group (both 
around 4 percent), health (2 percent), tobacco (1.6 percent) and durable items (1.4 
percent).  
 
If we look at the overall trend of expenditures across population on these 
commodities, as earlier, categories such as education, housing, travelling group and 
additionally durable items appeared to be luxuries (as expenditures on these 
categories as a percentage of total household expenditure increases as household 
become affluent) while expenditure on food, fuels/utilities and clothing still appear to 
be necessities (as expenditures on these categories as a percentage of total household 
expenditure fall as household become affluent). Surprisingly now tobacco also 
appears to be a necessity!  
 
In addition to this if we look at the average level of expenditures over time we find 
that the average expenditure on a food category has slightly fallen from 53 percent in 
1990-91 to 48 percent in 2001-02. It appears overtime average expenditure on major 
food items like milk has slightly declined, but increased for sugar and cereals. Among 
non-food expenditure categories, average expenditure shares on clothing, travelling, 
house rent, tobacco and health have slightly declined, while expenditure on durable 
items, fuels/utilities and education has slightly increased over time.  
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4.5 Conclusion 
 
 
This study will use the HIES (1990-91) and (2001-02) survey for carrying out partial 
equilibrium indirect tax incidence analysis of Pakistan. This chapter has tried to 
present an overview of the underlying data source, its methodology, data collection 
procedures along with household welfare estimates for 1990-91 and 2001-02. We 
have tried to show in this chapter that HIES survey is a carefully collected survey; it 
provides very relevant information to what is needed in this study and it is a good 
quality household cross section survey which has been utilised intensively over time 
for Pakistan. 
  
Thus, in the following chapters we are in a position of carrying out the main empirical 
analysis of this study. In next chapter we move to determining the social incidence of 
GST/VAT in Pakistan while using (1990-91) and (2001-02) HIES survey. 
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CHAPTER V: Social Incidence of General Sales Tax (GST) 
in Pakistan (1990-91) & (2001-02) 
 
 
5 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter attempts to measure the social incidence of GST in Pakistan in the pre- 
and post- reform era. We start with GST/VAT incidence because GST/VAT reforms 
were at the centre stage of the reform process embarked by Pakistan in the 1990s, and 
by the end of the reform process GST/VAT revenues emerged as the most significant 
component of Pakistan’s federal tax structure. Thus, any serious attempt at estimating 
indirect tax incidence must start with the GST/VAT incidence, which this chapter 
intends to do. 
 
Furthermore, this chapter also aims to present GST/VAT incidence picture at 
disaggregated level. The intention is to clearly show how the underlying GST/VAT 
incidence at pre- and post- reform era for the national as well as the urban/rural areas 
is being generated. We believe such discussion is important not only for 
understanding the elements that may make the overall GST/VAT incidence pattern 
progressive/regressive/proportional but also for isolating effects that may be 
distributively  more important for the poor. Furthermore, the last section of this 
chapter also focuses on the explicit issue of GST/VAT exemptions. We believe this is 
fundamentally an important issue for safeguarding the poor from GST/VAT net by 
maintaining well-targeted exemptions.  
 
This Chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section begins with the main 
aim of this chapter that is determining the GST/VAT social incidence at pre- and post- 
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reform time for national as well as for the urban/rural areas. The second section 
presents the disaggregated view of GST incidence over time at national level as well 
as for the urban/rural areas. The third section of this chapter moves to address the 
question of GST/VAT exemptions. We use distributional characteristics of a good 
approach to show expenditure items in HIES (2001-02) that are proportionally more 
important for the poor, and use this information to evaluate current and propose future 
GST/VAT exemptions to safeguard the poor. The fourth section concludes.  
 
5.1 GST Incidence 
 
5.1.1 Description of GST 
 
As mentioned in Chapter two in detail, GST in VAT mode was introduced in Pakistan 
by the Sales Tax Act of 1990. Initially it was levied at the import and manufacturing 
stage only at a rate of 12.5 percent. During the initial years the revenue impact of GST 
was almost negligible because the GST regime was riddled with standard, 
geographical and development exemptions. It was not until late 1990s when GST 
structure came close to the true spirit of VAT; with its extension to the retail sector, 
elimination of most of exemptions, and introduction of a single rate at 15 percent93. 
These summary differences are presented in Table 5.1. 
 
                                                 
93 This discussion has been kept brief purposely since most of these issues have been covered in detail 
in Chapter 2; Taxation in Pakistan (1985-2001). 
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Table 5.1: Summary of General Sales Tax evolution overtime 
 
 (1990-91) (2001 – 02) 
Goods Services Goods Services  
 
All goods GST taxable @ 12.5 percent except those 
mentioned below: 
 
All goods GST taxable @ 15.0 percent except 
those mentioned below: 
 
Exempt Goods: 
 
1. Live animal, meat and 
fish 
2. fresh milk 
3. vegetable, fruits and nuts 
4. cereals 
5. pulses 
6. edible oils: desi ghee, 
vegetable ghee, cooking 
oils & other oils & fats 
7. salt and spices 
8. butter, cream, cheese and 
eggs 
9. curd, yogurt, honey & gur 
10. tea  
11. pickle chatni, yeast and 
ice 
12. fuels 
13. tobacco & tobacco 
products 
14. second hand clothing and 
footwear 
15. books and stationary for 
educational purpose. 
16. milled products 
17. pharmaceutical products 
18. durables: air conditioner, 
air cooler and fans 
(ceiling, table and 
pedestal), cooking stove 
(electric, gas or 
kerosene), bicycle, 
sewing machine, personal 
computers 
19. hides and skins 
20. cotton & wool 
21. fertilizer 
22. equipment of national 
defense 
 
Exempt Services: 
 
1. Hair saloons 
and beauty 
parlors 
2. dry cleaning 
and laundry 
3. hotels, 
catering and 
clubs 
4. advertising 
5. photography 
6. auditing and 
engineering 
7. consultation 
8. cinema 
9. commission 
agents 
10. tourism 
11. hire of goods 
12. air travel 
13. train travel 
14. financial 
services 
15. real estate and 
construction 
16. educational 
services 
17. water 
18. electricity 
19. Gas (pipe and 
cylinder) 
 
Exempt Goods: 
 
1. Live animal, meat 
and fish 
2. fresh milk 
3. butter, cream, 
cheese and eggs 
4. cereal  
5. pulses 
6. edible oils: desi 
ghee  
7. salt and spice /1 
8. butter, cream, 
cheese and eggs /1 
9. curd & yogurt /1 
10.  ice 
11.  fuels: dung cake 
and agriculture 
waste 
12.  tobacco: tobacco 
raw, pan leaves and 
betel nut 
13.  wool and cotton 
14.  second hand 
clothing and 
footwear 
15.  books and 
stationary for 
education purpose 
16.  milled products 
17.  pharmaceutical 
products 
18.  durables: personal 
computers and 
sewing machine 
19.  hides and skins 
20. equipment of 
national defense 
 
 
Exempt Services / 2: 
 
1. photography 
2. audit and 
engineering 
3. commission 
agents 
4. tourism 
5. hire of goods 
6. financial services 
7. real estate and 
construction 
8. education 
services 
9. water 
 
 
1/ Unless packed and sold under brand names or trade mark. 
2/ The Federal Legislative list (item No.49 of the Fourth Schedule) of the Constitution provides for levy of tax on 
sales and purchases of goods, but not on services. The Sales tax act, 1990 is thus applicable to supply of goods. 
Services are therefore considered a Provincial subject. In case of eleven services (namely services provided by hotels, 
marriage halls/lawns, clubs, caterers, advertising on TV/Radio, custom agents, ship chandlers, stevedores, courier 
service, beauty parlor/ beauty clinics/ slimming clinics, laundries and dry cleaners) Provincial constitution has been 
promulgated to allow the Federal Government to collect tax on services as if it was sales tax under the federal sales 
tax Act of 1990. 
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5.1.2 Estimation of GST/VAT amounts
94
 
 
 
Since GST/VAT can be charged from market transactions only, the starting point of 
this calculation is HIES reported paid or formal market transactions. The tax 
information is provided by the Central Board of Revenue, Pakistan which is used to 
identify taxable items from the HIES survey for each year. Once a good/ service is 
identified as taxable, the statutory GST/VAT rate is used to calculate the taxable 
liability.  
 
 
We use the same formula used by Cho et al., (2003), Sahn and Younger (2003), and 
Edmiston and Bird (2006) (to name but a few) to determine the tax paid on each item: 
 
ji
j
j
ji e
t
t
T ,,
1+
=          5.1 
 
Where 
 
jiT ,  = household i’'s per capita VAT/GST payment on good j 
jt  = statutory VAT/GST rate 
jie ,  = observed expenses or post tax per capita expenditures on good j 
 
 
Equation 5.1 is used to determine amount of taxes paid on each item, (on per capita 
basis) for each household for a span of a year. However, we present results on the 
basis of deciles. Households ranking in deciles are based on ascending order of 
                                                 
94 Given that household welfare estimates for 1990-91 and 2001-02 have already been discussed in 
detail in Chapter 4, this section only focuses on how that information is used to calculate GST 
liabilities and incidence.  
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annualized per capita household total expenditures, also a proxy of household welfare 
(for instance see Chapter four). This enables us to determine average tax payments per 
decile at annual level. The incidence or the effective GST/VAT rate per decile is 
determined by dividing this by the average total household annual per capita 
expenditure (paid & un-paid) per decile.  
 
 
5.1.3 Progressivity, Regressivity or Proportionality of tax 
 
 
This study uses average progressivity rate (APR) to judge progressivity, regressivity 
or proportionality of an underlying tax/tax system. As already discussed above (and in 
chapter 4) that this study uses household total expenditure (per capita) as a measure of 
household welfare and this measure is used to rank households in decile in ascending 
order; from poorest (1st) decile to richest (10th) decile. Thus, when effective tax rate 
per decile (i.e. average per capita tax liability as a percentage of average per capita 
total household expenditures for each decile) rises as we move up the deciles; the 
tax/tax system will be considered progressive; it is regressive if effective tax rate falls 
as we move up the deciles and proportional when effective tax rates remain 
constant95.  
 
 
5.1.4 National GST Incidence    
 
 
Results for GST incidence at the national level for (1990-91) and (2001-02) are 
presented in Table 5.2. If we look at Table 5.2 and the GST incidence figures for 
(1990-91) two things are quite obvious. (a) GST incidence for (1990-91) appears to be 
                                                 
95 This may not be the only definition of progressivity/regressivity; for other definitions/measures see 
Chapter 3. However, this definition is considered adequate for this analysis. 
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clearly progressive. (b) The magnitude of incidence is quite small. For instance, the 
average GST/VAT tax incidence in (1990-91) was around 1.30 percent while for the 
poorest and richest ten percent population of Pakistan it was only 1.08 and 1.52 
percent respectively. However, this should not be a surprise given information in 
Table 5.1 and discussion in the earlier chapter, chapter two. 
 
Table 5.2 also presents GST/VAT incidence for (2001-02) which in other words also 
shows the impact of tax reform process and shows GST incidence at post- reform 
time. Looking at (2001-02) results makes two things apparent. (a) The magnitude of 
GST/VAT in (2001-02) is quite different from GST/VAT incidence at pre-reform era. 
(b) Despite exemptions of basic food items, GST/VAT incidence appears to be at best 
proportional over majority of the population. Our results show that the average 
GST/VAT incidence in 2001-02 for a Pakistani household was 4.7 percent, whereas it 
was 4.58 percent for the bottom ten percent of the population and only 4.65 percent 
for the richest ten percent of the population!  
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Table 5.2: Household per capita annual expenditure and GST Incidence (1990-2001) 
Deciles Household 
Total Exp.
Paid Exp. GST 
Payable
GST 
Incidence
1 4,367 3,364 205 4.58
2 5,676 4,487 275 4.73
3 6,535 5,100 314 4.70
4 7,375 5,753 355 4.70
5 8,273 6,432 399 4.71
6 9,345 7,282 450 4.68
7 10,698 8,386 518 4.69
8 12,654 9,746 600 4.58
9 16,123 12,529 786 4.70
10 32,782 26,467 1,632 4.65
Avg 11,218 8,817 545 4.67
1 5,243 3,984 55 1.08
2 6,841 5,116 82 1.25
3 7,964 5,803 96 1.25
4 8,949 6,522 110 1.28
5 10,061 7,330 126 1.30
6 11,289 8,228 142 1.31
7 12,950 9,404 168 1.34
8 15,234 10,883 198 1.35
9 19,372 13,752 258 1.39
10 37,628 27,705 548 1.52
Avg 13,140 9,568 172 1.30
Note 1/ Shaded region represents households below poverty line for that year.
2/ All Expenditures are in reported in (2001-02) prices.
(1990-91)
Source: Authors own calculation using HIES (1990-91) & (2001-02).
(2001 - 02)
 
 
 
Another interesting aspect is to look at the percentage increase in tax liabilities over 
time. On average the GST tax liabilities over time increased by 72 percent for an 
average Pakistani household. The greatest increase in GST tax liabilities was 
experienced by the poorest segment of the population which experienced a 76 percent 
increase in GST liabilities after reform compared to a 67 percent increase experienced 
by the richest ten percent of national population. Interestingly, even the middle 
income deciles experienced a higher increase in GST liabilities over the period i.e. 
1990-2001 compared with what was experienced by the top thirty percent of 
population.  
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One plausible explanation of this (other than changing expenditure patterns overtime) 
could be that during the reform process the pattern of GST/VAT broad-basing has  
affected the poor households more than the rich. For instance, if we look at Table 5.3 
we get some feel of how GST broad basing over time has affected different segments 
of population over time. In 1990-91, 84 percent of the total goods/services consumed 
by a Pakistani household on average were GST/VAT exempt.  Furthermore, almost 87 
percent of total goods/services consumed by a Pakistani household on average were 
exempted; this fell to 84 percent for the middle decile households and to 82 percent 
for the richest ten percent of population. Thus, the pattern of GST/VAT exemption at 
pre- reform era appear to benefit the relatively poor segments of populations more and 
could be one of the reasons behind GST/VAT progressivity in 1990-91.  
 
By 2001-02 due to the removal of GST/VAT exemptions or GST/VAT broad basing, 
GST/VAT exemption shares for an average Pakistani household fell from 88 percent 
to only 52 percent! Additionally, compared to the pre-reform era, it appears that the 
pattern of GST/VAT exemptions is benefiting all segments of population almost 
equally (this issue in detail is discussed in the last section of this chapter). Thus, this is 
also one of the reasons (other than changes in expenditure patterns overtime) 
responsible for almost proportional GST/VAT incidence in 2001-02.  
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Table 5.3: Share of Exempt goods and services 
Deciles National Urban Rural National Urban Rural
1 52.62 55.60 51.31 87.44 88.64 87.35
2 52.89 56.02 51.65 85.19 87.30 84.79
3 52.58 55.84 51.43 84.82 86.23 84.13
4 52.22 55.01 50.81 84.47 86.01 83.60
5 51.97 55.31 50.96 84.18 85.79 83.72
6 52.24 54.67 50.88 84.22 84.86 83.79
7 51.96 55.31 49.97 83.70 84.73 83.48
8 52.16 53.09 50.61 83.18 84.45 82.83
9 51.12 53.19 49.58 82.71 84.39 81.37
10 51.29 52.12 48.71 81.76 83.00 80.99
Total 52.11 54.62 50.59 84.22 85.49 83.66
Source: Authors own calculation using HIES (1990-91) & (2001-02)
Note: 1/ Shares here are calculated as a % age of household total paid (or formal market) expenditures.
2/ Shaded area represents households below the poverty line for that year.
(2001 - 02) (1990-91)
 
 
 
5.1.5 GST Incidence: Urban and Rural Areas 
 
 
GST regional (i.e. the urban and the rural) incidence is presented in Table 5.4. The 
average GST incidence in (1990-91) for a household in urban area on average was 
1.32 percent while that for the rural area it was 1.29 percent. Thus, it appears in 
(1990-91) the level of average GST/VAT incidence faced in both regions was quite 
similar as rural areas on average paid only 1 percent less GST/VAT than their urban 
counterparts. The GST/VAT pre-reform incidence for the poorest ten percent of 
population in the rural and the urban areas was 1.06 and 1.09 percent respectively and 
that for the richest ten percent of population it was 1.5 and 1.4 percent. Thus, it 
appears that the rural and the urban incidence trend lie very close to each other, as  the 
overall GST/VAT incidence trend in the urban areas (except for sixth and ninth decile 
households) and for rural areas (except for fourth decile households) can be termed as 
progressive.  
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If we look at the average GST/VAT incidence in 2001-02 i.e. the post reform era for 
the rural and urban households, it averaged around 4.62 percent for the rural areas 
compared with 4.80 percent for the urban areas. In (2001-02) the poorest ten percent 
of the rural and the urban households were facing an incidence of 4.50 and 4.84 
percent respectively while the richest ten percent of population in the rural and the 
urban areas faced an incidence of 4.66 and 4.60 percent respectively. It appears the 
incidence faced by the poorest ten percent of population in the rural areas was lowest 
GST/VAT incidence on average faced by any rural decile in the post- reform era but 
in the urban areas incidence faced by the poorest ten percent of population was the 
highest incidence faced by any decile (except the fourth and sixth decile households).  
As for the overall incidence trend for the regional population, it appeared to be 
progressive for both the urban areas (at least over the bottom six deciles) and the rural 
areas. 
  
If we look at the proportionate increase in tax liabilities over time we can see that both 
rural/urban areas on average experienced a 72 percent increase in tax liabilities. 
However, the poorest ten percent of population in both the rural/urban areas 
experienced a 77 percent increase in tax liabilities compared to 69 and 67 percent 
increase in tax liabilities experienced by the urban and rural richest ten percent 
respectively. Thus, it appeared GST reforms on average increased the tax liabilities 
for the poorest segment of urban/rural population more than that for the richest 
segment of population.  
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5.2 Selected Commodity Incidence Analysis  
 
 
The main reason for disaggregating GST/VAT incidence is to highlight the important 
facts that remain hidden when we only look at the overall incidence picture only. For 
instance, by disaggregating the incidence picture we can clearly see how this 
incidence picture is being generated and also identify taxable commodities that may 
be having powerful distributional impact on the poor. This we believe is a very 
important information as far as the Government pro-poor policy agenda is concerned. 
  
Table 5.5 presents GST/VAT disaggregated incidence picture for 1990-91 at national 
as well as for the rural and the urban areas. It is perhaps no surprise to find a very few 
items on the list as taxation under GST at this time was quite limited (due to plethora 
of existing exemptions as discussed earlier). During 1990-91 the highest average GST 
incidence share (as a percentage of total GST incidence) for a average Pakistani 
household at national level came from food items (0.28 percent with almost 85 
percent of this due to the taxation of sugar!). This was followed by petroleum, oil and 
lubricant products (POL) taxation which was responsible for (0.27 percent of total 
GST incidence), tobacco (0.15 percent), clothing (0.14 percent) and personal effects 
(0.13 percent) respectively.  
 
As perhaps expected, the overall incidence of the food category (also sugar) and 
clothing items were clearly regressive. In addition to this we find that the GST 
incidence on POL products appears to be strongly progressive. Furthermore, GST 
incidence on tobacco also appears to be progressive but only for the first fifty percent 
of population and slightly regressive afterwards (this ties well with our discussion of 
selected commodities disaggregated expenditure analysis in section 4.4 of previous 
chapter). According to our earlier discussion based on the pattern of expenditures on 
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major expenditure categories (as percentage of total household expenditure); food 
items, clothing appeared to be necessities while POL products appeared to be a luxury 
item. Thus if necessities are taxed they are likely to create a negative distributional 
effect on the welfare of people.  
 
The bottom part of Table 5.5 also presents the rural and the urban GST disaggregated 
incidence shares (i.e. as a percentage of the total GST incidence) for 1990-91. This 
analysis is important since it can help us figure out why average GST incidence and 
the overall GST trend for both the urban and the rural areas in the pre- reform era 
appeared to lie so close. Interestingly, the top GST incidence share for an urban 
household on average was coming from POL product (0.30 percent). This was 
followed by food items (0.25 percent share), tobacco (0.15 percent), personal effects 
(0.14 percent) and clothing (0.13 percent). While for rural households on average the 
most significant incidence share was coming from food items (0.30 percent), followed 
by POL products (0.25 percent), tobacco and clothing (each at 0.15 percent), and 
personal effect at 0.12 percent. Thus, it appeared as a result of underlying similar 
patterns of expenditures on these taxable items in the rural/urban areas on average, the 
respective incidence picture was also quite similar. 
 
In terms of the overall GST incidence trend of these categories, in the urban areas 
only POL product incidence appeared to be progressive while the incidence on food 
items and clothing was significantly regressive. Additionally, the GST incidence on 
tobacco group appeared to be of inverted U-shaped showing middle classes bearing 
larger burden of tax compared to tails. Thus, one reason for the clear progressivity of 
GST incidence in the urban areas appeared to be strong progressivity of GST 
incidence on POL products. Furthermore, this to some extent was aided by the fact 
that even though GST incidence on food fell across population as households became 
more affluent but for the top fifty percent of population this fall in the GST incidence 
on food was comparatively less sharp than increase in POL incidence on the other 
side. 
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On the other side, for the rural areas, we also find GST incidence on POL products 
progressive but regressive for food items. Furthermore, clothing incidence appears to 
be regressive, while GST incidence on tobacco and personal effects to a large extent 
appear to be proportional. However, compared to the urban population, GST 
incidence on food appears to fall much slowly over deciles as population becomes 
affluent (because of the underlying expenditure patterns). Thus, it appears GST 
incidence progressivity in the rural areas appears to be largely driven by POL 
incidence particularly due to strong progressivity of GST incidence on POL products 
over the top fifty percent of population. 
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Table 5.5: Incidence shares (i.e. % of total GST incidence) for GST (1990-91) 
Total Food
Sugar
Tobacco Personal 
Effects
POL 
products Public Tran.
Clothing Durables
Pakistan 1 0.36 0.34 0.14 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.00
2 0.35 0.32 0.14 0.11 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.00
3 0.34 0.31 0.14 0.12 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.00
4 0.33 0.30 0.16 0.12 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.00
5 0.31 0.28 0.17 0.12 0.21 0.20 0.15 0.00
6 0.30 0.25 0.16 0.12 0.24 0.23 0.15 0.00
7 0.29 0.24 0.16 0.12 0.24 0.21 0.14 0.01
8 0.27 0.22 0.15 0.14 0.25 0.20 0.14 0.01
9 0.25 0.20 0.13 0.13 0.28 0.21 0.13 0.01
10 0.18 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.41 0.14 0.09 0.01
Total 0.28 0.24 0.15 0.13 0.27 0.19 0.14 0.01
Urban 1 0.41 0.37 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.00
2 0.34 0.31 0.16 0.14 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.00
3 0.33 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.20 0.19 0.15 0.00
4 0.29 0.25 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.18 0.15 0.01
5 0.28 0.24 0.20 0.13 0.23 0.22 0.15 0.00
6 0.27 0.22 0.16 0.12 0.28 0.23 0.13 0.00
7 0.25 0.21 0.18 0.13 0.26 0.22 0.12 0.01
8 0.24 0.18 0.12 0.15 0.29 0.22 0.13 0.01
9 0.22 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.36 0.21 0.12 0.02
10 0.15 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.45 0.11 0.08 0.01
Total 0.25 0.19 0.15 0.14 0.30 0.19 0.13 0.01
Rural 1 0.35 0.33 0.13 0.11 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.00
2 0.35 0.32 0.14 0.11 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.00
3 0.34 0.31 0.14 0.11 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.00
4 0.33 0.30 0.16 0.11 0.21 0.20 0.16 0.00
5 0.34 0.31 0.16 0.11 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.00
6 0.31 0.27 0.15 0.12 0.23 0.22 0.15 0.00
7 0.31 0.26 0.14 0.12 0.22 0.20 0.15 0.00
8 0.29 0.25 0.15 0.12 0.23 0.20 0.15 0.01
9 0.27 0.22 0.15 0.13 0.26 0.20 0.14 0.01
10 0.22 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.36 0.17 0.11 0.01
Total 0.30 0.26 0.15 0.12 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.01
Source: Authors own calculation using HIES (1990-91) & (2001-02)
1 /  Shaded area represents households that are below the poverty line for that year.
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The disaggregated incidence of GST/VAT for 2001-02 is presented in Table 5.6. 
From this Table we can easily see the appearance of many new GST/VAT incidence 
categories that were not there in 1990-91 (for instance, edible oils, and fuels/utilities). 
At the national level we can see that the highest average GST/VAT incidence share 
(in terms of total GST/VAT incidence) is coming from food items averaging around 
0.34 percent, followed by incidence share on fuels/utilities (0.28 percent), clothing 
and footwear (0.19 percent), POL products (0.15 percent), durables (0.08 percent), 
personal care (0.07 percent), and tobacco (0.04 percent). We can also clearly see that 
the GST/VAT incidence on food items, clothing (for the top fifty percent of 
population) and fuel/utilities appears to be regressive. This should not be a surprise 
given their underlying expenditure patterns show these to be necessities (for instance, 
see section 4.4 of previous chapter). On the other hand, GST/VAT incidence for 
durable items, and POL products, appears to be progressive (as these are also luxuries 
according to our discussion in section 4.4). Furthermore, the incidence trend for 
tobacco and personal care articles appears to be proportional for a large segment of 
population.  
 
If we look at the urban GST/VAT incidence in 2001-02 we can see that food items on 
average appear to be the most significant incidence category (compared to POL 
products in 1990-91) responsible for almost 24 percent of total GST/VAT incidence. 
This is closely followed by an average incidence share of fuels/utilities at (0.20 
percent), clothing (0.13 percent), POL products (0.11 percent), durables (0.05 
percent), personal care (0.05 percent), and tobacco (0.03 percent) respectively.  
 
A look at the GST/VAT disaggregated incidence trend for these categories reveals 
that for urban areas only GST/VAT incidence on durables items and POL products is 
progressive while GST/VAT incidence on clothing, tobacco and (all) food items 
appears to be regressive. Furthermore, the GST/VAT incidence for personal care 
items and fuels/utilities appears to be at best proportional (for a large segment of 
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population). Thus one of the reasons for somewhat proportional urban GST/VAT 
incidence in post- reform era appears to be a largely regressive pattern for food and 
clothing balanced to some extent against progressive incidence of POL products and 
durables. 
  
If we look at the disaggregated incidence of GST/VAT items for the rural areas, 
perhaps it is no surprise to find food incidence share constituting the most significant 
GST/VAT incidence category (0.34 percent). The second and third most important 
GST/VAT incidence constituting category appears to be clothing items (0.19 percent) 
and fuels/utilities (0.14 percent). This is followed by GST incidence shares on POL 
products (0.10 percent), personal care (0.04 percent), tobacco (0.04 percent) and 
durables (0.03 percent). If we look at the incidence trend for these categories these are 
largely the same as in the urban areas. It appears to be progressive for durables items 
and POL products, but regressive for food items and clothing, and proportional for 
personal care articles and tobacco.  
 
This information allows us to keep track of percentage increase in tax liabilities due to 
some of the main incidence categories over time. This information can help us to see 
how GST/VAT incidence increase over time (due to the rate increase, broad-basing 
and changes in underlying expenditure patterns) has affected different segments of 
population. It appears, for a Pakistani household GST/VAT liabilities overtime due to 
taxation of food items on average have increased by 76 percent, while this increase 
for the urban and the rural households on average has been around 71 and 75 percent 
respectively. Furthermore, increase in tax liabilities due to taxation of sugar has 
increased GST/VAT liabilities for a Pakistani household on average by 20 percent, 
but this increase for the urban and rural households has been 10 and (a gigantic) 37 
percent respectively. Interestingly, tax liabilities due to GST/VAT taxation of tobacco 
have declined for urban population on average by 35 percent but increased for 
national and the rural household on average by 0.8 and 4.0 percent respectively. 
Furthermore, clothing incidence for a Pakistani household on average has increased 
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by 79 percent, while this increase for the urban and the rural areas on average has 
been around 74 and 78 percent respectively.  
 
Thus, it appears GST broad-basing (and also change in rate and changes in underlying 
expenditure patterns) to include un-processed food items, vegetable ghee on top of 
sugar consumption that is already taxable, has relatively increased the GST incidence 
burden for the poor more as compared to other segments of population. This change, 
we believe, has been responsible for emergence of (largely) proportional GST 
incidence at national as well as the urban/rural areas over time. 
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In Table 5.7 below, we do a simple exercise of exempting both sugar and vegetable 
ghee from GST net and analyse the distributional effect of this change. If both sugar 
and vegetable ghee are exempted from GST net, it will turn GST incidence at the 
national as well as for the rural/urban areas clearly progressive96. Another important 
thing to note is that gains from this policy clearly will benefit the rural areas as well as 
the poorest segment of population in general. For instance, exemption of sugar and 
vegetable ghee will decrease GST incidence for the rural area on average by 24 
percent compared to 12 percent for the urban areas. Similarly the poorest segment of 
population in the rural and the urban areas will receive the largest decline as their 
GST tax liabilities will decrease by 31 and 25 percent respectively compared to the 
rural and urban richest ten percent of population which will only experience a 15 and 
5 percent decline respectively. More importantly, exempting these items will make 
GST/VAT incidence at national level as well as at the urban/rural level clearly 
progressive97.  
 
Table 5.7: GST incidence with Sugar & Vegetable ghee exemption 
 
 
 
                                                 
96 This is a simple exercise; it does not claim to maintain revenue neutrality.  
97 Except for the seventh decile households in urban as well as national level  
Deciles 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Avg 
Actual GST 4.58 4.73 4.70 4.70 4.71 4.68 4.69 4.58 4.70 4.65 4.67
GST exclu. Sugar & veg. ghee 3.39 3.60 3.66 3.74 3.84 3.87 3.96 3.94 4.19 4.41 4.08
Actual GST 4.84 4.90 4.91 4.88 4.83 4.85 4.71 4.76 4.77 4.59 4.80
GST exclu. Sugar & veg. ghee 3.66 3.81 3.93 4.01 4.03 4.14 4.09 4.25 4.37 4.41 4.21
Actual GST 4.51 4.70 4.62 4.68 4.65 4.62 4.63 4.56 4.56 4.66 4.62
GST exclu. Sugar & veg. ghee 3.11 3.34 3.31 3.42 3.43 3.43 3.49 3.55 3.64 3.98 3.53
Source: Authors own calculation using HIES (2001-02) 
National
Urban
Rural
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However, the question of what must be exempt from GST/VAT in Pakistan is a 
critical policy question particularly as far as Governments pro-poor agenda is 
concerned. In the next section, we explicitly address the question of GST/VAT 
exemptions in order to determine how GST/VAT exemptions can be better targeted to 
provide relief to the poor.  
 
 
5.3 Analysis of GST exemptions using Distributional Characteristics of a good 
approach  
 
 
In the earlier section we have seen that the GST incidence for 2001-02 appears to be 
regressive. With that we have also seen that increase in GST incidence over time has 
been proportionally much higher for the poor segment of the population and for those 
in the rural areas. This is quite interesting since, on the one hand, policymakers in 
Pakistan claim to have adequately sheltered the poor against GST (by exempting basic 
items consumed by the poor) on the other hand our GST incidence results do not 
match with the policymaker’s claims. Thus it is quite possible that GST exemptions 
are not working the way they are supposed to. Although in the earlier section we have 
briefly talked about GST exemption, in this section we will probe this issue 
empirically and attempt to evaluate how well placed GST exemptions in Pakistan 
really are by first addressing the issue of what is really being consumed by the poor in 
Pakistan98. 
 
The question of what the poor really consume in Pakistan has never been really 
addressed. Are only basic (un-processed) food items (namely, cereals, vegetables, 
pulses and fruits) more important to the poor as far as their budget is concerned? How 
                                                 
98 For instance according to Ahmad and Stern (1987) a uniform VAT in India would reduce the 
expenditures of the poorest segment of population in the rural areas by almost 7 percent compared to 5 
percent for the urban poorest. These estimates suggest a strong distributional case for exemptions in 
general and that such exemptions may play an important role in poverty reduction in developing 
countries (Bird and Zolt, 2005).  
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important is edible oil consumption to the poor? What sorts of fuel and utilities do the 
poor really consume? Now all of these are very important questions for the proper 
design of GST exemptions in Pakistan. Empirically, there is a growing but limited 
literature on the distributional characteristics of goods approach in the spirit of 
Feldstein (1972) (for application see, Newbery (1995) for Hungary and United 
Kingdom, Gibson (1998) for Papua New Guinea, Sonia et al (2003) for Ethiopia, and 
Liberati (2001) for Italy.  
 
The underlying approach followed by the distributional characteristic approach 
measures how heavily consumption of each item is concentrated on the poor (Gibson, 
1998). This measure is a direct complement of the theory of marginal tax reform 
(Newbery and Stern, 1987). 
 
It was developed with the idea of creating a measure that both captures the welfare 
impact of price change as well as one that relies on the rich information available in 
the household surveys, while making minimum assumptions regarding the consumer 
behaviour. The only shortcoming of this measure is that it is strictly applicable for 
small changes in relative prices. It is able to quantify the direction of the welfare 
change but not its amount (Newbery, 1995).  
 
The distributional characteristics of a good is defined by Newbery (1995) as99 
 
i
h
i
h
h
i
Q
q
d
β
β∑
≡         5.2 
 
Where hβ is the social marginal utility of transferring one Rupee to household h, ihq  
is the consumption of item i by household h, β is the average of social weights over 
all households and iQ is the aggregate consumption of good i. 
                                                 
99 Notations and explanation used in this methodology rely heavily on (Gibson, 2001). 
 141 
 
                                                                         
This takes us to the issue of how to calculate the social weights. Although it must be 
admitted that there is no definite answer to this issue, this must be first agreed upon in 
order to measure the welfare changes100. The simplest functional form is based on 
Atkinson (1970) that uses social weights (based on a utilitarian framework) with a 
constant elasticity of substitution social welfare function so we follow this approach:  
 
v
c
W
vh
−
=
−
1
)( 1
   1,0 ≠≥ vv     5.3 
)ln( hcW =    ,1=v      5.4 
 
 
Where W is the value judgment we place on the income distribution, v is the 
coefficient of inequality aversion and hc is the consumption level of household h. 
According to this, social weights are given by vhh c −= )(β 101. Different values of v 
reflect judgments regarding the desirability of giving transfers or of levying taxes in 
order to correct income inequality. For the high inequality version, taxing one rupee 
from a poor household has four times the social cost of taxing a household with twice 
the income and (for lower inequality aversion) this ratio becomes 1.4 (Munoz and 
Cho, 2003). The use of social weights here are independent of other agent’s utilities 
and prices (Liberati, 2001)102 thus consistent with the marginal character of the 
                                                 
100 According to Deaton (1997) these social welfare function can best be seen as “…statistical 
aggregator that turns into a single number that provides an overall judgment on that distributional and 
that forces us to think coherently about welfare and its distribution” (pp. 135). And also according to 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), “…better thought of as an aggregate weighing function of the 
individual opportunity sets…” (pp.225).  
101 For application see, Ahmad and Stern (1984); Newbery and Stern (1987); Kaiser and Spahn (1989); 
Ahmad and Stern (1991); Newbery (1995); Madden (1995a; 1995b), to name a few. 
102 According to Ahmad and Stern (1984), 
hβ can be thought of as “…a convenient local 
approximation given current prices and incomes rather than an exact expression holding all prices and 
incomes” (pp.279).  
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approach that identifies direction of reforms but not their amounts (Ahmad and Stern, 
1984).  
 
The distributional characteristics ranking for 165 items in the HIES (2001-02) is 
reported in Appendix 5.1 corresponding to relatively little, and higher inequality 
aversion (v = 0.5, 2.0). By looking at Appendix 5.1 we can see clearly that two out of 
the first four items are own produced and consumed items (namely beg gasses , and 
dung-cake). It is perhaps little surprise to find various food items ranked at the very 
start of the list (implying these are disproportionately more consumed by the poor). 
We find cereals ranked at the start of the list (for instance wheat is ranked 7, 
maize/barley ranked 17 and rice is ranked 19). Similarly some spices such as salt at 10 
and chillies at 12, are proportionally more consumed by the poor. Additionally, some 
vegetables are ranked as quite important for the poor (for instance potato is ranked 18, 
onion at 25, karaila, lady finger, brinjal and cucumber ranked at 26 and tinda, 
pumpkin and bottle gourd are ranked 27). Pulses are also quite early on the list as 
expected (for example other pulses are ranked at 15, dal channa is ranked 21, moong 
at 23, and masoor at 38).  
 
Perhaps it is a bit surprising to find some tobacco based items ranked so early (for 
instance biri is ranked at 3, raw tobacco at 16 and cigarettes at 24). Another surprise is 
to find some of home fuel items ranked so early (reflecting that these are 
disproportionately more consumed by the poor). For example, we find firewood 
ranked 11, coal ranked 14, charcoal ranked 31 and kerosene oil is ranked at 34. It is 
also a surprise to find items from the edible oil group ranked so early (for example, 
other oils and fats at 6, and vegetable ghee ranked at 13). We also find sugar and 
clothing items being disproportionately more important for the poor, for instance 
sugar is ranked 20 while clothing items are ranked 50. 
 
Even under lower inequality aversion, using distributional characteristic ranking, we 
can find a clear difference in goods that are important for the poor and for the rich. 
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For instance, the first fruit to appear on the list is mango and it is ranked 70. Utilities 
such as electricity is ranked 82, gas pipe ranked 109 and gas cylinder 110, appear to 
be more important for the rich. Travelling expenditures such as travelling by train is 
ranked 107, petrol/diesel charges ranked 151, and air-travel ranked 154 appear to be 
highly skewed toward the richer segments of population. Within edible oil group it 
appears cooking oil is disproportionately more consumed by the rich as it is ranked at 
130. Similarly, items related to educational expenses, health expense and housing also 
appear to be disproportionately more important for the rich. 
 
If we use a higher inequality aversion, i.e. v = 2.0, we find some changes in the list 
but nothing too drastic103. Within the cereal group, we find wheat becoming more 
important for the poor as it moves from 7 to 6, while there is no change for rice flour 
(ranked 19) but maize, barley and jawar fall in rank from 17 to 37. If we look at fuel 
items that were important for the poor under low inequality aversion, we find 
firewood slightly falling down in ranking from 11 to 16, coal becoming very 
important as it moves to 2 from 14, while both charcoal and kerosene oil slightly fall 
in ranking (charcoal from 31 to 41 and kerosene 34 to 36). If we look at the edible 
oils, both other oils and fat (previously ranked 6 now 3) and vegetable ghee 
(previously ranked 13 now 11) become proportionally more important for the poor 
when higher inequality aversion is used.  
 
Similarly, biri falls in ranking from 3 to 7, both cigarettes and raw-tobacco move up 
in the ranking (cigarettes move from 24 to 20 while raw-tobacco moves from 16 to 
13). Utilities still remain important for the rich with electricity slightly falling down in 
ranking from 82 to 74, while gas pipe and gas cylinder appears to be even more 
skewed toward the richer segment of population. Similarly, travelling expenditures 
such as travelling by train, by-air and petrol/diesel charges appear to become more 
important for the richer segment of population. Also, edible oil items previously 
                                                 
103 The fact that such listing do not appear to be too sensitive to the middle ranges of inequality 
aversion (i.e. 0.5 and 2.0) is also reported by Gibson, (1998) for Papua New Guinea, Sonia et al (2003) 
for Ethiopia, and Liberati (2001) for Italy. 
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important for the richer segment of population, namely cooking oil and desi-ghee 
become more skewed toward the richer segment of population.  
 
Thus, this ranking is immensely important in the case of Pakistan because for certain 
categories it clearly shows exemptions that would be beneficial for improving 
distributional burden of GST as well for meeting Government‘s poverty alleviation 
initiatives. For instance, sometimes it is asserted that VAT exemptions cannot be 
better targeted than generally exempting basic food items since consumption patterns 
are not sufficiently separable to provide low-income household necessary protection. 
However, in the case of ranking for Pakistan (at such disaggregated level) we saw 
clear separable consumption patterns in key commodities that can be targeted to 
provide relief for the poor.  
 
For instance information in Appendix 5.1 is summarized in Table 5.8 for key 
elements along with information on whether these are taxed or not. We can clearly see 
that within the edible oil group; other oils and fats (ranked 6 under low inequality 
aversion), vegetable ghee (ranked 13 under low inequality aversion) are important for 
the poor compared to cooking oil that is ranked 130 but all three are taxed. Similarly, 
within the fuel and utilities group basic fuels are disproportionately more consumed 
by the poor (even under low inequality aversion firewood is ranked 11, coal at 14, 
charcoal at 31 and kerosene oil is ranked at 34) while utilities such as electricity and 
gas-pipe are ranked at 82 and 109 (under low inequality aversion) but both categories 
are being taxed. Similarly, sugar ranked at 20 (under low inequality aversion) is taxed. 
Some food items such as chicken meat, mutton and particularly fruits are very high up 
in the ranking (thus benefiting the rich more) but these are exempt.  
 
Thus looking at this list, if distributional issues and poverty alleviation issue are at the 
heart of Government policy agenda, it has an option to fine- tune exemptions that can 
help alleviate the burden of GST from the poor segment of population particularly 
within categories such as edible oils, basic fuels and sugar where there is a clear 
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difference between the types of commodities consumed by the poor and the rich and 
where revenue loss may not be significant. 
 
Does this mean that distributional characteristics ranking of expenditure items in 
Pakistan is very different from other countries which requires a different pattern of 
exemptions? This question can be answered in the light of existing evidence of 
distributional characteristic ranking for Papua New Guinea (PNG), and Italy (former 
developing countries and latter a developed country) with prime exemptions 
candidates mentioned in the case of Pakistan (see previous discussion)104. In the case 
of Papua New Guinea (PNG), Gibson (1998) ranks 87 goods in the PNG survey. In 
the PNG case (under low inequality aversion), goods disproportionately more 
important for the poor are firewood (ranked 3), leaf tobacco (7), sugar cane (9), 
children clothing (16), adult clothing (23), sugar (26), kerosene (29) and cigarettes 
(37) while goods that were disproportionately more important for the rich included 
health, housing, travel expenses and expenses on electricity etc.  
 
While in the case of Italy, Liberati (2001) provides ranking of 68 goods in the Italian 
HES survey and the main findings are as following. Under low inequality aversion, 
sugar is ranked 1, electricity (3), other meat (7), Pasta (8), beef (12), telephone (14), 
oil (15), gas (17), vegetables (16), other cereals (19), tobacco (21), medicine (24), 
coal (34), cloths (53), and kerosene (63).  
 
Thus, it appears the distributional characteristic ranking in the case of Pakistan is 
more similar to PNG as compared to Italy. For instance, if we look at the Italian 
ranking, it appears, clothing items, kerosene and coal (under low inequality aversion) 
is being disproportionately more consumed by the rich! That is quite opposite to PNG 
and Pakistan. Additionally for Italy, it appears utilities such as gas and electricity are 
better candidates for exemptions compared to basic fuels. Also, we see other items 
                                                 
104 Here a comparison with Ethiopia was not possible because the author did not include a complete 
listing with her work.  
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such as education, health expenses, telephone charges, appear quite early in the list 
which is not the case for either PNG or Pakistan. Thus, it appears that the 
distributional characteristics ranking in the case of a developing and a developed 
country can be different; as a result what is more important for the poor is also 
different. However, since GST/VAT reforms in most of the developing countries are 
designed and dictated by IFI’s, it is perhaps no surprise to find that VAT/GST 
harmonization over the years has failed to take this difference into account (that can 
be very important for the poor).  
 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
 
GST/VAT is the most pervasive feature of tax reforms in many developing countries 
including Pakistan. This highlights the importance of evaluating GST/VAT incidence 
in Pakistan in both pre- and post- reform era to see how GST incidence at the national 
as well as the urban/rural levels has changed over time. And given, the current and 
future importance of this tax in many countries, it is also important to evaluate how 
this tax can be better structured (particularly via exemptions) to address the 
distributional issues. Thus, this chapter has tried to present the overall GST incidence 
picture along with the disaggregated incidence picture in order to clearly show how 
the underlying incidence is generated and how it has impacted various segments of 
population at both the national level and the urban/rural areas over time.  
 
We have tried to highlight that certain steps in the reform strategy (such as GST/VAT 
broad basing to include processed food items such as sugar, vegetable ghee etc.) 
appear to be having strong distributional impact particularly as far as the poorest and 
most vulnerable segments of the population are concerned. Similarly extension of 
GST/VAT to basic fuels such as kerosene, firewood, coal etc. in order to maintain 
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GST/VAT uniformity appear to be creating significant burden for the poor and for 
those in the rural areas. 
 
We also believe that the issue of GST/VAT exemptions in developing countries needs 
to be looked at more carefully if GST/VAT development over time has to keep in line 
with the Government pro-poor agenda. It appears at the moment policymakers in 
Pakistan are not paying sufficient attention to the fact that consumption patterns for 
key commodities are clearly separable. This separation should provide a very good 
opportunity to the policymakers to fine- tune GST/VAT exemptions to safeguard the 
poor (and not necessary at too much cost to the exchequer). And this chapter has tried 
to answer how GST/VAT exemptions can be better tailored to safeguard the poor in 
Pakistan. 
  
Although analysis of the incidence of a single tax (in this case GST/VAT) over time is 
important on its own  we do need to look at the overall indirect tax incidence over 
time for Pakistan in order to see how social incidence of indirect taxes in Pakistan has 
changed due to the type of reform process followed in Pakistan. This is undertaken in 
the next chapter which completes the discussion on the social incidence of indirect 
taxes at pre- and post- reform era in Pakistan by first looking at custom duty and 
excise duty incidence (in that order) and than completing the picture by bringing all 
components together. 
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Table 5.8: Distributional characteristics of items consumed in Pakistan (2001-02) 
d i Rank d i Rank
Taxable Goods:
(Important for the Poor)
biri 1.056 3 1.08 7
gur/shakkar 1.041 5 1.04 8
other oils and fats 1.036 6 1.18 3
chewing tobacco & snuf 1.021 9 0.98 14
fire wood 1.015 11 0.96 16
vegetable ghee 1.011 13 0.99 11
coal hard & soft peat 1.010 14 1.20 2
sugar (desi or milled) 0.988 20 0.92 24
laundry soap, etc. 0.984 22 0.95 18
cigarettes 0.982 24 0.93 20
tea (black,green etc.) 0.969 29 0.86 28
char coal 0.968 31 0.84 41
kerosene oil 0.963 34 0.84 36
(Important for the Rich)
electricity 0.870 82 0.66 74
expense travelling by train 0.808 107 0.453 114
gas (pipe) 0.802 109 0.46 113
gas (cylinder) 0.799 110 0.40 125
expense traveling by roads 0.768 83 0.42 81
cooking oils 0.750 130 0.36 140
cosmetics 0.750 131 0.41 123
telephone, telegraph, postal, etc 0.645 149 0.22 150
petrol/diesel charges 0.624 151 0.20 153
expenditure on air travelling etc. 0.606 154 0.20 154
0.560 97 0.153 98
Exempt Goods:
(Important for the Poor)
beggasses, agri. waste 1.097 1 1.37 1
dung cake (dry) 1.058 2 1.15 4
wheat and wheat flour 1.033 7 1.08 6
maize, barly, jawar etc. 0.998 17 0.84 37
potato 0.994 18 0.97 15
dal chana 0.987 21 0.93 21
moong 0.983 23 0.93 22
onion 0.981 25 0.92 23
karaila, lady finger,brinjal,cocumber0.978 26 0.90 25
Source: Author's own calculation using HIES (2001-02)
Social Weights Based on
Low inequality aversion 
(v =0.5)
High inequality aversion 
(v =2)
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Chapter VI:  Overall Indirect Tax Incidence in 
Pakistan (1990 – 2001)  
 
6 Introduction 
 
Our incidence analysis started in the previous section with determining the 
social incidence of GST during the pre- and post- reform time. Our analysis in 
the previous chapter showed that as a result of reform process the incidence of 
GST has increased substantially over time and the overall incidence looks 
proportional for most of the population. Although, it is meaningful to ascertain 
the incidence of a single component of tax system particularly GST/VAT 
(which in the case of Pakistan has emerged as the single most important tax 
component), what really matters is the collective tax incidence picture not its 
individual components. Thus, the main aim of this chapter is to determine the 
overall indirect tax incidence for Pakistan at the pre- and post- reform time. 
This is an extremely important issue because it will allow us to determine 
whether equity envisaged (as a part of reform process) was really translated 
into policy actions (that made the overall indirect tax system progressive).  
 
For this purpose this Chapter is divided into four sections. We start with 
determining the incidence of remaining components of indirect tax system at 
the pre- and post- reform time before we put them together. This is important 
because it gives a clear and transparent picture of how the overall indirect tax 
incidence is being put together. Thus, the first section begins with determining 
the custom duties incidence at the pre- and post- reform time at national as 
well as for the urban/ rural areas, along with discussion on the underlying 
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methodology and assumptions used for incidence determination. The second 
section estimates the social incidence of excise duties at the pre- and post-- 
reform time and provides a description of methodology used for incidence 
calculation. The third section moves to the main aim of this study, that is to 
determine the social incidence of overall indirect taxes in Pakistan at the pre- 
and post-- reform time. This section enables us to ascertain if the indirect tax 
system has really changed in line with the vision of RMTRC at least where 
equity is concerned, which is also the central question of this study. The last 
section concludes. 
 
  
6.1 Custom Duty Incidence (1990-91) to (2001-02) 
 
 
6.1.1 Measuring Imports Content (IMPCON) within Domestic 
Consumption 
 
 
Since trade taxes are levied on the imported items, the base for determining 
payable custom duties is consumption of imported items not consumption of 
domestically produced goods. Thus, this section will try to establish how this 
study measures proportionate consumption of the imported goods within total 
domestic consumption of these goods, which is a clear improvement in the 
methodology used for estimation for trade tax incidence. 
  
It is not an exaggeration to admit that determining custom duties incidence is 
not straightforward. The complication arises from the fact that in order to 
accurately assess the custom duties incidence we need to know the content of 
imported goods consumption within total domestic consumption (IMPCON) 
for each good (at respective level of unit of analysis which in our case is the 
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household). Since information in HIES survey does not distinguish between 
imported and domestically consumed goods we have no way of directly 
ascertaining this information from the survey. As a result, we have to rely on 
other data sources such as aggregate data on domestic production and 
aggregate import/export data in order to get some sense of this estimate. 
However, since data on domestic production and trade is available at an 
aggregated level we can only calculate the IMPCON ratio for a few broad 
categories of goods and henceforth use the same ratio for all items within that 
category.  
 
The IMPCON ratio is calculated in the following way. 
  
 
IMPCONA = IMA / (IMA + DPA – EXA)    6.1 
 
 
Where, IMPCONA is the imported content of good A within the domestic 
consumption of good A. IMA is the import value, DPA is the domestic 
production and EXA is the export value of good A (all in PRs.). This 
relationship enables us to estimate proportionate imported content 
(IMPCONA) for 19 categories of goods (see for instance Appendix 6.1).  
 
 
6.1.2 Additional data sources used for calculating IMPCON 
 
 
The additional data sources used for calculating IMPCON are as follows: 
  
i. Production data105:  
                                                 
105 Production data for Pakistan does not include data on other sectors such as services.  
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a. Agriculture production data is taken from the Agriculture 
Statistical Year Books for Pakistan (various years). 
b. Manufacturing production data is taken from the Census of 
Manufacturing Industries (CMI) (1990-91) and (2000-01)106.  
 
ii. Import and export data: 
 
a. Data on imports and export of agriculture goods is taken from 
the Agriculture Year Books of Pakistan (various years)107. 
b. Remaining import and export data is taken from the Statistical 
Yearbooks of Pakistan (various years)108. 
 
 
6.1.3 Additional assumptions 
 
 
This section like the previous chapter uses the assumption that custom duties 
are fully borne by the consumers of tradable items and this assumption is 
made by a large number of studies for developed as well as developing 
countries. But this has been severely criticised by Shah and Whalley (1991) 
according to whom, the presence of binding quotas and tariff licensing scheme 
on trade taxes may result in tax shifting of less than a hundred percent since 
                                                 
106 The (2000-01) manufacturing data is updated using (2001-02) sectoral growth rates as 
reported in Economic Survey of Pakistan (2001-02) which reports 5 percent growth rate for 
manufacturing sector. Thus, all categories covered in the CMI (2000-01) are updated using 
this rate except dairy products for which a 3.7% rate of growth of livestock GNP for (2001-
02) is used.  
107 However, data on fruits, vegetables and condiment is taken from Fruit, Vegetables and 
Condiment Statistics for Pakistan (various years). 
108 With exception of trade data on pulses, edible oil, tea/coffee/green tea, and bakery products 
that is provided directly on request by Pakistan Custom House Karachi. 
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these taxes may more or less operate like lump-sum taxes; borne by the 
recipients of rents.  
 
Although, this may be true in some cases, in the case of Pakistan, we believe 
using a hundred percent tax shifting assumption makes more sense because 
although earlier empirical evidence on shifting of trade taxes in Pakistan 
supports Shah and Whalley (1991) criticism (for instance see Pal, 1964; and 
Alamgir, 1968), later evidence on trade tax shifting supports a full or even 
higher tax shifting possibility (for example see Irfan, 1974; and Naqvi, 
1975)109.  
 
Also, since most of the binding restrictions on quotas and import licensing 
scheme in Pakistan were largely removed by the early 1990’s (for instance see 
World Trade Organization, 1995)110, this makes trade tax structure in the 
decade of 1990 less relevant for the structure described by Shah and Whalley 
(1991). As a result, we feel that a hundred percent tax shifting assumption is 
the right assumption to use in this analysis. 
  
 
6.1.4 Custom duty rates
111
 
 
 
Custom duty rates for (1990-91) and (2001-02) are directly provided by the 
Central Board of Revenue (CBR), Pakistan on request. These rates were used 
as statutory rates for incidence calculation with two exceptions; (a) In cases 
where HIES expenditure category included more than one statutory rate, the 
weighted average duty rate was used, (b) in cases where duty rates were levied 
                                                 
109 Tax shifting assumptions are discussed in detail in Chapter 3: Literature Review (pp.21-
23). 
110 For instance see custom duty discussion in Chapter 2: Taxation in Pakistan (1985-2001), 
pp. 28-36. 
111 See Appendix 6.2 (pp. 270) for Custom duty rates for (2001-02) & (1990-91). 
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by weight (for instance edible oils and fats group and pharmaceutical 
products), effective duty rates were used. 
  
 
6.1.5 Estimating Custom duty amounts and incidence 
 
 
Now we are in the position to determine the calculation of custom duty 
incidence. This is calculated using the following equations: 
 
jji
j
j
ji IMPCONe
c
c
D ..
1
,, +
=       6.2 
 
where 
 
jiD ,  = household i’s per capita custom duty payment on good j 
jc  = statutory custom duty rate on good j 
jie ,  = observed expenses or post- tax per capita expenditures on good j 
 
Similar to GST incidence, custom duty payable is also calculated with 
reference to only paid or formal market transactions. Payable custom duties on 
various dutiable items is summed across the relevant households and 
calculated on per capita basis. Additionally, average payable dutiable amount 
per decile is calculated by aggregating this amount over each decile and 
incidence is calculated with reference to average (net) total household per 
capita expenditure112 for each decile.  
 
                                                 
112 The progressivity, regressivity or proportionality definition used in this chapter is 
discussed in section 5.3.3. The same definition is used for all taxes. 
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6.1.6 Empirical Results 
 
 
6.1.6.1  Custom Duty Incidence (1990-2001) at national level 
 
 
The apparent difference in the importance of trade taxes within total federal 
structure of Pakistan over time is also evident in custom duty incidence. 
Custom duty incidence results are presented in Table 6.1. The custom duty 
incidence for an average Pakistani household in 1990-91 stood at 2.89 percent. 
The incidence for the poorest and richest ten percent of population on average 
stood at 3.26 and 2.22 percent respectively. This meant that the incidence 
faced by the richest ten percent of population was 32 percent less than the duty 
incidence borne by the poorest segment of population. If we look at the overall 
trend of custom duties incidence in (1990-91) at pre-reform era, it appeared to 
be clearly regressive. The results appeared to be largely driven by import 
duties on edible oils, sugar/sugar preparations, spice and condiment group and 
also wheat, which were important imported consumption commodities for the 
poor. 
 
By (2001-02), the customs duty incidence for an average Pakistani household 
stood at 1.35 percent. The average custom duty incidence for the poorest and 
the richest ten percent of population in (2001-02) stood at 1.23 and 1.54 
percent respectively. This meant that at the post--reform era the gap between 
what the poorest and the richest segment of population was paying narrowed 
to 25 percent. The incidence trend for (2001-02) except for sixth decile 
households appeared to be clearly progressive. Thus it appeared, as a result of 
the trade tax reform carried out during the decade of 1990s two things 
happened: (a) overall the level of incidence at national level was reduced by 
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fifty percent for most deciles; (b) the overall incidence in the post- reform era 
appears to have become progressive. This was mainly due to the combination 
of three different things over time; changing consumption patterns, change in 
dutiable rates and changes in IMPCON ratios. But, it is difficult to disentangle 
change in incidence over time due to these factors individually. However, it 
appears the progressivity of custom duties at the post-- reform time was 
largely driven by importance of POL product and miscellaneous expenditure 
items (such as bath soap, shampoo etc) within the budget of affluent 
households.  
 
It appears over time, due to the tax reform process, custom duty tax liabilities 
for an average Pakistani household have been reduced by 53 percent. The 
highest reduction in tax liabilities over time is experienced by the poorest ten 
percent households which is equal to 62 percent, while the richest ten percent 
households have experienced only 31 percent decline in tax liabilities due to 
custom duty reforms over time. Thus we can say that the highest relief of 
scaling down of custom duties taxation is experienced by most deserving part 
of the population. This has been a fundamental change in the incidence of 
custom duties over time along with a clear change in the trend of underlying 
incidence of custom duties from a clearly regressive to a progressive pattern. 
The rural/urban results are also presented in Table 6.1, which are quite similar 
to the overall national results. 
 
 
 
 157 
Table 6.1: Pakistan and Urban/Rural Custom Duties Incidence (1990-91) 
Deciles Duty Payable Duty Incidence 
(%)
Duty Payable Duty Incidence 
(%)
Pakistan 1 58 1.23 160 3.26
2 79 1.30 205 3.19
3 90 1.30 229 3.04
4 104 1.33 258 3.05
5 118 1.35 285 2.98
6 133 1.33 308 2.88
7 155 1.36 340 2.76
8 185 1.37 395 2.73
9 243 1.40 484 2.63
10 585 1.54 751 2.22
Avg 172 1.35 334 2.89
Urban 1 63 1.17 168 3.08
2 86 1.21 214 2.96
3 105 1.24 254 3.01
4 127 1.29 278 2.92
5 143 1.27 313 2.89
6 174 1.34 346 2.80
7 206 1.34 396 2.74
8 252 1.34 468 2.67
9 368 1.42 577 2.42
10 963 1.61 860 1.77
Avg 249 1.33 386 2.73
Rural 1 56 1.25 155 3.29
2 76 1.33 200 3.26
3 86 1.32 220 3.09
4 98 1.35 250 3.13
5 106 1.33 271 3.04
6 120 1.36 288 2.90
7 134 1.36 316 2.83
8 158 1.38 350 2.71
9 193 1.40 439 2.78
10 346 1.50 651 2.44
Avg 140 1.36 312 2.95
Note: 1990-91 results are presented in 2001-02 prices.
Source: Authors own calculation using HIES (2001-02) & (1990-91).
2001-02 1990-91
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6.2 Central Excise Duty (CED) Incidence (1990-91) to (2001-02) 
 
 
Excise duty revenue was the second largest revenue source for Pakistan  in the 
past but over time its relative importance has significantly declined. This 
change (as discussed in Chapter two) was a part of the overall indirect tax 
reform strategy where CED role was envisaged as being complementary to 
GST/VAT in taxation of luxuries. However, the scope of excise duties over 
time has remained quite narrow. For instance in 1990-91 five items were 
responsible for almost 75 percent of total CED revenue, this included 
cigarettes (33 percent), sugar (15 percent), cement (12.5 percent), petroleum 
products (8.7 percent) and beverages (4.4 percent) while in 2001-02, five 
items constituted almost 82 percent of total CED revenue; cigarettes (35 
percent), cement (21 percent), petroleum products (11 percent), natural gas (9 
percent) and sugar (6 percent).  
 
 
6.2.1 Description of Central Excise Duty 
 
 
Excise duty description (in cases where they apply to HIES items) is taken 
from the Effective Tariff of Central Excises Duty (1990-91) and (2001-02) 
and reported in Table 6.2. 
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113 Domestic consumers are exempted. 
114 Hectare cubic meter.  
Table 6.2: Central Excise Duty Evolution Over time 
(1990-91) to (2001-02) 
 
Item Description 2001 – 02 
 
1990 - 91 
Sugar Can 2.10/ kg PRs. 2.15/ kg 
Natural Gas113 PRs. 17.18 HCM114 85 paisa per DCM 
Carbonated Bev. 10% of RP115 PRs. 3 / bottle 
Squashes & Syrups 10% of RP 20% of RP 
Fruit Juices 10% of RP 20% of RP 
Ready made food 
consumed in a restaurant 
Covered under  Sales Tax 10% of charges 
Soaps/ Cosmetics/ Hair 
Oils/ Laundry/ Shampoo 
10% of RP 
 
10% of RP 
Detergent Bar 5% of RP 
 
5% Ad Val. 
Paper Napkins & other 
paper articles 
Covered under  Sales Tax 5% Ad Val. 
Cigarettes a/ If RP does not exceed PRs.  
4.48/ten cig.; duty is PRs. 1.91 per 
ten cig 
 
c/ If RP exceeds PRs 4.48 but not 
PRs. 10 /ten cig; duty is PRs. 1.91 
per ten cig. + 69% per incremental 
rupee of. 
 
c/ Exceeding PRs. 10 per ten cig; 
duty is 63% of RP 
 
73% or 75% of RP 
Biri 15% of RP NA 
Travelling by Train 12.5% of Charges in VAT mode 
(only on first class, parlour class 
and AC parlour) 
10% of Charges (only 
on first class, parlour 
class and AC parlour) 
Telephone, Telegraph, 
post-al, fax, email 
15% of Charges in VAT mode 25% of Charges 
Tableware/ kitchenware 5% Ad Val. NA 
Glassware 10% Ad Val. 10% Ad Val 
Bulbs/Tubes etc. Covered under  Sales Tax 10% of RP 
Travelling by Air 15% of Charges in VAT mode 10% of Charges 
Refrigerator/ Freezer 10% of RP NA 
TV Covered under  Sales Tax 5% of RP 
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6.2.2 Further Assumptions 
 
 
We have assumed that excise duty is fully borne by consumers of goods and 
services in terms of higher prices of these items. This simplifies incidence 
calculation in most cases except for cigarettes. 
 
 
a. Cigarettes (2001-02) 
 
The case of calculating excise duty on cigarettes for (2001-02) warrants more 
explanation since excise duty on cigarettes is levied according to three 
different tariff slabs. We can simplify the information presented in Table 6.2 
as following:  
 
a. If retail price per cigarette is no more than 0.448 paisa, excise duty is 
0.191 paisa per cig. 
b. If retail price per cigarettes is more than 0.448 paisa but no more than 
1 rupee, excise duty is 0.191 paisa per cig plus 69 percent of 
incremental rupee or part of. 
c. If retail price per cigarette is more than 1 rupeee excise duty is 63 
percent of retail price.  
 
Since there is no price information in HIES survey (and even if we get price 
information on cigarettes from some other source, it will be impossible to 
match this with HIES survey since consumers are not asked about the type of 
cigarettes they consume) we instead rely on unit values i.e. expenditure 
                                                                                                                                
115 RP is retail price. 
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divided by quantities, information from within the HIES survey data. 
Although, it needs to be mentioned that unit values are not actual prices, they 
have been used as implicit prices (for instance see Deaton and Grosh, 1988; 
and Deaton 1995) in cases where price information is hard to come by or 
where it is hard to match this information with information presented in the 
survey data.  
 
Although, it has been shown that unit values can be affected by quality choices 
i.e. someone buying better meat quality will pay more for that, spatial price 
variations of unit values have been found to be closely related to price 
variations especially when averaged over clusters (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002)116. 
Thus, we assume unit values for cigarettes are equal to the retail prices of 
cigarettes and this allows us to determine applicable duty slab for cigarettes. 
For example if a household consumed 100 cigarettes while spending PRs. 110 
in total than according to our calculation the unit value or the implicit price of 
cigarette in this case will be 1.1, which according to our estimation falls within 
duty slab c. Although, it must be admitted that by doing this we are assuming 
that all 100 cigarettes consumed by the household are of the same type and 
purchased at the same price, which is quite a restrictive assumption but in the 
light of available information the only option. Once we know the respective 
duty slab applicable for household cigarette consumption we can use the 
information given above to determine the duty slab and duty paid117.  
 
 
b. Travelling by Train (1990-91) & (2001-02) 
 
 
                                                 
116 For detailed discussion on using unit values as proxy for prices, see chapter 7. 
117 If unit value falls within slab b, excise duty is determined in two parts. Unit value is 
separated into two portions; that falls below 0.448 and the remaining unit value portion. These 
are then taken as weights to determine expenditure falling under a particular type of duty slab 
and duty is applied accordingly.  
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Since CED is levied only on passengers who are travelling in air conditioned 
compartment or in the first class parlour, duty is levied on only those 
households that lie in the top three expenditure deciles.  
 
 
6.2.3 Calculating payable excise duty and incidence 
 
 
Now we are in the position to determine the calculation of payable excise 
duty. This is calculated using the following equations: 
 
ji
j
j
ji e
ex
ex
Ex ,, .
1+
=        6.3 
 
where 
 
jiEx ,  = household i’s per capita excise duty payment on good j 
jex  = statutory excise duty rate on good j 
jie ,  = observed expenses or post- tax per capita expenditures on good j 
 
Similar to previous incidence calculation, payable excise duty is calculated 
with reference to only paid or formal market transactions. Payable excise duty 
on various dutiable items is summed together over the relevant households and 
converted to per capita basis. Average excise duty per decile is calculated by 
aggregating (and averaging over households) in each decile and incidence is 
calculated with reference to average (net) total household per capita 
expenditure for that decile118.  
                                                 
118 The progressivity, regressivity or proportionality definition used in this chapter is 
discussed in section 5.3.3. The same definition is used for all taxes. 
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6.2.4 National CED Incidence (1990-91) & (2001-02) 
  
 
The CED incidence results for (1990-91) and (2001-02) are reported in Table 
6.3. If we look at the 1990-91 results we can see that the CED incidence for an 
average Pakistani household stood at 1.88 percent. The average CED 
incidence for the poorest and the richest ten percent of population at pre-
reform time stood at 1.55 and 2.15 percent respectively. If we look at the 
overall trend of CED incidence, at pre-reform time the overall incidence 
pattern for CED clearly appears to be progressive.  
 
 By (2001-02), the CED incidence at national level appears to be slightly 
reduced. This mainly appeared to be due to reduction in rates (see for instance 
Table 6.2) as well as changes in the underlying consumption patterns over 
time (for instance see chapter five). The post- reform CED incidence for 
average Pakistani household stood at only 1.02 percent while incidence for the 
poorest and the richest ten percent of households stood at 1.06 and 1.05 
percent respectively. If we look at the overall trend of CED incidence during 
the post- reform time it appeared to be more or less proportional. Interestingly 
in (1990-91), CED incidence for the richest ten percent of households was 
almost 28 percent higher than their poorest counterparts but over time this 
difference was completely removed as by the end of the reform process, 
richest ten percent households were in fact paying on average 1 percent less 
than their poorest counterpart.  
 
This picture is also reflected in the proportionate change in CED tax liabilities 
over time which reflects how CED scaling down gains are distributed across 
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similar segments of population over time. We see that an average Pakistani 
household experienced a 46 percent reduction in tax liabilities over time. But 
the gains were highest for the richest ten percent of population, which on 
average experienced 51 percent reduction in CED tax liabilities over time 
compared to the poorest ten percent of national population which experienced 
a 31 percent reduction in tax liabilities over time. Thus, at a national level it 
appears that CED reforms have generally provided more tax relief to the richer 
segment of the population and reforms have failed to maintain the 
progressivity of CED over time119. 
  
 
                                                 
119 The regional i.e. rural and urban CED incidence results are also presented in Table 6.3. 
Our results indicate that the level of CED incidence declined considerably over time. And 
even though CED incidence in urban areas was higher than in rural areas during the pre-
reform era, this is not true for the post-reform era. It appears that over time a reduction in the 
CED regime has benefited (in terms of change in tax liabilities) the urban areas more than the 
rural areas and the benefits seem to be accruing more to the relatively rich segment of the  
population in both regions compared to their counterparts. Some of these issues can be better 
understood by looking at the disaggregated patterns of CED incidence over time. 
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Table 6.3: All Pakistan and Urban/Rural CED Incidence (1990-2001) 
Deciles Excise duty 
Payable
Excise duty 
Incidence (%)
Excise duty 
Payable
Excise duty 
Incidence  (%)
Pakistan 1 49 1.06 77 1.55
2 62 1.04 112 1.74
3 71 1.03 133 1.76
4 78 1.00 155 1.84
5 86 0.99 176 1.85
6 98 0.99 208 1.98
7 114 1.01 232 1.90
8 130 0.96 285 1.98
9 179 1.04 376 2.07
10 382 1.05 783 2.15
Avg 123 1.02 245 1.88
Urban 1 54 1.03 95 1.73
2 70 0.98 134 1.86
3 81 0.97 164 1.95
4 91 0.94 182 1.92
5 99 0.89 216 2.00
6 127 0.99 255 2.09
7 158 1.03 299 2.09
8 199 1.07 352 2.03
9 271 1.04 486 2.06
10 596 1.06 1125 2.12
Avg 175 1.00 320 1.99
Rural 1 46 1.05 68 1.42
2 61 1.08 102 1.68
3 66 1.02 126 1.78
4 75 1.04 144 1.79
5 82 1.04 166 1.87
6 87 0.99 173 1.76
7 102 1.04 207 1.91
8 113 0.99 245 1.91
9 130 0.94 325 2.07
10 235 1.05 577 2.10
Avg 101 1.02 211 1.82
Source: Author's own calculation using HIES (1990-91) and (2001-02)
2001-02 1990-91
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6.2.5 Selected Excise Duty Commodity Incidence 
 
 
One thing (as mentioned) earlier that remained constant during the pre and 
post- reform time was the narrow focus of excise duties. For instance in 1990-
91 five goods were responsible for almost 70 percent of excise revenue and 
these included cigarettes, sugar,  petroleum or POL products and beverages 
and these, more or less were also responsible in 2001-02 for around 80 percent 
of total excise duty collection. This narrow focus makes incidence analysis of 
excise duties quite interesting and makes it possible to see the impact of main 
component of excise duties at pre- and post-- reform time.  
 
Table 6.4a presents five categories that made up almost 80 percent of total 
CED  incidence in (1990-91)120. On average, cigarettes were the highest 
incidence creating category responsible for almost 37 percent of total excise 
duty incidence. This was followed by sugar (31 percent), beverages (12 
percent), detergent (4.2 percent), and telephone/fax (1.6 percent) respectively. 
It appears the top three CED incidence creating categories for the poorest ten 
percent of households were sugar (40 percent share of total excise duty 
incidence), cigarettes (34 percent), and beverages (6.2 percent). While these 
for the richest ten percent of households were also cigarettes (contributing a 
share of 41 percent), beverages (18 percent) and sugar (16 percent).  
 
If we look at the incidence trend of these components it appears CED 
incidence for sugar and detergent is clearly regressive, while cigarette 
incidence appears to be progressive for the bottom fifty percent of population 
and proportional afterwards. Furthermore, telephone/fax and beverages CED 
                                                 
120 We were not able to measure CED incidence on POL products and cement because of 
difficulty of identifying relevant expenditure item in HIES survey as well as complicated CED 
slab structure in the case of formal.  
 167 
incidence generally appeared to be progressive. Thus, it appears that CED 
progressivity at national level was largely driven by progressivity of 
telephone/fax charges as well as beverages. This was significantly supported 
by the progressive cigarettes incidence over the first half of the population and 
proportionality for rest of the population. And these factors, more than offset 
the regressivity of sugar CED incidence. 
 
The combined incidence of these five categories in 2001-02 still appeared to 
be around 80 percent of total CED incidence. Table 6.4b shows disaggregated 
CED incidence at the post--reform era. In 2001-02, sugar became the top CED 
incidence category contributing around 31 percent of the total CED incidence. 
This was followed by cigarettes at 29, telephone/fax and detergents both at 7.5 
percent and beverages at 3.2 percent.  
 
In 2001-02, the top three CED incidence generating categories for the poorest 
ten percent of population were cigarettes, sugar and detergents, each 
contributing around 38, 34 and 10 percent of total CED incidence respectively. 
while for the richest ten percent of households the top three incidence 
generating categories were telephone/fax, cigarettes and sugar, each 
responsible for 31, 18 and 15 percent of total CED incidence respectively.  
 
If we look at the individual incidence trends, it appears to be progressive for 
beverages and telephone/fax; regressive for cigarettes, sugar and detergents. 
Thus, over time regressivity of cigarettes (due to change in CED duty slabs as 
well as of changes in underlying consumption patterns) on top of regressivity 
of sugar (that also existed in the pre- reform era) has significantly affected the 
post- reform CED incidence. The overall CED incidence at post- reform time 
at best appears to be proportional as regressivity of sugar and cigarettes is 
balanced against the progressivity of beverages and telephone/fax charges.  
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These concerns are further highlighted when we look at urban/rural results 
particularly at the top and bottom ten percent of population and for top three 
incidence creating categories. For instance, in 1990-91, the top three incidence 
creating categories for the bottom ten percent of population in the urban areas 
were sugar (40 percent), cigarettes (30 percent) and detergents (11 percent). 
For the richest ten percent of population, the top three incidence creating 
categories included cigarettes contributing 37 percent of total CED incidence, 
24 percent for beverages and 13 percent for telephone/fax.  
 
As for incidence trend, sugar appeared to be clearly regressive, cigarettes 
progressive over first half of the population and regressive afterwards, 
telephone and fax charges and detergent remained generally progressive. 
Thus, again progressivity of CED incidence at pre- reform time for urban 
areas was generally driven by cigarettes incidence which was progressive over 
first half of the population and its regressivity for the top fifty percent of the 
population was more than offset by progressivity of telephone/fax charges and 
beverages over that segment of population.  
 
During the same time in the rural areas the top three incidence generating 
categories for the poorest ten percent of population were sugar (34 percent), 
cigarettes (26 percent) and detergent (5.4 percent). while for the richest ten 
percent of population the top three CED incidence categories were cigarettes 
(41 percent), sugar (22 percent) and beverages (15 percent). However, the 
progressivity of CED incidence for rural areas was largely driven by cigarette 
incidence that appeared to be generally progressive over most of rural 
population and it was strongly supported by beverage incidence that was 
clearly progressive.  
 
In 2001-02 in the urban areas the top three incidence creating categories for 
the poorest ten percent of population were cigarettes (38 percent), sugar (31 
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percent) and detergent (9 percent) while for the richest ten percent households 
these were telephone/fax (43 percent), cigarettes (14 percent) and sugar (7.6 
percent). Thus, in urban areas similar to 1990-91 there were significant 
variation in terms of which goods were mainly responsible for CED share for 
the urban poorest and the richest ten percent of the population. The incidence 
trend for sugar, detergent and cigarettes again appeared to be clearly 
regressive, while CED incidence for telephone/fax and beverages was 
progressive.  
 
For the poorest ten percent of households in the rural areas, the most 
significant CED incidence share came from cigarettes (38 percent), followed 
by sugar (36 percent) and detergents (11 percent) while for the richest ten 
percent households the most significant category this time was sugar (23 
percent), cigarettes (22.8 percent) and telephone/fax (17 percent). Thus, for 
rural households in all deciles compared with the urban population sugar 
remained the most significant incidence category.  
 
As for incidence trend in post- reform era for both the urban and rural areas, 
results were largely driven by a clear regressive pattern of CED incidence on 
cigarettes (both due to change in rate and due to changes in the underlying 
consumption patterns). This along with regressive sugar incidence created a 
strong regressive CED setup that to some extent was neutralized by the 
progressivity of telephone/fax charges but this was not enough to create 
progressivity in the overall urban/rural CED incidence.  
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Table 6.4a: Selected Excise Duty Incidence Shares in (1990-91) as 
(percentage of total CED incidence) 
Deciles Sugar Bev Detergent Tel/fax Cig. Total
1 39.7 6.2 5.9 0.2 33.7 85.7
2 39.0 9.6 5.1 0.5 31.6 85.8
3 37.7 8.7 4.8 0.5 34.6 86.2
4 34.4 11.5 4.7 0.9 34.9 86.3
5 33.1 8.3 4.4 0.9 39.4 86.1
6 33.4 13.6 4.1 0.7 34.4 86.2
7 29.5 11.4 4.2 0.7 40.2 86.0
8 26.5 14.1 3.8 1.4 38.5 84.3
9 23.9 17.1 3.1 2.6 38.2 84.9
10 16.1 18.2 2.4 7.1 41.4 85.2
Avg 31.0 12.1 4.2 1.6 36.8 85.7
1 39.8 10.5 5.0 0.4 30.2 85.9
2 34.8 9.3 4.5 0.5 36.4 85.6
3 34.8 13.6 4.3 0.6 32.5 85.7
4 29.1 9.2 4.1 0.7 42.1 85.2
5 27.2 10.5 3.9 0.7 44.0 86.3
6 25.3 15.1 3.7 0.6 41.7 86.5
7 23.8 11.7 3.5 1.6 45.5 86.0
8 22.2 19.6 3.3 2.5 35.9 83.6
9 17.0 21.2 2.8 6.7 38.1 85.8
10 8.7 24.1 1.7 13.0 36.5 84.0
Avg 25.7 15.6 3.9 2.9 36.4 84.4
1 34.0 4.4 5.4 0.1 26.0 69.9
2 35.6 8.1 4.9 0.4 28.7 77.7
3 34.6 6.8 4.5 0.4 33.0 79.2
4 34.5 9.1 4.5 0.7 32.0 80.8
5 32.1 8.2 4.2 1.0 35.7 81.3
6 27.3 11.0 4.0 0.6 29.1 71.9
7 36.4 9.7 4.1 0.9 27.9 78.9
8 27.6 12.2 3.9 0.5 35.7 79.9
9 26.9 13.8 3.5 1.3 39.5 84.9
10 22.0 15.4 2.8 3.3 41.2 84.7
Avg 30.8 10.5 4.4 1.0 30.8 77.5
Source: Author's own calculation
Urban
Rural
Pakistan
 171 
Table 6.5b: Selected Excise Duty Incidence Shares in (2001-02) as 
(percentage of total CED incidence) 
 
Deciles Sugar Bev Detergent Tel/fax Cig. Total
1 34.3 0.9 9.9 0.6 37.7 83.4
2 36.6 1.6 9.1 0.8 33.1 81.1
3 35.2 2.1 8.6 1.5 33.2 80.6
4 35.7 2.4 8.2 1.9 30.9 79.1
5 35.1 2.7 8.0 3.5 29.0 78.2
6 33.9 3.0 7.4 4.4 30.4 79.1
7 30.1 3.8 7.2 7.5 29.2 77.7
8 29.0 4.2 6.7 9.6 25.4 74.9
9 22.7 5.0 5.5 16.1 25.3 74.6
10 14.7 6.7 4.0 30.7 17.8 73.8
Avg 30.8 3.2 7.5 7.6 29.3 78.3
1 31.1 1.4 8.8 1.7 37.5 80.6
2 32.0 2.7 7.9 3.3 32.1 78.0
3 29.4 3.6 7.5 3.5 32.8 76.7
4 28.0 3.9 7.0 8.3 26.2 73.5
5 27.7 3.9 7.1 11.3 25.5 75.6
6 21.9 5.0 5.9 12.5 29.1 74.4
7 19.2 4.9 5.2 15.8 23.4 68.5
8 16.2 5.2 4.4 23.4 24.7 73.9
9 13.5 6.5 4.2 31.5 18.0 73.8
10 7.6 7.2 2.8 43.3 13.8 74.6
Avg 22.1 4.5 5.9 15.9 24.6 73.0
1 35.9 0.9 10.6 0.4 37.5 85.3
2 40.6 1.5 10.2 0.7 37.8 90.8
3 39.1 1.5 9.5 0.8 34.0 84.9
4 40.8 2.2 9.2 1.2 35.7 89.2
5 41.2 2.6 9.6 2.2 37.1 92.8
6 38.0 2.4 8.0 2.2 30.1 80.6
7 35.5 3.0 7.5 3.6 31.0 80.6
8 30.8 3.3 7.2 4.5 26.4 72.2
9 29.1 3.6 6.4 6.7 24.1 69.8
10 23.3 5.8 5.4 16.5 22.8 73.8
Avg 35.0 2.7 8.1 4.1 29.6 79.6
Source: Author's own calculation
Rural
Pakistan
Urban
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6.3 Total Indirect Tax Incidence for Pakistan (1990-91) to (2001-02)
121
 
 
 
After having examined the pre- and post- reform incidence for GST (Chapter 
five) and incidence for custom duties and excise duty in this chapter we are 
now in a position to address one of the core questions of this study i.e. the 
overall incidence of indirect taxes in Pakistan at pre- and post- reform times. 
This will allow us to see how the indirect tax incidence over time has changed 
due to the tax reform process embarked in the 1990s and to ascertain if the 
equity concerns envisaged in the pre- reform strategy really got translated into 
positive policy actions aimed at making the overall indirect tax incidence pro-
poor or not. 
  
 
6.3.1 National level results
122
 
 
 
The total indirect tax system incidence results for (1990-91) and (2001-02) are 
presented in Tables 6.5. The results for the pre-reform era i.e. (1990-91) show 
that the total indirect tax incidence for an average Pakistani household stood at 
6.32 percent. The overall incidence for the poorest ten percent of households 
stood at 6.11 percent while the incidence for the richest ten percent of 
households stood at 6.16 percent. If we look at the overall incidence trend at 
the pre-reform time it appears to be of inverted U-shaped with higher indirect 
tax incidence faced by the middle portion of population compared to the 
population at the tails. If we look at how total indirect tax incidence is being 
constituted for an average household at national level, almost 47 percent of 
                                                 
121 Incidence is this section is calculated by accumulating tax liabilities over net paid 
expenditures for  three taxes, namely custom duties, excise duty and sales tax.  
122 Although the overall indirect tax incidence results at the regional level i.e. urban and rural 
are also presented in Table 6.5, there are no major differences. 
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total indirect tax incidence is coming from custom duties, while 30 and 21 
percent incidence is coming from CED and sales tax respectively. Thus it 
appears that the inverted U-shaped incidence trend was mainly due to the 
regressivity of custom duty incidence which more than counterbalanced 
progressive patterns for CED and GST tax at the pre-reform time.  
 
In (2001-02) i.e. also the post- reform time an average Pakistani household 
faced an overall indirect tax incidence of 7.31 percent. The indirect tax 
incidence for the poorest and the richest ten percent of the population stood at 
7.14 and 7.56 percent respectively. If we look at the overall trend of indirect 
tax incidence at the post- reform era it appears to be progressive (excluding 
the second, sixth and eight decile households). However, one important thing 
to note is that the poorest ten percent of population now bear lowest indirect 
tax incidence while the top ten percent of population bear the highest indirect 
tax incidence, which is a positive development over time.  
 
If we look at the constitution of total indirect tax incidence at the post-reform 
era, for an average Pakistani household  almost the lion’s share i.e. 65 percent 
of total indirect tax incidence came from GST/VAT, while remaining 19 and 
15 percent of indirect tax incidence came from custom duties and CED. Thus, 
it appeared shifting reliance from trade taxes to GST/VAT revenues over time 
was mainly responsible for making the overall indirect tax incidence 
progressive, although we believe that progressivity of the current system at 
lower deciles has been limited (also evident from the national incidence 
pattern) because of taxation of processed food items such as sugar and 
vegetable ghee and basic fuel such as kerosene (also highlighted in chapter 
five).  
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Table 6.6: All Pakistan and Urban/Rural Indirect Tax Incidence (1990-2001) 
 
Deciles
Pakistan 1 7.14 6.11
2 7.34 6.43
3 7.30 6.30
4 7.30 6.43
5 7.32 6.40
6 7.26 6.45
7 7.33 6.27
8 7.17 6.31
9 7.43 6.36
10 7.56 6.16
Avg 7.31 6.32
Urban 1 7.30 6.14
2 7.35 6.28
3 7.39 6.49
4 7.37 6.40
5 7.23 6.49
6 7.46 6.57
7 7.36 6.48
8 7.45 6.37
9 7.53 6.10
10 7.57 5.53
Avg 7.40 6.31
Rural 1 7.06 5.98
2 7.39 6.45
3 7.22 6.40
4 7.34 6.49
5 7.29 6.47
6 7.23 6.18
7 7.30 6.30
8 7.21 6.20
9 7.18 6.55
10 7.52 6.34
Avg 7.27 6.33
Note: Shaded area represents households that are below poverty line for that year.
2001-02 1990-91
Source: Author's own calculation using HIES (1990-91) and (2001-02)
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For instance, if we look at Figure 6.1 we can see that taxation of sugar (via 
GST/VAT and CED) is responsible for almost 8 percent of total indirect tax 
incidence for an average Pakistani household and 10-12 percent of total 
indirect tax incidence for the bottom fifty percent of population. But for the 
richest fifty percent of national population sugar incidence fell quite sharply to 
under 4 percent of total incidence. Thus, we believe this is one of the reasons 
for limited progressivity exhibited by the overall indirect tax incidence at 
national level despite a shift from trade taxes to GST/VAT for the bottom fifty 
percent of population at the post--reform scenario.  
  
Figure 6.1: Share of Sugar incidence in total indirect tax incidence (2001-
02) 
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If we look at Figure 6.2 it shows the combined incidence of sugar, vegetable 
ghee and kerosene oil as a proportion of overall indirect tax incidence. We 
have purposely selected goods that were flagged to be proportionally more 
important for the poor (for instance see chapter five) and which were also the 
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main incidence categories in the post-reform era. It is perhaps no surprise to 
find that although these three items were responsible for only 12 percent of 
overall indirect tax incidence for an average Pakistani household but these 
together constituted around 22 percent of total incidence for the bottom ten 
percent of national households.  
 
Furthermore, for the bottom four deciles also flagged as the ‘poor’, the 
incidence share of these three goods within overall indirect tax incidence 
remained as high as 18 percent. On the other hand, for the top fifty percent of 
population the combined incidence share of three goods fall quite sharply, 
declining to a mere 12 percent for the richest ten percent households. Thus, we 
believe high incidence share coming from these three items has been 
responsible for not only restricted progressivity of the overall indirect taxes 
despite a shift from trade taxes to GST/VAT in the post-reform era but also 
responsible for keeping incidence for the ‘poor’ segment of population 
comparatively quite high.  
 
Figure 6.2: Share of Sugar, Kerosene-oil and vegetable ghee incidence in 
total indirect tax incidence (2001-02) 
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If we look at how overall indirect tax liabilities have changed over time at 
national level, this is presented in Figure 6.3. Even though tax reforms of 
1990s have slightly increased the level of overall indirect tax incidence for all 
segments of population, this increase has been almost the same for the bottom 
fifty percent; ranging from 12-14 percent while increase in indirect tax 
liabilities due to the reform process for the richest forty percent of the 
population has been between 11 – 18 percent. As a result, this has added 
progressivity at the top fifty percent of population but not for the bottom fifty 
percent of population. 
  
Figure 6.3: Percentage change in tax liabilities: National and Regional 
Results (1990-2001) 
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6.4 Conclusion 
 
 
The Pakistan federal tax structure relies heavily on indirect taxes as the prime 
source of revenue. Like many developing countries, Pakistan also embarked 
upon a substantial tax reform process during the decade of 1990s with the 
main aim of revenue mobilization. But this reform strategy also gave 
substantial importance to equity considerations and envisaged addressing both 
issues via revitalizing direct taxes (that later did not materialize) as well as the 
replacement of trade taxes with GST/VAT revenues, with latter expected to be 
“pro-poor” as a result of well targeted GST/VAT exemptions.  
 
It would not be wrong to say that even though tax reforms of the 1990s have 
increased the tax liabilities for an average Pakistani household at the national 
level by 15 percent, reforms have been generally progressive for national as 
well as for the urban areas. This is a clear break from the pre-reform era in 
which the overall indirect tax incidence at national as well as the urban/rural 
levels at best appeared to be of inverted U-shaped. Thus, we do believe that 
our overall indirect tax incidence results at national as well as for the urban 
areas support Gemmel and Morrissey (2003) finding that for most developing 
countries a move away from import taxes to sales taxes has generally been 
progressive.  
 
Although this result is not apparent in the rural areas, we believe one of the 
main reasons for this is the existing taxation of sugar, vegetable ghee and 
kerosene oil, which are responsible for almost a quarter of total indirect tax 
incidence for the poorest ten percent of households. These items have been 
flagged (in the previous chapter) to be proportionally more important for the 
poor, thus best candidate for GST/VAT exemptions on distributional grounds. 
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And our incidence results clearly support our previous findings. And results 
show that post reform progressivity of the overall indirect tax system for 
urban/rural poor and for rural areas in general have been marginalized by 
taxation of sugar, vegetable ghee and kerosene oil. 
 
We have found sufficient differences in the consumption patterns of the poor 
in Pakistan that allows for better targeting of exemptions particularly where 
basic fuels, sugar and vegetable ghee consumption is concerned (for instance 
see chapter five). These consumption patterns are found to be quite different 
from developed countries. Thus, if poverty alleviation and distributional 
concerns are important for the policy makers in developing countries, general 
rule of thumb for GST/VAT exemptions may not work. And policy making 
has to be more sensitive to the indigenous factors. 
 
In this chapter, our incidence results still hinge on the no-behavioural response 
assumption. In the next chapter we try to evaluate how incorporation of 
behaviour responses will change our results and also try to propose direction 
of reforms that can be welfare improving at margin. 
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CHAPTER VII: Using Demand Analysis to Evaluate 
Price and Tax Reforms in Pakistan (2001-02) 
 
 
7 Introduction 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to go beyond the distributional analysis of tax 
incidence by estimating own- and cross- price elasticities using spatial price 
variation in the survey data. The intentions are multiple: (a) to provide useful 
discussion on why estimates of elasticities are important for ex-ante tax policy 
planning and tax reform analysis; (b) to illustrate how or if tax incidence 
estimates from earlier chapters are sensitive to demand responses; and (c) to 
recommend the future directions of welfare enhancing reforms for Pakistan at 
margin. 
 
For this purpose this chapter is divided into eight sections. The first section 
provides a brief description of the general approach. The second section talks 
about unit values and how they can be used to estimate implicit or proxy 
prices from survey data and problems and issues related to this conjecture. 
Section three talks in depth about Deaton’s (1988;1990;1997) methodology 
that can be used to estimate spatial price variation from survey data. Section 
four talks about basic data information i.e. cluster structure of HIES (2001-02) 
for Pakistan, basic summary information on dependent and independent 
variables that will be used in this analysis as well as providing important 
information on how unit values vary across clusters as well as over time. The 
fifth section provides the results of the first stage of estimation as well as final 
own- and cross- price elasticity estimates for Pakistan for (2001-02). The sixth 
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section will try to illustrate if partial equilibrium tax incidence estimates from 
earlier chapters are sensitive to incorporation of demand responses. The 
seventh section starts with a brief explanation of theory and methodology of 
marginal theory of tax and price reform and concludes with providing 
recommendations on the future direction of tax reforms particularly for VAT 
for Pakistan that can be welfare enhancing (and are in line with efficiency and 
equity criteria). The last section concludes.  
 
 
7.1 Basic approach 
 
 
This chapter aims at estimating price elasticities using spatial price variation in 
the survey data to estimate demand functions, by taking unit values as proxies 
for prices. The survey data that used for this estimation is the Household 
Integrated Economic Survey (HIES) 2001-02 for Pakistan. The following 
sections provide detailed description of various issues related to this 
methodology as well as our results.  
 
 
7.2 Why Unit Values? 
 
 
In order to determine the welfare price effect of a tax change we must begin 
with understanding how households will respond to price changes. Such 
information is also critical for design of effective tax or subsidy policy. 
However, modelling consumer behaviour is not easy because it requires 
accurate and robust price information (that requires historical time series data 
on prices). According to Deaton (1988) availability of such data is a rarity 
even for developed countries let alone developing countries123. Although in 
                                                 
123 For instance see [Barton, 1969] for classic attempt using data on Holland and [Deaton, 
1974a] using time series data on UK.  
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many cases some price data is collected by the statistical offices, in many 
developing countries such data is available only at: (a) a geographically 
aggregated level and (b) for a few years only. This, therefore rules out a 
possibility of using this price data source for constructing robust price 
elasticity estimates.  
 
However, many developing countries do have cross-sectional survey data of 
very good quality collected for a reasonable span of time. Such surveys report 
data on both expenditures and quantities consumed by households for a wide 
variety of goods. Dividing expenditures by quantity gives us unit values for 
each items purchased by the households, ratio of expenditure to quantities, 
which can be used as proxies for prices (Disney et. al, 2004). 
 
However, unit values are not the same as ‘prices’ and can not be directly 
treated as market prices without adjustment in quality differences in purchases 
across households (Houthakker, 1952; Theil 1952; and Deaton, 1988), 
adjustment for units of measurement (Prais and Houthakker, 1955), as well as 
other sources of measurement error (Timmer and Alderman, 1979; Strauss, 
1982; .Prais and Houthakker, 1955). Although, unit value has been used 
directly for estimation of price elasticities (Deaton, 1988; Timmer and 
Alderman, 1979; Timmer, 1981; and Pitt, 1983),  failure to address quality 
effects within prices can lead to parameters being different from what would 
have been otherwise (Cox and Wohlgenant, 1986). But if the appropriate 
adjustment in unit values can be made, the usefulness of information contained 
in unit values cannot be denied particularly for developing countries where 
price data is so scarce (Deaton, 1988).  
 
 
7.3  Deaton’s Methodology
124
 
                                                 
124 This section relies heavily on Deaton (1988; 1992; 1997) for notations and explanations.   
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Deaton (1988; 1990; 1997) proposes a methodology aimed at estimated spatial 
price variation from unit values in order to estimate price elasticities using 
survey data. The basic assumption of this methodology is that households 
belonging to the same cluster face the same prices. Since households 
belonging to the same cluster in a survey are more or less interviewed at the 
same time (in order to minimize travel cost) this assumption is quite realistic 
particularly for rural areas where a single market exists. Once this assumption 
is made the idea is to use cluster information on expenditures and unit values 
to estimate the effects of household income and demographics characteristics 
on quantities and qualities. The demand system can then be estimated on the 
basis of inter-cluster variation in corrected quantities and unit values.  
 
Before we start with Deaton’s methodology we need to understand how he 
models quality. According to Deaton (1997) the most suitable way of thinking 
about quality is to define quality as a property of commodity aggregates. 
According to this definition if icq denotes the household’s vector of 
consumption levels of good i within the group consumed by household in 
cluster c, than the group quantity index  icQ  can be written as: 
 
 
iciic qkQ .=         7.1 
 
 
where ik is used to add quantities of items in the group. Corresponding to the 
quantity vector is a price vector, icp , which contains no price variation since 
each commodity that makes up commodity vector is perfectly homogenous. 
Thus, we can write icp  as: 
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0. iicic pp π=         7.2 
 
 
where icπ is a scalar measure of the level of prices in the group and 
0
ip is the 
reference price vector. According to the notation we can see that price level 
icπ varies between clusters but not within households while reference price 
vector 0ip  remains constant across clusters. Now if group expenditure ihcx , is 
equal to icic qp ⋅ , equation 7.1 and 7.2 can be used to write the following 
identity: 
 
 
)./.()./.(. 0 iciiciiciciciicicicicicic qkqpQqkqpQqpx π===   7.3 
 
 
Where the term in brackets in equation 7.3 is the measure of quality ( icξ ). 
which can be defined as: 
 
 
iciiciic qkqp /.
0=ξ        7.4 
 
 
So we can re-write unit values using equation 7.3 as a product of quality and 
prices: 
 
 
iciciciiciicicicic qkqpQxv ξππ === )./.(/
0     7.5 
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After defining unit values and quality  we are in a position to explain his 
procedure which essentially is based on two equations used to estimate budget 
shares and observed unit values. In essence budget share and unit value 
equations are being estimated using cluster level information on household 
total (per capita) expenditures as well as other demographic variables, such as 
household size etc. These two equations can essentially be written as:  
 
 
1
1
111 lnln iccjc
N
H
icicicic ufpzxw +++++= ∑
=
θγβα    7.6 
2
1
222 lnlnln icjc
N
H
Hicicic upzxv ++++= ∑
=
ψγβα    7.7 
 
 
where icw is the budget share of good i in cluster c, icx  is the total household 
expenditure, icv  is the calculated unit values, and icz  is the vector of 
household characteristics, all of which are observed. However, other terms 
such as prices jcp , the cluster fixed effects cf (represent unobserved taste 
variation among different clusters, which is homogenous or shared by all 
households in a cluster) and error terms 1icu  and 
2
icu  are all not observed. 
Additionally, it is assumed that cluster fixed effects cf are uncorrelated with 
the unobservable prices so that even when both variables are unobservable, 
price elasticities can be measured. The error term 1icu contains usual 
unobservable as well as measurement error in the share equation. Additionally, 
it is assumed that they are correlated with the error term 2icu  in the unit value 
equation which also includes measurement error in unit values .  
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We can see that equations 7.6 and 7.7 contain different dependent variables. 
The unit value equation i.e. equation 7.7 is kept slightly different because unit 
values unlike unobservable prices vary from household to household within 
the same commodity group. These are linked with prices through 2β  (i.e. 
elasticity of quality with respect to total expenditure) in the unit value 
equation. If there was no measurement error or unit values were equal to 
prices, the matrix Hψ  would be an identity. Also it is important to mention 
that the cluster fixed effect term because of identification issues only appears 
in the share equation but not in the unit value equation because if it did it 
would break the direct link between prices and unit value. 
 
Now we are in a position to explain Deaton’s estimation procedure given 
underlying assumption and structure as has been mentioned above.  
 
 
7.3.1  First Stage 
 
 
Once we have assumed that there is no price variation within the same cluster 
we can use within cluster information on expenditures and unit values to 
estimate the effects of household income and demographics characteristics on 
quantities and qualities using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). However, if we 
look at equation 7.6 we can see that this equation is being estimated with 
cluster fixed effects by allowing dummy variables for each cluster. But the 
possibility of a very large number of clusters in survey data can make this very 
time consuming if not impossible task. One shortcut according to Firsch-
Waugh (1993) theorem is to carry out estimation of equations after removing 
cluster means from each of the variables. Consequently, all variables in both 
equations can be first demeaned by their cluster means and then OLS can be 
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applied to the demeaned equations125. And the residuals from both equations 
i.e. 1ice and 
2
ice can be used to estimate the variances and covariance of the 
measurement errors in 1icu  and 
2
icu  in equation 7.6 and 7.7: 
 
 
11111 )(~ jc
c
iceekCn ∑−−−=σ        7.8 
 
22122 )(~ jc
c
ici eekCnw ∑−+ −−=       7.9 
 
21112 )(~ jc
c
ici eekCn ∑−+ −−=χ       7.10 
 
 
Where n is the total number of households in the survey, +in is the number of 
households who report purchases of good i, C is the number of clusters, and k 
is the number of explanatory variables. This also brings an important point 
home that unit value equation (7.6) is estimated only for positive market 
purchases, whereas 1β , which is not the price elasticity but a response of 
budget shares to change in prices as a result budget share equation (7.7), is 
observed for all households irrespective of whether a household makes a 
purchase or not .  
 
 
7.3.2 Second Stage 
  
 
                                                 
125 Using OLS on equations where all variables have been demeaned by their cluster means 
gives us correct parameters estimates that would have resulted if we had carried out estimation 
using dummies for each cluster in equation 7.6 and 7.7 
 188 
The next stage starts with using between cluster information in the data to 
estimate prices responses. This is done by calculating cluster averages of 
“corrected” budget shares and unit values by netting out the effects of 
expenditures and demographic characteristics estimated in the first stage 
(Deaton, 1997).  
 
)~ln
~
(
1~ 1
1
1
icicic
cic
ic zxw
n
y γβ −−= ∑
∈
     7.11 
)~ln
~
(ln
1~ 2
2
2
icicic
ciic
ic zxv
n
y γβ −−= ∑
∈
+
    7.12 
 
 
Where cn  is the number of households within cluster, 
+
icn is the number of 
household in a cluster that purchase good i. The superimposed tildes 
correspond to variable from the first within cluster stage. Furthermore, it must 
be remembered that as the sample size in the first stage of estimation 
increases, the estimates converge to their true values, and 1~icy  and 
2~
icy  also 
converge to true cluster means which are: 
 
 
1
1
1
1 lnˆ iccjc
N
H
icic ufpy +++= ∑
=
θα      7.13 
 
2
1
1
2 lnˆ icjc
N
H
icic upy ++= ∑
=
ψα       7.14 
 
where 1icu  and 
2
icu  are the cluster means of the error terms in equation 7.7 and 
7.7. Since the cluster size of household survey is typically small, normally in 
single digits, averaging over clusters will reduce the effect of measurement 
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error, but it cannot completely remove it. As a result, both the covariance and 
the variance must be corrected appropriately using a standard errors-in-
variable estimator. 
 
The between-village variance-covariance matrix assumes that if one were to 
use 1ˆ icy and 
2ˆ
icy to run between village OLS, the between cluster estimates of 
equation 7.13 and 7.14 would be: 
 
 
RSBOLS
1−=         7.15 
 
 
Where the between village variance-covariance matrix of (theoretical, not 
estimated) 1ˆ icy of S is the 
2ˆ
icy  and R is the covariance matrix of 
1ˆ
icy and 
2ˆ
icy . 
According to Deaton (1997), S is likely to over estimate the variance-
covariance matrix of actual prices because it includes the effects of 
measurement error in equation 7.7 and the same holds true for R as well. The 
corrected estimators can be written as: 
 
 
)
~~~
()
~~~
(
~ 111 −−−
+ −Ω−= NXRNSB      7.16 
 
where 1)(lim 11 −= ∑ +−−+
c
cnDCpN , )(
+
nnD is a diagonal matrix from the 
elements of +nn , and the matrix 
1−N is the corresponding quantity formed from 
the cn ’s. The matricesΩ  and X are the variance covariance matrices for u’s 
from equation 7.8 - 7.10. Finally, the probability limit of the matrix B can be 
written as:  
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Θ′Ψ′== −1)(
~
lim BBp       7.17 
 
 
The matrix Θ cannot be further identified without more information. Here the 
information supplied by the quality theory which links price elasticity of 
quality to the usual price and total expenditure elasticity proposed by Deaton 
(1988) based on the assumption of weak separability is used to extract true 
matrix of price responses.  
 
The elasticity of unit value with respect to prices ψ  is one plus the elasticity 
of quality to price, i.e. 
 
 
iijijij εεβδψ /
2+=        7.18 
 
 
Where ijδ  is the kronecker delta that is unity if i = j and zero otherwise. 
2β is 
the quality elasticity from equation 7.7, ijε  is the price elasticity of quantity, 
and iε is the expenditure elasticity. Where expenditure and price elasticities 
respectively can be computed using 7.19 and 7.20 respectively: 
 
112 )(1 −+−= wDe ββ       7.19 
 
Θ+−= −1)(wDE ψ        7.20 
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Where e is the vector of total expenditure elasticity and E is the matrix of price 
elasticities. The diagonalization operator D(.) converts its vector argument into 
a diagonal matrix.  
 
 
7.4 The DATA 
 
 
The data set that is being used for carrying out demand responses is the 
Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES) (2001-02) which is also 
discussed in Chapter three of this study. Thus in this section only information 
relevant to estimation for this chapter will be discussed. As already explained 
HIES (2001-02) is a nationally representative survey which like other 
household surveys tries to minimize travel cost by selecting and interviewing 
households belonging to the same cluster almost at the same time. This is 
made possible because the size of cluster tends to be quite small; around 10-16 
households in each cluster.  
 
As a result, Deaton’s (1992;1997) assumption about households facing the 
same set of prices within a cluster is a plausible example for households in the 
cluster particularly in villages where a single market exists. However, we have 
decided to use both urban/rural clusters for estimation of price elasticities 
because we believe tax policy recommendations cannot be disaggregated on 
the basis of urban/rural areas, thus we want to estimate elasticities that are 
representative of a national scenario.  
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Table 7.1: Cluster level Information of HIES  (2001-02) Survey 
 
Urban Rural Total 
 
471 578 1,050 
Source: Author’s own calculation using HIES (2001-02)  
 
 
Table 7.2 provides summary statistics for seven important food items for the 
households that will be used for calculation of behaviour responses at national 
level. These items include beef, wheat, rice, vegetable ghee, sugar, milk and 
pulses. The budget shares presented in Table 7.2 are also the dependent 
variables for first stage of estimation equation 7.6 (shares are calculated as a 
proportion of total household per capita expenditures). As explained in the 
earlier section since the intention is to calculate demand responses for the 
entire population, households with zero expenditure shares are also included. 
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Table 7.2: Summary Statistics: Dependent Variable Budget Shares 
 
 
  HIES item 
codes 
Mean S.D 
Beef Beef 
 
1201 0.019 0.023 
Wheat Wheat & wheat flour 2101 0.072 
 
0.067 
Rice Rice and rice flour 2102 0.017 
 
0.031 
Vegetable Ghee Vegetable ghee 2302 0.041 
 
0.025 
Sugar Sugar (desi & milled) 1701 0.040 
 
0.025 
Milk Milk (fresh & boiled) 1101 0.082 
 
0.050 
Pulses Gram whole (black & 
white) 
Dal chana 
Mash 
Moong 
Masoor 
Other pulses 
2201 
 
2202 
2203 
2204 
2205 
2206 
0.014 0.010 
 
Definition Budget Shares: 
 
Annualized per capita expenditure on a commodity for a household h as a proportion of 
total annualized per capita expenditure for household h.  
 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation using HIES (2001-02) 
 
 
According to Table 7.2 households are spending around 8.2 percent of total 
per capita expenditure on milk. This is followed by wheat, vegetable ghee, 
sugar, beef, rice and pulses, each having an expenditure share of 7.2, 4.1, 4.0, 
1.9, 1.7 and 1.4 respectively. 
 
Table 7.3 on the other hand, includes information on the explanatory variables 
used in equation 7.6 and 7.7. These include log of household per capita 
expenditure, demographic variables that include log of household size and 
thirteen age to household size ratios, three dummies for seasonality (based on 
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household interview date) and three dummies for geographic locations (based 
on household provincial location).  
 
Table 7.3: Summary Statistics: Explanatory Variables 
 
 Mean S.D 
Expenditure Variables 
Log of per capita total expenditure 9.27 0.57 
Demographic Variables 
Log of household size 
Ratio of male members less than 11 years of age to 
household size 
Ratio of male members less than 11-20 years of age to 
household size 
Ratio of male members less than 21-30 years of age to 
household size 
Ratio of male members less than 31-40 years of age to 
household size 
Ratio of male members less than 41-50 years of age to 
household size 
Ratio of male members less than 51+ years of age to 
household size 
Ratio of female members less than 11 years of age to 
household size 
Ratio of female members less than 11-20 years of age to 
household size 
Ratio of female members less than 21-30 years of age to 
household size 
Ratio of female members less than 31-40 years of age to 
household size 
Ratio of female members less than 41-50 years of age to 
household size 
Ratio of female members less than 51+ years of age to 
household size (omitted) 
 
1.85 
 
0.16 
 
0.12 
 
0.08 
 
0.06 
 
0.04 
 
0.06 
 
0.15 
 
0.11 
 
0.08 
 
0.05 
 
0.04 
 
0.06 
 
0.52 
 
0.16 
 
0.14 
 
0.13 
 
0.10 
 
0.08 
 
0.11 
 
0.15 
 
0.13 
 
0.11 
 
0.08 
 
0.08 
 
0.11 
Seasonality 
Dummy for HH interviewed in 1st quarter 
Dummy for HH interviewed in 2nd quarter 
Dummy for HH interviewed in 3rd quarter 
Dummy for HH interviewed in 4th quarter (omitted) 
  
Geographic  
Dummy for province Punjab 
Dummy for province Sindh 
Dummy for province NWFP 
Dummy for province Balochistan (omitted) 
  
Source: Author’s own calculation using HIES (2001-02) 
 
 195 
 
Table 7.4 presents the summary statistics for unit values that will also be used 
as dependent variable in equation 7.7.  
 
 
Table 7.4: Summary Statistics: Unit Values for food 
items 
 
Item (units) % of HH 
reporting 
 
Mean S.D 
Beef (kg) 
 
59.0% 56.29 9.09 
Wheat (kg) 
 
72.5% 9.47 1.53 
Rice (kg) 
 
76.1% 19.45 4.67 
Vegetable Ghee 
(litre) 
 
87.9% 49.87 6.87 
Sugar (kg) 
 
96.7% 26.21 2.34 
Milk (litre) 
 
59.4% 16.26 4.08 
Pulses (kg) 
 
95.8% 95.17 48.43 
 
Definition unit values: 
 
Diving reported expenditure by reported quantities for each 
commodity purchased by each household. However, unit values 
are calculated only from paid or formal market transactions. 
 
Note: kg  means kilogram. 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation using HIES (2001-02) 
 
 
As already explained, unit values, ratio of expenditure to quantity, are 
calculated for those households that report some expenditure on that item. By 
looking at above Table we can see that the highest percentage of households 
report unit value for sugar (97 percent) while lowest number of households 
report expenditure on both beef and milk each at 59 percent. The second 
column reports the unit values of these food items and according to this Table 
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on average households paid PRs. 56 for each kg of beef while per kg wheat 
cost was around PRs. 10.  
 
Since demand analysis is primarily concerned with spatial price variation in 
the unit values, it is a worthy exercise to look at the behaviour of unit values in 
a bit of detail before we embark on our formal analysis (and result of this is 
presented in Table 7.5). Table 7.5 provides a way of looking at the spatial 
price variation in the unit values. It reports two different sets of calculation for 
Pakistani data. The top panel represents the logarithm of unit values regressed 
against a set of dummies for each of the four provinces; Punjab, Sindh and 
NWFP, (Balochistan is the omitted category) and for each of the four quarters 
(omitting the fourth) of the calendar year during which the survey was 
conducted. The intention is to capture broad provincial and seasonal patterns. 
The bottom portion of the table looks at variation from cluster to cluster within 
each province, and uses analysis of variation to decompose price variation into 
its within- cluster and between cluster components.   
 
The top panel of Table 7.5 shows that in most cases (except wheat and sugar) 
inter-provincial price variations are much larger than the seasonal differences 
(although none appear to be statistically significant). We can see that in 2001-
02 among provinces, wheat was relatively cheaper in Punjab, while rice 
appeared to be relatively cheaper in Sindh (this is in line with the fact that 
most of the production of wheat takes place in Punjab while most of 
production of rice takes place in Sindh). Sugar appears to be cheapest in 
Balochistan (the omitted province), while milk appears to be cheapest in 
Punjab. There appears to be a great deal of price variation across provinces for 
all commodities (except for wheat and sugar).  
 
The bottom part of Table 7.5 reports not parameter estimates but the F-test and 
R2- statistics for a regression of the logarithm of unit value on dummies for 
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clusters, of which there are 458 in Punjab, 264 in Sindh, 188 in NWFP and 
140 in Balochistan. However, it must be kept in mind that not all clusters will 
appear in each regression since if no household in a cluster reports that type of 
expenditure, that cluster is not selected. What we are aiming to look for from 
this regression is how informative unit values are about prices. Since prices 
are assumed not to vary by much within-cluster over a short period of time, F-
statistics should be significant for cluster effects at conventional level of 
significance, or in other words the cluster effects should explain around a half 
of the total variance.  
 
According to our results, all F-Statistics appear to be quite large and 
significant by conventional standard. However, given that the sample size is 
quite large, a better indication of the strength of inter-cluster variation in unit 
values is typically whether the F-Statistics are larger than the logarithm of the 
sample sizes (Schwarz, 1978). Most of F-Statistics (identified as bold figures) 
meet even this stringent requirement. Thus, this should justify the assumption 
that there is spatial price variation and that the variation in unit values 
provides a (noisy) guide to it.  
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7.5 Estimation 
 
7.5.1 First-stage estimates 
 
 
After a detailed basic discussion regarding variables that will be used in this 
estimation and after confirming that the unit values (at least in the case of 
seven goods above) are providing significant inter-cluster variation 
(significant enough in most cases to meet stringent (Schwarz, 1978) criteria); 
as a result, we are in a good position to start discussion of our estimation.  
 
Table 7.6 presents within cluster estimates of regression for (log) unit values 
and expenditure shares i.e. equation 7.6 and 7.7. As explained before, all 
variables in both equations were first demeaned by their cluster means and 
then OLS was applied to the demeaned equations. OLS regressions at this 
stage are run using demeaned values of each variable in the regression and 
result of key variables is presented in Table 7.6 (for complete estimation 
results please see Appendix 7.1 attached at the end of this chapter) 
  
Note that the estimates in Table 7.6 are final estimates for the effects of total 
expenditure and demographic variables derived completely from within cluster 
information. The first and fourth line represent our 1β  and 2β coefficient 
respectively from equation 7.6 and 7.7. According to our estimates, all 
coefficients of total (per capita) household expenditures (w:lnx) appear to be 
statistically significant and with right sign (except milk). The total expenditure 
elasticity for wheat appears to be 0.157, for rice it is 0.518, vegetable ghee 
0.41, sugar 0.64, milk 1.01, pulses 0.28 and beef 0.77. Since only milk appears 
to have expenditure elasticity greater than unity, it appears to be a luxury item 
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while all other items with expenditure elasticities less than unity are 
necessities.  
 
Furthermore, the coefficients of household size (w:lnhhs) in all cases (except 
milk) appeared to be statistically significant and the sign of the coefficients is 
the same as the coefficients on total expenditure. This implies that increasing 
household size (with household composition being held constant) would 
increase the household expenditure and vice versa.   
 
The quality elasticities estimates (v:lnx) are presented in the fourth line of 
Table 7.6 with subsequent coefficient for household composition effects 
(v:lnhhs) in the next line. The quality elasticity estimates for rice, vegetable 
ghee, milk and pulses appeared to be statistically significant while those for 
wheat, sugar and beef are not. The unit value of rice, vegetable ghee, milk and 
pulses increases with expenditure, with elasticities of 0.13, 0.017, 0.019 and 
0.21 respectively. The unit values coefficient in most cases as expected are 
quite small. Additionally, household size effects in most cases (except sugar 
and beef) are statistically significant. Also, the sign of the coefficient of 
household size in the unit value equation (v:lnhhs) is the same as the sign of 
coefficients on total expenditures. Thus, the household size effect in all cases 
(holding composition constant) reinforces the changes in unit values via 
expenditures. 
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7.5.2 Price response: Second-stage estimates  
 
 
Table 7.7 present own- and cross-price elasticities results for Pakistan along 
with the bootstrapped estimates for “standard errors”. The numbers are 
presented such that the elasticity estimate in row i and column j is the response 
of consumption of good i to the price of good j . These estimates include the 
provincial and quarter effects in demands as these are allowed for by 
regressing the corrected cluster averages of budget shares and unit values on 
quarterly and provincial dummies.  
 
According to our results in Table 7.7 we can see that all own- price elasticity 
estimates are negative (except for wheat) and significant126. The own- price 
elasticity for beef, rice and milk is less than -1. This means milk, rice and beef 
are price elastic goods while demand for vegetable ghee, sugar, and pulses is 
fairly inelastic. This provides very useful information from the tax policy 
planning perspective. For instance, additional price increase of milk, rice and 
beef (due to imposition of tax for instance) is going to be not that successful 
because demand for these products is quite elastic. Thus, it is unlikely that 
much revenue is going to be raised from such a policy. On the other hand, 
vegetable ghee, sugar and pulses are an attractive candidate for further price 
increase (due to a tax) since their demand is fairly inelastic. Thus, these 
elasticities estimates are fundamental for tax policy planning as they make ex-
ante tax policy analysis possible.  
 
 
                                                 
126 It is hard to explain a positive own-price elasticity case, such as wheat, in our case. One 
possibility is that the estimation is severely affected by aggregation across various qualities of 
wheat in the survey.. 
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Table 7.7 also presents cross- price elasticity results for all seven goods. 
Almost around half of our cross- price elasticity estimates appear to be 
significant and in some cases the cross- price elasticities estimates are not too 
small to ignore. For instance, one percent increase in the price of beef 
decreases the demand for rice by 1.7 percent. In quite a few cases we are able 
to make out a clear relationship pattern between goods but very few of these 
are also statistically significant. For instance, beef appears to be a complement 
to vegetable ghee, sugar and pulses (but only in the case of sugar is this 
relationship statistically significant). The complement relationship between 
beef and sugar warrant extra comment. One possibility is that given beef is an 
expansive meat type, it is normally cooked by average Pakistani households 
on special occasions and a dessert is also part of the menu of such events. This 
can explain a positive relationship between beef and sugar. Wheat, on the 
other hand, appears to be a substitute for rice and vegetable ghee but a 
complement to sugar (but only in the case of sugar is this relationship also 
statistically significant). Similarly, rice appears to be a substitute of vegetable 
ghee and sugar but a complement to milk while vegetable ghee appears to be a 
substitute to sugar and pulses (but none of these relationships are significant). 
Lastly, milk and pulses appear to be complements (but this relationship is not 
statistically significant). Thus, these results show important differences from 
results obtained by imposing symmetry.  
 
The results presented in Table 7.7 highlight an important point. In the case of 
developing countries where data availability is limited to one year cross-
sectional data, model based on additive preferences such as linear expenditure 
system (LES) that restricts cross- price elasticities to be small and enforces 
approximate proportionality, are generously used (for instance see Ahmad and 
Stern (1986) for Pakistan). According to Deaton (1987) models that assume 
additive preferences (such as LES system), tax reform prescriptions tend to be 
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quite simple and he concludes “under these assumptions, empirical analysis is 
unnecessary, since the answer is predetermined” (pp.6). This is supported by 
our findings since we do not find any such proportionality between 
expenditure elasticities and price elasticities127. For instance, first we do not 
find cross-price elasticities to be too small to be negligible (i.e. fundamental 
assumption underlying most of optimal taxation literature) and second, if we 
look at Table 7.6 expenditure elasticities show all items except milk to be 
necessities while according to own- price elasticities estimates in Table 7.7, 
demand for beef, rice and milk appears to be quite price elastic while demand 
for wheat, vegetable ghee, sugar, and pulses appears to be price inelastic. 
Thus, this really questions whether predictions of a system such as LES are 
really meaningful for tax and price reform analysis.  
 
Table 7.8 presents our own price elasticity results with Deaton and Grimard 
results using the same methodology but for a different time period. We do not 
expect results to completely match with Deaton & Grimard (1992) own-price 
elasticities for three reasons: (a) Difference in time period (almost 15 years); 
(b) The definition (see third column) of only sugar, rice and wheat is directly 
comparable to ours otherwise Deaton and Grimard (1992) use broader 
aggregation of commodities; (c) Our results are for national level (as flagged 
earlier)128.  
                                                 
127 This finding is supported by Deaton and Grimard (1992) and Deaton (1997). 
 
128 Please see Appendix 7.2 for rural elasticities estimates for (2001-02). 
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Table 7.8: Comparison of Own Price Elasticities Results129 
 
Our 
Categories 
Our Results / 1 
(2001-02) 
Deaton & Grimard Categories Deaton & Grimard 
Results 2/ 
 (1984-85) 
 All Pakistan 
 
 Rural Urban 
Beef -1.84 Meat 
Beef 
Mutton 
Chicken meat 
-0.57 -0.33 
Wheat 0.36 Wheat -0.51 -0.86 
Rice -1.30 Rice -1.59 -1.83 
Vegetable 
Ghee 
-0.304 Oils & fats 
Desi ghee(butter oil) 
Vegetable Ghee 
Cooking oils 
Other oils & fats 
-2.04 -1.17 
Sugar -0.380 Sugar -0.07 -0.81 
Milk -1.14 Dairy 
Milk (fresh & boiled) 
Lassi (buttermilk) 
Milk (packed) & (powdered 
for adults and children) 
Butter, Margarine, Cream 
Cheese 
Curd/Yogurt 
Ice cream, Kulfi 
Others 
-0.87 -1.10 
Pulses -0.45    
Source: 1/ Author’s own calculation from HIES (2001-02) 2/ Table 5, LSMS Working Paper 
no. 85, Demand Analysis and Tax Reform in Pakistan, 1992 
 
 
In the case of homogenous goods and where the good aggregation level is the 
same as used by Deaton and Grimard (1992), for instance sugar and rice, the 
results over time have not changed much (as one would expect). For instance, 
sugar according to both sets of result appears to be price inelastic, while rice 
appears to be a price elastic good. Milk according to our and Deaton & 
Grimard urban estimates, appears to be price elastic. This gives us further 
confidence in our results and recommendations (discussed ahead).  
                                                 
129 Own price elasticities for rural area in Pakistan (2001-02) are presented in Appendix 7.2. 
None of own price elasticity estimates are drastically different from national level results.  
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7.6 Demand Responses and Our Incidence Findings 
 
 
In this section we will try to illustrate how price elasticities estimated in the 
previous section are likely to impact our incidence findings reported in the 
earlier chapters. This is quite important as it is one of the fundamental 
criticisms faced by partial equilibrium tax incidence model. 
  
Let’s assume there is an x percentage point increase in the price of sugar (for 
instance GST on sugar is increased). This means according to our elasticity 
estimates, demand for sugar will fall by 0.38x percent. As demand for sugar is 
fairly price inelastic, Government revenue should increase from this policy. As 
sugar is consumed more by the poor in both the rural and urban areas, this is 
likely to impact the poor more. However, due to fairly inelastic demand 
patterns incidence is likely to remain very close to the one predicted earlier 
(because partial equilibrium tax incidence analysis already assumes no 
demand response).  
 
However, an x percentage increase in the price of sugar due to GST does not 
only affect sugar consumption, but also affects demand for other commodities 
via significant cross- price effects. Thus, demand for beef and wheat will fall, 
while the demand for rice, vegetable ghee, milk and pulses will increase. As a 
result Government revenue will fall on account of decrease in demand for 
beef, and wheat but increase due to increase in demand for other goods 
(assuming all these goods were already being taxed). However, it appears a 
fall in demand on aggregate will slightly dominate the increase in demand, 
given our cross- price elasticities estimates. Thus on this account, overall 
Government revenue will fall. Since large cross price effects are for beef 
(demand falls), wheat (demand falls) and rice (demand increases), poor who 
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largely consume wheat will experience some relief but this to some extent will 
be offset by increase in demand for rice. Thus, at the end the overall incidence 
picture may not change much. More importantly, price of sugar that was 
mainly increased to raise additional revenue, may not result in much additional 
revenues.  
 
Let’s consider another example, vegetable ghee. For an x percentage point 
increase in price of vegetable ghee given its demand is fairly inelastic (with 
own- price elasticity similar to that of sugar) demand for vegetable ghee will 
not fall by that much. Thus, Government should be able to raise revenue from 
this policy but it is likely to impact the poor more as they spend relatively 
more on this item. However, in this case if we look at cross- price effects 
things appear to be quite different compared to our earlier illustration. For 
instance, demand for sugar and wheat will increase (and also milk and pulses 
but to a lesser extent) while demand for beef declines quite sharply. However, 
in this case the cross- price effects do not balance out neatly as before. Thus, 
as a result of this policy Government will be able to raise revenue but likely 
large distributional effects will be borne by the poor who are spending more 
on vegetable ghee, sugar and wheat.  
 
Thus it appears for our selected sample of commodities, incidence patterns 
while allowing for the own- price elasticities do not alter dramatically. 
However, effect of incorporation of cross- price elasticities varies from case to 
case basis depending on the magnitude and sign of the elasticity and the 
importance of the other commodities in the consumption basket; sometimes 
(as per our illustration) it makes little difference, in other cases it might matter 
more. However, generally it appears that incorporation of own- and cross- 
price effects while making possibly bigger impact on incidence, may still not 
alter our results that dramatically. Nevertheless, we cannot generalize these 
results to commodities outside our sample or for other countries or for a 
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different time period. As in other cases inclusion of cross-price effects may 
prove more important for policy purposes. 
 
 
7.7 Tax and Price Reform 
 
 
Now we are in a position to begin with the last section of our chapter, that is 
carrying out microsimulation analysis using elasticities estimates calculated in 
the previous section. We feel it is necessary to incorporate this section because 
in chapters five and six, we were able to show the social incidence of indirect 
taxation at pre- and post reform scenarios but we were not able to give any 
specific recommendation that at the margin can improve the welfare of 
households particularly from the point of view of post-reform position. This 
section gives us an opportunity to point out future reforms that will be 
welfare-enhancing at margin (as a consequence completing our discussion in 
earlier chapters). 
 
This section will use the theory of marginal tax reform (MTR) (as explained 
earlier in chapter three) developed by the seminal work of Ahmad and Stern 
(1984). The aim of this theory is to measure welfare gains due to small 
changes in tax rates of every good. Essential to this approach is that the 
current system must be taken as given and the aim is to identify directions of 
tax reform that at the margin are welfare enhancing (Madden, 1995). The 
importance of MTR theory lies in the fact that this approach attempts to 
calculate the directions of welfare improving reform at margin from the 
existing position of the economy, which according to Madden (1995) and 
Deaton (1995), is not only more appealing for the policy makers but also a 
more practical approach.  
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We can write the indirect social welfare function consisting of N households 
as: 
 
 
),....,( 21 NuuuVW =        7.21 
 
 
),( pxu hh ψ=        7.22 
 
 
It is possible to determine the effect of tax reform on social welfare W through 
a movement in the prices of goods which using the chain rule can be obtained 
by differentiating equation 7.21 with respect to the tax change. 
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which shows the welfare effect of a tax-induced marginal price change that is 
given by the sum of each household’s consumption of good i. Where ihq  is the 
 211 
quantity of good i consumed by household h, and hη  is the social marginal 
utility of money which is equal to: 
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Since the household social welfare along with household expenditure is also 
determined by the Government public expenditures, which is a function of 
taxes, government revenues is the sum of all the tax payments and subsidy 
cost: 
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Thus, a small change in tax (or subsidy) will have an effect on Government 
revenue R and the corresponding level of individual welfare. If we take the 
differential of equation 7.26 with respect to tax change we get the 
redistributive effect of tax reform: 
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If we assume consumer prices are determined by world prices, 0ip
130, then tax 
or a subsidy can be written as iii tpp +=
0 , and the household budget 
constraint can be written as: 
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Since total expenditure of each household is not affected by tax increase, if we 
differentiate equation 7.26 with respect to tax change while holding world 
prices fixed, we get: 
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This is also the social benefit of raising one additional rupee for Government’s 
revenue. Thus, the social benefit of raising one additional rupee as 
Government revenue (equation 7.29) and the cost of raising this revenue 
(equation 7.24) can be given by a ratio as follows: 
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130 Needless to say this is a heroic assumption since it assumes that all goods are tradable. 
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The numerator of equation 7.30 represents the social cost of raising one rupee 
of additional revenue by increasing the tax on good i while the denominator 
represents the social benefit of raising an additional rupee in terms of extra 
revenue. If iλ is large, social welfare will be increased by reducing tax on 
good i because this tax is taxing those who have higher weights in the social 
welfare function or because it is distortionary, or both. If iλ is low, goods with 
low iλ  are better candidates for tax increase. In case when all iλ ’s are equal, 
taxes are optimally set; hence, there is no beneficial reforms. 
 
It is possible to rewrite equation 7.30 in a form that allows us substantial 
generalization that takes account of both quality and quantity responses to 
price change. This can be done by writing:  
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Where iw
~ can be defined as the “plutocratic” average budget share which can 
be written as 
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Where hx is the expenditure of household h and ihw is the share of good i 
within household h budget. 
 
ε
iw ,on the other hand, can be defined as the “socially representative budget 
share” which can be written as  
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Where ε−)/( hh nx is the standard Atkinson social welfare function. 
 
 
Now the numerator of equation 7.31 can be taken as a pure distributional 
measure of good i. It can be interpreted as the relative shares of the market 
representative individual and the socially representative individual, whose 
income is lower the higher the inequality aversion parameter.  
 
The first part in the denominator (in addition to 1) is the tax factor multiplied 
by the income elasticity of good i with respect to price, quality and quantity 
effects taken together. This term can also be thought of as one that measures 
own- price distortionary affect of the tax. If this term is large (and negative), 
that means it will result in a corresponding large iλ (given other things are 
constant), implying a high cost attached with raising further revenue from 
taxes from this good and vice versa. The last term in the denominator is the 
sum of the tax factors multiplied by the cross price elasticities. This terms 
captures the effects of how change in the tax on good i affects other goods, 
including quantity and quality effects.  
 
 
7.7.1 The Analysis of Tax and Price Reform 
 
 
If we look at equation 7.31 we can see that the implementation of the tax 
reform formula requires most of the information which we now have available 
to us. This includes information on consumption of various items, price 
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derivates, social weights and shadow prices. We have just estimated price 
derivates (own and cross). Assigning social weights is a fairly common 
practice; as a result we are left with the issue of clarifying how shadow prices 
or shadow tax (subsidy) rate iτ can be determined. The shadow prices 
represent the element of tax (or subsidy) in percentage terms that each good is 
subject to. Ideally, this price should be set by taking into account tariffs, taxes, 
subsidies and other transfers; all of which contribute to the determination of 
domestic price of a good (Deaton, 1997). However, like Deaton (1997), we 
work with an illustrative set of shadow prices in order to keep this discussion 
simple. This price set is termed illustrative since it does not claim to 
incorporate all the ingredients that should ideally be included for a shadow 
price but nevertheless it is simple, transparent and comprehensive enough to 
include Pakistan’s actual post reform situation, that should be enough to 
ascertain direction of welfare improving reforms131 132.  
 
Most of the information required for the calculation of an illustrative set of 
shadow prices (tax or subsidy) is taken from World Bank (2007). According to 
this report most of major agriculture commodities during the 1980s were 
heavily implicitly taxed through negative indirect effects of trade and 
exchange rate policies. However, by the end of the 1980’s there was a 
significant decline in the distortion of agriculture prices as a result of major 
trade and agriculture price reform policies undertaken by the Government 
(World Bank, 2007).  This information is presented in Table 7.9 which shows 
                                                 
131 The experiment that is being considered here is an increase or decrease in the consumer 
price of a good as a result of a consumption tax like VAT or tariff. This experiment would not 
correspond well with analysis of export taxes because such a tax according to our model will 
increase consumer welfare as well as Government revenue at the same time, which according 
to our specification requires this tax to be increased indefinitely. Additionally, since export 
taxes can alter both the consumer as well as producer prices, it can not be fully analyzed 
without bring supply responses in the picture (Deaton, 1997). 
132 Also, this experiment only looks at the demand side of analysis where its assumed producer 
and consumer prices are separated (Deaton, 1997). 
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a nominal rate of protection for the major agriculture commodities during the 
last three decades.  
 
 
Table 7.9: Nominal Rate of price distortions in Pakistan’s Agriculture 
1981-90 1991-00 2001-05
Wheat -0.28 -0.19 -0.15
Basmati Paddy -0.65 -0.39 -0.39
IRRI Paddy -0.38 -0.29 -0.08
Sugar 0.83 0.65 0.88
Vegetable Oil -0.08 0.25 0.24
Note 2: Paddy, Sugar and vegetable oil nominal rates of protection are 
calculated at the wholesale market level. Sugar cane is calculated at 
mill gate. All other rates are calculated at farm gate.
Source: (Selected Excerpts from) Table 3.9, 'Nominal Rates of 
Assistance for Selected Agricultural Products in Pakistan', in Pakistan 
Promoting Rural Growth and Poverty Reduction, World Bank Report 
# 39303-PK. A negative sign here means domestic prices being kept 
below the border prices (thus a subsidy for domestic consumers) and a 
positive sign means domestic prices being kept higher than the border 
prices (henceforth a tax on domestic consumers).
Total Effect
Note 1: Direct trade and pricing policy distortions are measured by 
nominal rates of protection using official exchange rates. 
 
 
By looking at Table 7.9 we can get some idea of level of price distortion in 
Pakistan over time. According to 2001-05 estimates (which are most relevant 
to us for future policy forecast) the border price of wheat was 15 percent 
above the domestic price, while border price for basmati rice was 39 percent 
more than domestic price and border price for IRRI rice was only 8 percent 
above the domestic rice price. Both are tradable goods; for wheat I work with 
accounting ratio (shadow prices divided by consumer prices133) of 1.15 and 
                                                 
133 Accounting ratios are defined as shadow prices divided by consumer prices where latter is 
taken as one (Ehtisham and Stern, 1990). 
 217 
1.17134.  In the case of sugar, domestic industry is heavily protected; in this 
case border price of refined sugar is some 88 percent of the domestic price. 
Thus, in this case the accounting ratio will be 0.88. Additionally, vegetable oil 
border price appears to be some 24 percent of the domestic price. Thus, the 
accounting ratio for vegetable ghee is 0.24. For other items (mainly non-
traded) I work with an accounting ratio of 1. This information is sufficient to 
build accounting ratios (shadow prices divided by consumer prices) for seven 
goods namely beef, wheat, rice, vegetable oil, sugar, milk, and pulses as (1.0, 
1.15, 1.17, 0.24, 0.88, 1.0, 1.0).  
 
 
7.7.2 Efficiency Effect 
 
 
Results for the efficiency aspect of tax reform in Pakistan for (2001-02) are 
presented in Table 7.10a which also presents the denominator of equation 
7.33. The first column of Table 7.10a presents a shadow tax factor; 
)1( ii ττ + , calculated from accounting ratios discussed in the previous 
section. This shadow tax factor, according Ahmad and Stern (1990) is the 
difference between consumer prices and shadow prices expressed as a 
proportion of consumer prices, taken to be one here. The second column 
represents own price elasticities of quantity into quality and reflect own-good 
contribution to the tax distortion. The third column shows own-price distortion 
effect and this is zero in the cases where there is no shadow tax factor on the 
good, thus no distortionary affect due to a change in its own price due to a tax. 
The fourth column contains cross effects where a negative term implies a 
higher distortionary cost of raising extra rupee revenue from a tax on these 
                                                 
134 Accounting ratio for rice is estimated using weights equivalent to domestic consumption of 
various varieties of rice. These weights are taken to be 30 percent for Basmati (which is 
mostly export quality rice) and 70 percent for IRRI Paddy rice within the total domestic rice 
consumption.   
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goods. The last column reflects the total effect or the denominator of equation 
7.30.  
 
According to our estimates for total effect, as far as efficiency is concerned, 
rice is one  prime candidate for price increase; its subsidy is distortionary and 
should be removed. Moreover, vegetable ghee and sugar are also prime 
candidates for further price increase. By contrast wheat, beef and milk appear 
to be prime candidates for price decrease.   
 
 
Table 7.10 a: Efficiency aspects of price reform in Pakistan (2001-02) 
Own 
effect
Cross 
effect
Total
Beef 0.00 -1.95 0.00 -0.41 0.59
Wheat -0.15 0.84 -0.13 -0.53 0.35
Rice -0.17 -1.37 0.23 0.17 1.41
Veg_ghee 0.76 -0.69 -0.02 1.13 2.11
Sugar 0.12 -0.22 -0.20 0.25 1.05
Milk 0.00 -1.16 0.00 -0.22 0.78
Pulses 0.00 -0.34 0.00 -0.03 0.97
(2001-02)
Note: This estimation is based on Equation 7.33. The own effect  column is the product of 
column 1 and column 2; cross effect column is the last term in denominator of Equation 
7.33 ; column total  is 1 plus own  effect  and cross effect  column.
Source: Author's own calculation using HIES (2001-02).
i
i
τ
τ
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i
w
θ
 
 
 
7.7.3 Equity Effect and cost-benefit ratio for price increase in Pakistan 
 
 
The equity effects of price and tax reform in Pakistan are presented in Table 
7.10b along with the cost benefit ratio of raising an extra rupee by increasing 
the price of a good. The first two columns of Table 7.10b shows the equity 
effect of price reform when there are no distributional concerns (i.e. 0=ε ) and 
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the equity effect here is simply the reciprocal of total effects in Table 7.10a as 
a result the outcome is also same as described in Table 7.10a. 
 
The results show that when there are no distributional concerns that rice, 
vegetable ghee and sugar are prime candidates for price increase while beef, 
wheat, milk and pulses are not. Under low inequality aversion, ε =0.5, goods 
whose price should not be increased, now also include sugar. For the medium 
level of inequality aversion, ε =1.0, results do not change from the previous 
level while only in the case of a higher inequality aversion, ε =2.0, rice joins 
the ranks of goods whose price should not be increased for equity reasons. 
Thus, as we move across different equality aversion levels in Table 7.10 we 
can see that results in particular are not very sensitive to the level of inequality 
aversion used which is the usual strength of this procedure.  
 
Thus, if we compare the efficiency and equity recommendation for inequality 
aversion (ε =0.5 andε =1.0) we can see that efficiency requires price of goods 
such as sugar, vegetable ghee and rice should be increased. When relatively 
more inequality aversion is introduced i.e. using either,ε =0.5 andε =1.0, 
equity still requires that not only price of wheat, meat, milk and pulses but also 
of sugar should not be raised. However, rice joins the rank of commodities 
whose price should not be increased on distributional grounds when higher 
(i.e. ε =2.0) inequality aversion is used.   
 
Thus, our finding suggest that raising revenue from an increase in the price of 
rice and vegetable ghee would be desirable from both an efficiency and equity 
considerations (except for higher inequality aversion i.e. ε =2.0 for rice). 
However, raising revenue by increasing price of sugar is desirable on 
efficiency grounds but undesirable on equity grounds (even with low 
inequality aversion). We can further extrapolate these results to VAT future 
recommendation since such experiment of price increase is clearly in line with 
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the imposition and extension of a tax like VAT. It appears that basic goods 
such as beef, wheat, milk and pulses should remain exempt as it is in line with 
efficiency as well as equity considerations; sugar should be exempt (which is 
currently taxed) if equity considerations are held more important than 
efficiency considerations and perhaps a bit surprisingly taxation of vegetable 
ghee is justified under both equity and efficiency grounds.  
 
 
Table 7.10 b: Equity effect and cost-benefit ratios for price increase in 
Pakistan (2001-01) 
Beef 1.00 1.70 1.12 1.91 1.18 2.01 1.22 2.07
Wheat 1.00 2.88 1.24 3.58 1.40 4.05 1.58 4.57
Rice 1.00 0.71 1.19 0.84 1.30 0.93 1.43 1.02
Veg_ghee 1.00 0.47 1.21 0.58 1.35 0.64 1.53 0.72
Sugar 1.00 0.95 1.17 1.12 1.27 1.21 1.37 1.30
Milk 1.00 1.29 1.08 1.40 1.11 1.43 1.10 1.42
Pulses 1.00 1.03 1.13 1.17 1.18 1.22 1.21 1.25
(2001-02)
Source: Author's own calculation using HIES (2001-02).
0=ε 5.0=ε 0.1=ε 0.2=ε
ww ~ε ww ~ε ww ~ε ww ~ελ λ λ λ
 
 
 
7.8 Conclusion 
 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to go beyond the distributional analysis of tax 
incidence by estimating own- and cross- price elasticities using spatial price 
variation in the survey data. The intentions have been manifold: (a) to provide 
useful discussion on why estimates of elasticities are important for ex-ante tax 
policy planning and tax reform; (b) to illustrate how or if tax incidence 
estimates from earlier chapters are sensitive to demand responses; and (c) to 
recommend the future direction of welfare enhancing reforms for Pakistan at 
margin.  
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There is overwhelming support for the fact that robust estimation of price 
elasticities is pivotal for tax policy planning and reform analysis. However, 
empirical research in this area, particularly for developing countries to date, 
has been limited. This shortcoming appears to be rooted in difficulty involved 
with estimating price elasticities given data availability in these countries. 
However, this is very relevant and critical information for policy makers for 
carrying out successful and welfare enhancing reforms (at margin or 
otherwise). Thus, this is one area where despite all the problems debate needs 
to be taken further and here we believe this study has made a valuable attempt 
by estimating elasticities. 
  
We have also tried to illustrate that at least in the case of Pakistan 
incorporating demand responses into partial equilibrium tax incidence analysis 
may not change results that much. However, this in our case largely hinges on 
the fact that for our illustrative case cross- price effects appear to cancel out. 
This should give some credibility to the earlier estimates in the previous 
chapters. However, it is worth nothing that in other studies the inclusion of 
cross- price effects may prove more important for policy purposes. 
  
The practical appeal of the theory of marginal tax reform (MTR) in developing 
countries can not be exaggerated. In these countries policy makers rarely have 
the privilege of designing tax structure from scratch or of introducing changes 
in tax structure that may be too extreme. Thus, in many cases policy makers 
are interested in knowing empirically robust and theoretically consistent 
suggestions to improvement over the status quo. Our estimates show that 
raising further revenue (from VAT) by increasing the price of basic goods 
such beef, wheat, milk and pulses will not be welfare enhancing, as it is 
neither efficient nor equitable. On the other hand raising further revenue from 
taxation of sugar (which is currently being taxed) is efficient but not equitable. 
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Similarly, increasing price of rice is efficient but not equitable (for all cases of 
inequality aversion). Lastly, it appears only in the case of vegetable ghee there 
is a case of further price increase that is both equitable and efficient. This 
offers some lessons for future direction of VAT reforms. It appears 
policymakers seriously need to think about taxation of sugar (as also flagged 
in earlier chapters). Also, exemptions of wheat, pulses, beef, milk and rice 
(last under high inequality aversion) should continue. Furthermore, taxation of 
vegetable ghee is justified and it is an ideal candidate for future price 
increases.  
  
Interestingly, the results for MTR also show that policy makers in these 
countries in reality face a dilemma in trying to balance equity and efficiency 
considerations. For instance, in many cases additional revenue can be raised 
from reforms that may be efficient but not necessary equitable. Thus, finding 
the right combination of reforms that are both efficient and equitable may 
leave policymakers with very few policy options. Thus, this perhaps highlight 
real problem and issues faced by policymakers when designing reforms or 
policy options.  
 
In next chapter, which is also the conclusion of this study we will attempt to 
highlight what this study has brought in terms of its overall contribution and 
innovation to this research area.   
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CHAPTER VIII:  Conclusions 
 
 
8.1 Main Findings 
 
 
This study aimed at measuring the social incidence of indirect taxes in 
Pakistan as a result of the tax reform process135 during 1990-2001, focusing on 
the area of indirect taxes. In this regard, our results show that a move from 
dependence on trade tax revenues to GST/VAT revenues has made the overall 
indirect tax system of Pakistan a little more progressive136. This study also 
carried out a high level of disaggregation of the incidence to reveal its 
sensitivity to key commodities. It appears post- reform indirect tax incidence 
is sensitive to taxation of key commodities which include sugar, edible oils 
and basic fuel/utilities. Incidentally, taxation of these commodities also 
appears to have strong distributional effect on the poor and our results show 
that the indirect tax system can be made strongly progressive by exempting 
these commodities137. 
 
We also explored the sensitivity of estimated tax incidence results to a special 
case of partial equilibrium tax incidence analysis that assumes zero demand 
responses. Estimations illustrate that incidence results (for the selected sample 
of commodities) do not appear to be very sensitive to incorporation of own- 
and cross- price responses. We also used these estimates to identify directions 
of welfare enhancing reform for Pakistan at margin. We find that a reduction 
                                                 
135 Also known as the first generation of tax reform process in Pakistan 
136 This statement is borrowed from Gemmell and Morrissey (2003) excluding the country 
reference. 
137 These are not necessarily revenue-neutral recommendations. 
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in the price of basic items such as beef, wheat, milk and pulses should be 
welfare enhancing at the margin. Furthermore, taxation of sugar maybe 
justified on efficiency grounds but not from the equity perspective while 
taxation of vegetable ghee is justified on both revenue efficiency as well as on 
equity grounds. 
  
This study has made a significant contribution to tax policy analysis in 
Pakistan as well as to the literature of tax incidence in general. For instance, 
this study has not only attempted to disaggregate indirect tax incidence over its 
major components (namely, GST/VAT, custom duties and excise duty) but 
further disaggregation of incidence in each case (except custom duties) was 
undertaken to reveal sensitivity of incidence to key commodities. Needless to 
say, both of these aims themselves were extremely ambitious given the 
difficulty of estimating aggregate custom duties and excise duty incidence as 
well as attempting to further disaggregate this. However, we believe herein 
lies the strength of this study. 
 
We carried out a separate GST/VAT incidence evaluation pre- and post- 
reform given the importance of this tax within Pakistan federal taxation 
structure. Results have revealed that progressivity of GST pre-reform 
incidence was mainly due to the limited scope of GST/VAT at that time and 
due to the patterns of exemptions that clearly favored the poor. However, post-
reform GST/VAT incidence, despite focus on ‘equity’ and ‘distributional’ 
considerations in the reform agenda, appears at best to be proportional. Our 
disaggregated incidence results here reveal that taxation of some basic 
processed food items and basic fuels has undermined the progressivity of 
GST/VAT. Given this is also the most pervasive component of indirect tax 
system in the post- reform era, this proportionality has restricted the 
progressivity of the overall indirect taxation to being slightly so (or 
progressive over a limited range). 
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This issue was probed further by exploring how GST/VAT exemptions can be 
better targeted to safeguard the poor. This was done using the distributional 
characteristics of a good approach in order to identify goods/services that are 
relatively more important to the poor. This issue has been explicitly addressed 
for Pakistan for the first time. Our findings reveal that consumption patterns of 
key commodity groups such as basic fuels, sugar and edible oils, are 
sufficiently separable to provide poor households with necessary relief via 
well targeted exemptions (and not necessarily at too much cost to the 
exchequer138). This is extremely relevant information for the policymakers in 
Pakistan for safeguarding the poor from the GST/VAT net and for carrying out 
future GST/VAT reforms.  
 
This study has also attempted to evaluate the pre- and post- reform incidence 
of custom duties as well as excise duties. Since pre-reform incidence was 
largely dependent on trade taxes this disaggregation was crucial. The 
innovation in attempting to measure the incidence of custom duties came from 
attempting to measure the import content of domestic consumption of major 
product categories (rather than treating all consumption identically as is done 
in most other studies). We believe this was a crucial and ambitious 
undertaking as these estimates had to be generated from relying on many other 
data sources necessary for carrying out informative analysis. Our results reveal 
that the inverted U-shaped incidence of pre-reform indirect tax incidence was 
largely driven by regressivity of custom duties incidence while disaggregated 
analysis revealed that this regressivity was mainly due to significantly large 
import share that year (within domestic consumption) for some basic food 
commodities which included sugar, edible oils, spices and even wheat. 
  
                                                 
138 Though this line of argument was not formally investigated 
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One of the aims of this study was to illustrate the sensitivity of estimated tax 
incidence results (summarized in terms of tax progression) to the assumption 
of zero demand responses (a special case of partial equilibrium tax incidence 
analysis assumed in some tax incidence studies. For instance see Chen et al., 
2001; Munoz et al., 2003; and Sahn and Younger, 2003, to name but a few). 
Our illustration suggests that in most cases (for a selected sample of 
commodities) our estimated incidence results are not affected much by 
incorporation of own-price elasticities although not allowing for behavioural 
responses may appear to overestimate the incidence results slightly. In the case 
of cross-elasticities, overall impact appears to vary from case to case as it 
depends on the magnitude and sign of the elasticity and the importance of the 
other commodities in the consumption basket. Sometimes it makes little 
difference, in other cases, it matters more. However, generally, incorporation 
of own-price elasticities plus cross-price elasticities (which could make the 
impact bigger) is still quite small to impact our results significnatly. We 
believe by doing this we have made a contribution to the literature on price 
elasticities and to tax incidence (given any attempt to test the robustness of tax 
incidence estimates is important rather than ignoring this issue altogether). 
  
We also used our estimates of elasticities (for a selected sample of 
commodities) to identify the directions of welfare enhancing reform at the 
margin for Pakistan using the marginal theory of tax reform. Our results show 
that a reduction in the prices of basic items such as wheat, pulses, milk, and 
beef should be welfare-enhancing. Results also reveal that further revenue can 
be raised by raising the price of sugar; this may be efficient but it is not 
equitable whereas vegetable ghee appears to be an ideal candidate for a price 
increase on both grounds.  
 
This perhaps also reflects that, in reality, policymakers are faced with a very 
delicate act of juggling equity, efficiency and administrative convenience. 
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What is efficient may not necessarily be equitable; thus achieving both goals 
simultaneously to raise revenue may leave policymakers with very limited 
options. Thus, this research informs the literature of ex-ante tax policy 
planning and tax reform (in margin) for Pakistan and for this literature in 
general. 
 
With regards to Pakistan’s future tax policy we believe getting the GST/VAT 
exemptions right is a critical policy step for safeguarding the poor because of  
current and future importance of this tax within the overall federal tax 
structure. Furthermore, powerful distributional effects created due to taxation 
of (some) processed food items and basic fuels needs serious reconsideration.  
  
 
8.2 Qualifications to the Study and Future Directions of Research 
 
 
Although this study has tried to be ambitious, innovative and comprehensive 
in meeting its objectives, like all research, its findings are limited to what was 
achievable within the given the timeframe, availability of data, existing 
literature and the scope of this study. 
  
This research looks at the welfare effect of a specific type of indirect tax 
reform process that largely focused on replacement of trade tax revenues with 
GST/VAT revenues. Thus, this study does not claim to be reflective of 
distributional incidence of a wider reform process that may encompass the 
whole tax system139 or overall fiscal policy i.e. tax and expenditure policy. 
Though these are interesting areas of research they are not the explicit focus of 
this research.  
                                                 
139 This may include direct taxes, local and provincial tax and non-tax revenues, implicit 
taxation issues and surcharges. 
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It is also worth mentioning that the findings of this study are specific to the 
particular definition of progressivity used in this study i.e. average 
productivity rate and also to a particular method of measuring household 
welfare. The main aim of this research was not to find the ideal definition of 
progressivity or welfare in Pakistan though these can be future areas of 
research. 
 
Likewise, we have made a simple underlying assumption regarding tastes, 
preferences and technology. Going beyond this was not possible given the 
non- availability of data, and time constraints. 
  
Most of the studies on tax incidence for developing and developed countries 
use the 100 percent tax shifting assumptions particularly where indirect taxes 
incidence is concerned, although little consensus emerges where pass- through 
effects of direct taxes are concerned. Given the lack of empirical research in 
the area of tax shifting, even for developed countries let alone Pakistan and 
other developing countries, it may be adequate to assume a full tax shifting 
assumption for indirect taxes. But a cautious interpretation of the results is 
necessary. Similarly particular features of developing countries such as tax 
evasion and smuggling can have an important impact on incidence results 
(though the former may be a more significant problem for direct tax 
incidence). However, incorporation of these features within our analysis was 
not possible due to non-availability of necessary data. These however pose 
interesting questions which should be investigated in the future. 
 
All these factors/issues point towards the fact that ascertaining tax incidence 
for any country, especially a developing country is a difficult empirical 
question and there are no easy answers. Future research in the case of Pakistan 
should focus on incorporating direct taxes into the tax incidence analysis but 
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realistically hinges on the availability of tax return data which, at present, is 
not available. Also, given the structure of Household Integrated Economic 
Survey (HIES) it is not possible to get estimates of services consumption in 
Pakistan. Since GST/VAT is the most fundamental tax component of 
Pakistan’s tax system we believe these estimates and analysis are necessary to 
analyze how GST/VAT can be broadened to the services sector and who it is 
likely to be affected.  
 
Lastly, we would like to add (for various reasons mentioned above) that this 
study should be taken as more than just a study on Pakistan. On the whole, we 
believe, this study has been ambitious, methodologically innovative and 
comprehensive which should further strengthen the relevance, uniqueness and 
innovativeness of this dissertation.  
 230 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 
 
2
3
1
 
  
A
p
p
en
d
ix
 3
.1
 :
 P
a
k
is
ta
n
 T
a
x
 I
n
ci
d
en
ce
 S
tu
d
ie
s 
(1
9
7
0
 –
 2
0
0
7
) 
 
A
u
th
o
r/
Y
ea
r
 
P
er
io
d
 
In
co
m
e 
C
o
n
ce
p
t 
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
/I
n
d
v
. 
 
co
v
er
ed
 
T
a
x
es
 c
o
v
er
ed
 
P
ro
g
re
ss
iv
it
y
 
M
ea
su
re
 
A
u
th
o
r’
s 
C
o
n
cl
u
si
o
n
 
A
zf
ar
, 
1
9
7
2
 /
1
 
1
9
6
6
-6
7
 
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 
In
co
m
e 
(H
IE
S
 
su
rv
ey
) 
6
 i
n
co
m
e 
cl
as
se
s;
 
n
at
io
n
al
, 
u
rb
an
 a
n
d
 
ru
ra
l 
D
ir
ec
t 
an
d
 
In
d
ir
ec
t 
A
P
R
 
O
v
er
al
l 
ta
x
 s
y
st
em
 i
s 
p
ro
g
re
ss
iv
e;
 u
rb
an
 
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 p
ay
 a
 m
u
ch
 h
ig
h
er
 p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 
th
an
 t
h
ei
r 
ru
ra
l 
co
u
n
te
rp
ar
ts
 
Je
et
u
n
, 
1
9
7
8
 
1
9
7
8
 
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 
In
co
m
e 
(f
ro
m
 H
IE
S
 
su
rv
ey
) 
1
3
 i
n
co
m
e 
cl
as
se
s;
 
n
at
io
n
al
, 
u
rb
an
 a
n
d
 
ru
ra
l 
C
o
m
p
re
h
en
si
v
e 
A
P
R
, 
 L
o
re
n
z 
C
u
rv
e 
an
d
 
G
in
i 
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t 
O
v
er
al
l 
ta
x
 s
y
st
em
 i
s 
p
ro
g
re
ss
iv
e;
 P
Y
T
 
an
d
 i
n
d
ir
ec
t 
ta
x
es
 a
re
 p
ro
g
re
ss
iv
e.
 
K
az
i,
 1
9
8
4
 
1
9
7
2
-7
3
 t
o
 
1
9
7
9
-8
0
 
N
.A
 
A
g
ri
cu
lt
u
re
 a
n
d
 N
o
n
-
A
g
ri
cu
lt
u
re
 s
ec
to
r 
C
o
m
p
re
h
en
si
v
e 
N
.A
 
A
g
ri
cu
lt
u
re
 s
ec
to
r 
as
 a
 w
h
o
le
 i
s 
o
v
er
ta
x
ed
 c
o
m
p
ar
ed
 t
o
 n
o
n
-a
g
ri
cu
lt
u
re
 
se
ct
o
r.
 
M
al
ik
 a
n
d
 S
aq
ib
, 
1
9
8
9
 
1
9
7
8
-7
9
 
P
er
so
n
al
 
In
co
m
e 
(f
ro
m
 H
IE
S
 
su
rv
ey
) 
1
2
 i
n
co
m
e 
cl
as
se
s 
ru
ra
l 
an
d
 u
rb
an
 
D
ir
ec
t 
an
d
 
In
d
ir
ec
t 
A
P
R
 a
n
d
 S
u
it
 
In
d
ex
 
O
v
er
al
l 
ta
x
 s
y
st
em
 i
s 
sl
ig
h
tl
y
 
p
ro
g
re
ss
iv
e 
at
 n
at
io
n
al
 a
n
d
 u
rb
an
 a
re
as
 
an
d
 r
eg
re
ss
iv
e 
o
v
er
 r
u
ra
l 
ar
ea
s.
 
K
em
al
, 
2
0
0
1
 
1
9
8
7
-8
8
 t
o
 
1
9
9
9
-0
0
 
n
o
t 
in
d
ic
at
ed
 
1
2
 i
n
co
m
e 
cl
as
se
s 
D
ir
ec
t 
an
d
 
In
d
ir
ec
t 
A
P
R
 
o
v
er
 t
h
e 
ti
m
e 
p
er
io
d
, 
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
in
cr
ea
se
 i
n
 t
ax
 b
u
rd
en
 h
as
 b
ee
n
 m
o
re
 f
o
r 
th
e 
p
o
o
re
st
 s
eg
m
en
t 
o
f 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
. 
 
2
3
2
 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ix
 3
.1
 (
C
o
n
td
.)
 :
 P
a
k
is
ta
n
 T
a
x
 I
n
ci
d
en
ce
 S
tu
d
ie
s 
(1
9
7
0
 –
 2
0
0
7
) 
 
A
u
th
o
r/
Y
ea
r
 
P
er
io
d
 
In
co
m
e 
C
o
n
ce
p
t 
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
/I
n
d
v
. 
 
co
v
er
ed
 
T
a
x
es
 c
o
v
er
ed
 
P
ro
g
re
ss
iv
it
y
 
M
ea
su
re
 
A
u
th
o
r’
s 
C
o
n
cl
u
si
o
n
 
S
h
ir
az
i,
 I
ly
as
 a
n
d
 
A
h
m
ad
, 
2
0
0
1
 
1
9
9
2
-9
3
 
N
et
 N
at
io
n
al
 
P
ro
d
u
ct
 (
N
N
P
) 
1
1
 R
u
ra
l 
an
d
 u
rb
an
  
in
co
m
e 
cl
as
se
s 
C
o
m
p
re
h
en
si
v
e 
A
P
R
 
O
v
er
al
l 
ta
x
 s
y
st
em
 
is
 r
eg
re
ss
iv
e 
fo
r 
ru
ra
l 
ar
ea
s 
an
d
 
p
ro
g
re
ss
iv
e 
fo
r 
u
rb
an
 a
re
as
. 
R
ef
aq
at
, 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
1
-0
2
 
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 
In
co
m
e 
1
0
 I
n
co
m
e 
D
ec
il
es
 
V
A
T
 
A
P
R
 
V
A
T
 i
n
ci
d
en
ce
 i
s 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
al
 i
f 
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
 i
s 
u
se
d
 
as
 a
 b
as
e;
 
re
g
re
ss
iv
e 
if
 
in
co
m
e 
is
 u
se
d
 a
s 
a 
b
as
e.
 
S
P
D
C
, 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
1
-0
2
 
(b
u
t 
d
ir
ec
t 
ta
x
es
 o
v
er
 
1
9
8
7
-8
8
 &
 
2
0
0
1
-0
2
) 
N
o
t 
C
le
ar
 
1
0
 I
n
co
m
e 
D
ec
il
es
 
D
ir
ec
t 
an
d
 I
n
d
ir
ec
t)
 
A
P
R
 
O
v
er
al
l 
ta
x
 s
y
st
em
 
is
 c
le
ar
ly
 
re
g
re
ss
iv
e;
 a
ll
 
co
m
p
o
n
en
ts
 o
f 
in
d
ir
ec
t 
ta
x
es
 a
re
 
re
g
re
ss
iv
e;
 d
ir
ec
t 
ta
x
es
 a
re
 
p
ro
g
re
ss
iv
e 
b
u
t 
p
ro
g
re
ss
iv
it
y
 o
v
er
 
ti
m
e 
h
as
 d
ec
li
n
ed
. 
S
o
u
rc
e:
 A
s 
in
d
ic
at
ed
. 
N
o
te
:1
/ 
A
zf
ar
 (
1
9
7
2
) 
is
 c
it
ed
 i
n
 D
e 
W
u
lf
 (
1
9
7
5
).
 
 
 
2
3
3
 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ix
 3
.2
 :
 M
a
in
 F
in
d
in
g
s 
P
a
k
is
ta
n
 I
n
ci
d
en
ce
 S
tu
d
ie
s 
(1
9
7
0
 –
 2
0
0
7
) 
 
In
co
m
e 
(P
R
s.
) 
m
o
n
th
ly
 
T
a
x
 C
o
v
er
a
g
e:
 C
o
m
p
re
h
en
si
v
e 
A
zf
a
r 
(1
9
7
4
) 
/1
 
U
n
d
er
 1
0
0
 
1
0
0
 –
 2
0
0
 
2
0
0
 –
 
4
0
0
 
4
0
0
 –
 7
4
0
 
7
4
0
 –
 1
2
5
0
 
O
v
er
 1
2
5
0
 
A
v
g
. 
T
o
ta
l 
 
5
.0
 
6
.4
 
7
.9
 
9
.6
 
1
6
.6
 
2
5
.3
 
9
.1
 
U
rb
an
 
9
.9
 
1
0
.7
 
1
1
.5
 
1
2
.6
 
2
1
.4
 
2
4
.3
 
1
5
.8
 
R
u
ra
l 
4
.8
 
6
.3
 
7
.0
 
8
.2
 
1
2
.0
 
1
7
.3
 
6
.9
 
In
co
m
e 
(P
R
s.
) 
m
o
n
th
ly
 
T
a
x
 C
o
v
er
a
g
e:
 C
o
m
p
re
h
en
si
v
e
 
J
ee
tu
n
 
(1
9
7
8
) 
/2
 
L
es
s 
th
a
n
 5
0
 
5
0
 -
9
9
 
1
0
0
-
1
4
9
 
1
5
0
-
1
9
9
 
2
0
0
-
2
4
9
 
2
5
0
-
2
9
9
 
3
0
0
 –
 
3
9
9
 
4
0
0
 –
 
4
9
9
 
5
0
0
 –
 
7
4
9
 
7
5
0
 -
 
9
9
9
 
1
0
0
0
 –
 
1
4
9
9
 
1
5
0
0
 -
 
1
9
9
9
 
2
0
0
0
 -
 
a
b
o
v
e 
A
v
g
. 
(A
lt
. 
I)
 
1
7
.4
8
 
9
.0
3
 
8
.5
5
 
8
.4
8
 
9
.7
0
 
8
.5
2
 
8
.7
3
 
9
.1
1
 
9
.5
2
 
1
0
.4
9
 
1
4
.8
0
 
1
6
.4
3
 
3
0
.4
6
 
1
1
.7
2
 
(A
lt
. 
II
) 
1
5
.4
2
 
8
.2
1
 
7
.8
4
 
7
.8
1
 
9
.1
0
 
8
.1
0
 
8
.4
6
 
9
.1
1
 
9
.7
7
 
1
1
.1
9
 
1
5
.8
4
 
1
7
.4
5
 
3
1
.9
5
 
1
1
.7
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
a
x
 C
o
v
er
a
g
e 
: 
S
ec
to
ra
l 
O
n
ly
 
K
a
zi
 (
1
9
8
4
) 
%
 s
h
a
re
s 
1
9
7
2
 -
7
3
 
1
9
7
3
 -
7
4
 
1
9
7
4
 -
7
5
 
1
9
7
5
 -
 7
6
 
1
9
7
6
 –
 
7
7
 
1
9
7
7
 -
 7
8
  
1
9
7
8
 –
 7
9
  
1
9
7
9
 -
 
8
0
 
 
D
ir
ec
t 
T
ax
es
 
A
g
. 
1
3
.6
 
1
6
.6
 
1
5
.0
 
9
.6
 
5
.2
 
4
.6
 
6
.6
 
5
.0
 
 
 
N
o
n
-A
g
 
8
6
.4
0
 
8
3
.4
 
8
5
.0
 
9
0
.4
 
9
4
.8
 
9
5
.4
 
9
3
.4
 
9
5
.0
 
 
In
d
ir
ec
t 
T
ax
es
 
A
g
. 
2
3
.5
 
2
9
.3
 
2
8
.8
 
2
8
.2
 
2
6
.9
 
2
6
.2
 
2
7
.1
 
2
7
.5
 
 
 
N
o
n
-A
g
 
7
6
.5
 
7
0
.7
 
7
1
.2
 
7
1
.8
 
7
2
.1
 
7
2
.8
 
7
2
.9
 
7
2
.5
 
 
   
 
2
3
4
 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ix
 3
.2
  
(C
o
n
td
.)
 :
 M
a
in
 F
in
d
in
g
s 
P
a
k
is
ta
n
 I
n
ci
d
en
ce
 S
tu
d
ie
s 
(1
9
7
0
 –
 2
0
0
7
) 
 
T
a
x
 C
o
v
er
a
g
e 
: 
C
o
m
p
re
h
en
si
v
e
 
In
co
m
e 
(P
R
s.
) 
m
o
n
th
ly
 
M
a
li
k
 a
n
d
 
S
a
q
ib
 (
1
9
8
9
) 
 
U
p
to
 3
0
0
 
3
0
1
  
-4
0
0
 
4
0
1
 –
 5
0
0
 
5
0
1
 –
 
6
0
0
 
6
0
1
 –
 
8
0
0
 
8
0
1
 –
 
1
0
0
0
 
1
0
0
1
 
–
 
1
5
0
0
 
1
5
0
1
 
–
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
 
–
 
2
5
0
0
 
2
5
0
1
 
–
 
3
0
0
0
 
3
0
0
1
 
–
 
3
5
0
0
 
3
5
0
1
 
- a
b
o
v
e 
 
 
N
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
1
1
.9
3
 
1
1
.4
1
 
1
0
.7
5
 
1
1
.4
4
 
1
0
.6
9
 
1
1
.3
0
 
1
0
.4
3
 
1
0
.1
4
 
1
0
.2
1
 
1
0
.0
2
 
1
3
.1
5
 
1
7
.6
0
 
 
 
R
u
ra
l 
1
1
.6
3
 
1
1
.2
6
 
1
0
.5
 
1
1
.0
3
 
1
0
.1
9
 
1
0
.8
6
 
9
.5
 
8
.8
9
 
8
.3
3
 
8
.0
1
 
7
.8
8
 
8
.1
2
9
 
 
 
U
rb
a
n
 
1
4
.3
2
 
1
2
.3
7
 
1
1
.9
1
 
1
3
.3
6
 
1
2
.5
4
 
1
2
.4
2
 
1
1
.9
6
 
1
1
.6
2
 
1
2
.0
0
 
1
1
.3
4
 
1
6
.5
4
 
2
2
.8
6
 
 
T
a
x
 C
o
v
er
a
g
e 
: 
C
o
m
p
re
h
en
si
v
e 
In
co
m
e 
(P
R
s.
) 
m
o
n
th
ly
 
 
S
h
ir
a
zi
, 
Il
y
a
s 
a
n
d
 A
h
m
a
d
, 
(2
0
0
1
) 
 
 
U
p
to
 1
0
0
0
 
1
0
0
1
 –
 1
5
0
0
 
1
5
0
1
 
–
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
 
–
 
2
5
0
0
 
2
5
0
1
 
–
 
3
0
0
0
 
3
0
0
1
 
–
 
3
5
0
0
 
3
5
0
1
 
–
 
4
0
0
0
 
4
0
0
1
 
–
 
5
0
0
0
 
5
0
0
1
 
–
 
6
0
0
0
 
6
0
0
1
 
–
 
7
0
0
0
 
7
0
0
1
 
&
 
a
b
o
v
e 
 
U
rb
a
n
 
T
a
x
 I
n
ci
..
 
4
4
.9
3
 
1
8
.0
0
 
1
5
.8
8
 
1
4
.4
1
 
1
3
.9
3
 
1
4
.5
1
 
1
7
.4
6
 
1
7
.0
1
 
2
1
.7
3
 
2
7
.4
8
 
2
0
.2
8
 
 
 
N
et
 F
is
ca
l 
In
ci
. 
2
0
.9
3
 
2
3
.6
7
 
1
8
.1
4
 
1
5
.2
2
 
1
2
.9
6
 
1
0
.3
3
 
5
.9
9
 
4
.8
6
 
-1
.3
4
 
-8
.1
3
 
3
.6
 
 
R
u
ra
l 
T
a
x
 I
n
ci
..
 
3
3
.4
 
1
8
.5
5
 
1
6
.4
1
 
1
4
.7
7
 
1
3
.9
7
 
1
4
.1
6
 
1
2
.8
5
 
1
2
.9
3
 
1
1
.8
5
 
1
0
.3
1
 
8
.9
4
 
 
 
N
et
 F
is
ca
l 
In
ci
. 
1
2
.2
4
 
1
1
.1
9
 
8
.7
0
 
7
.7
3
 
6
.7
7
 
5
.3
3
 
5
.7
9
 
4
.8
3
 
5
.2
9
 
5
.9
1
 
5
.8
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
a
x
 C
o
v
er
a
g
e 
: 
V
A
T
 D
ir
ec
t 
a
n
d
 I
n
d
ir
ec
t 
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
  
in
co
m
e 
p
er
 m
o
n
th
 
K
a
m
a
l 
(2
0
0
1
) 
/3
 
4
8
9
 
6
5
6
 
7
5
8
 
9
0
9
 
1
2
5
9
 
1
7
4
4
 
2
2
3
9
 
2
7
4
8
 
3
2
4
6
 
3
7
3
6
 
4
2
4
6
 
7
7
7
0
 
 
 
1
9
8
7
-8
8
 
7
.9
4
 
8
.1
1
 
8
.6
3
 
8
.1
8
 
8
.1
8
 
8
.2
4
 
8
.1
0
 
8
.2
9
 
8
.0
3
 
8
.8
7
 
8
.7
0
 
1
0
.1
7
 
 
 
1
9
9
0
-9
1
 
8
.4
0
 
8
.4
9
 
8
.8
0
 
8
.3
6
 
8
.2
9
 
8
.2
9
 
8
.0
8
 
8
.1
4
 
7
.9
3
 
8
.7
6
 
8
.5
2
 
9
.8
4
 
 
 
1
9
9
9
-0
0
 
8
.2
4
 
8
.1
8
 
8
.1
8
 
7
.8
1
 
7
.6
5
 
7
.5
4
 
7
.2
9
 
7
.3
3
 
7
.1
3
 
7
.6
9
 
7
.3
3
 
8
.1
4
 
 
 
 
 
2
3
5
 
 
A
p
p
en
d
ix
 3
.2
  
(C
o
n
td
.)
 :
 M
a
in
 F
in
d
in
g
s 
P
a
k
is
ta
n
 I
n
ci
d
en
ce
 S
tu
d
ie
s 
(1
9
7
0
 –
 2
0
0
7
) 
  
T
a
x
 C
o
v
er
a
g
e 
: 
V
A
T
 o
n
ly
 
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 p
er
 c
a
p
it
a
 a
n
n
u
a
l 
in
co
m
e 
R
ef
a
q
a
t 
(2
0
0
3
) 
4
/ 
D
ec
il
es
 
1
st
 (
p
o
o
re
st
) 
2
n
d
 
3
rd
 
4
th
 
5
th
  
6
th
 
7
th
 
8
th
 
9
th
 
1
0
th
 
 
 
 
 
A
lt
. 
I 
3
.4
 
3
.4
 
3
.4
2
 
3
.4
 
3
.5
 
3
.6
 
3
.6
 
3
.7
 
3
.8
5
 
4
.2
3
 
 
 
 
 
A
lt
. 
II
 
6
.7
6
 
4
.3
0
 
4
.0
1
 
3
.8
8
 
3
.8
2
 
3
.7
8
 
3
.6
3
 
3
.5
3
 
3
.5
3
 
3
.0
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
a
x
 C
o
v
er
a
g
e 
: 
F
ed
er
a
l 
T
a
x
es
 
S
P
D
C
 (
2
0
0
4
) 
 
D
ec
il
es
 
1
st
 
(p
o
o
re
st
) 
2
n
d
 
3
rd
 
4
th
 
5
th
  
6
th
 
7
th
 
8
th
 
9
th
 
1
0
th
 
A
v
g
. 
 
T
o
ta
l 
tx
. 
 
1
6
.1
 
1
5
.0
 
1
4
.1
 
1
4
.1
 
1
3
.3
 
1
2
.8
 
1
2
.5
 
1
2
.2
 
1
1
.6
 
1
2
.0
 
1
3
.4
 
 
In
d
ir
ec
t 
 
1
6
.1
 
1
5
.0
 
1
4
.1
 
1
4
.1
 
1
3
.3
 
1
2
.7
 
1
2
.4
 
1
1
.8
 
1
0
.9
 
9
.9
 
1
3
.0
 
 
 
S
a
le
s 
ta
x
 
9
.3
 
8
.6
 
8
.2
 
8
.3
 
8
.0
 
7
.7
 
7
.4
 
7
.1
 
6
.7
 
5
.9
 
7
.7
 
 
 
E
x
ci
se
s 
4
.5
 
4
.2
 
3
.9
 
3
.8
 
3
.5
 
3
.2
 
3
.1
 
2
.9
 
2
.6
 
2
.2
 
3
.4
 
 
 
Im
p
o
rt
 d
u
ty
 
2
.3
 
2
.1
 
2
.0
 
2
.0
 
1
.9
 
1
.8
 
1
.8
 
1
.7
 
1
.7
 
1
.8
 
1
.9
 
 
D
ir
ec
t 
 t
x
 
 
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
.2
 
0
.4
 
0
.7
 
2
.1
 
0
.3
 
 
 
S
o
u
rc
e:
 A
s 
in
d
ic
at
ed
. 
N
o
te
: 
1
/ 
A
zf
ar
 (
1
9
7
2
) 
is
 c
it
ed
 i
n
 D
e 
W
u
lf
 (
1
9
7
5
).
 2
/ 
Je
et
u
n
 (
1
9
7
8
) 
al
te
rn
at
e 
I,
 r
ef
er
s 
to
 d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 o
f 
ta
x
es
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 P
 &
 O
 (
1
9
7
4
) 
ty
p
e 
o
f 
m
et
h
o
d
o
lo
g
y
. 
H
o
w
ev
er
, 
fo
r 
al
te
rn
at
e 
II
 h
e 
as
su
m
es
 f
o
r 
to
b
ac
co
 a
 s
p
re
ad
 o
f 
1
 t
o
 5
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
ra
te
 o
f 
d
u
ty
 a
s 
a 
p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 o
f 
re
ta
il
 p
ri
ce
 b
ei
n
g
 h
ig
h
er
 b
y
 1
0
 p
er
ce
n
t 
in
 e
ac
h
 
su
cc
es
si
v
e 
in
co
m
e 
g
ro
u
p
. 
F
o
r 
cl
o
th
in
g
, 
th
is
 d
u
ty
 p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
 b
ei
n
g
 h
ig
h
er
 b
y
 2
0
 p
er
ce
n
t 
in
 e
ac
h
 s
u
cc
es
si
v
e 
in
co
m
e 
g
ro
u
p
s,
 y
ie
ld
in
g
 a
 d
is
p
er
si
o
n
 o
f 
1
 –
 9
 (
p
p
. 
2
1
).
 3
/ 
K
am
al
 (
2
0
0
1
) 
p
re
se
n
te
d
 i
n
ci
d
en
ce
 r
es
u
lt
s 
fo
r 
1
9
8
7
-8
8
 t
o
 1
9
9
9
-0
0
 b
u
t 
w
e 
h
av
e 
ci
te
d
 o
n
ly
 t
h
re
e 
y
ea
rs
. 
4
/ 
R
ef
aq
at
 (
2
0
0
3
),
 a
lt
. 
1
 r
ef
er
s 
to
 i
n
ci
d
en
ce
 
w
.r
.t
. 
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 a
n
n
u
al
 e
x
p
en
d
it
u
re
 a
n
d
 a
lt
. 
II
 r
ef
er
s 
to
 i
n
ci
d
en
ce
 w
.r
.t
. 
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 a
n
n
u
al
 i
n
co
m
e.
 
 236 
Appendix 3.3: Measurement of Progressivity 
 
1. Average Progressivity Rate (APR) 
 
 
It may not be wrong to say that progressivity is one of the key concepts in 
incidence analysis. Statistical progressivity measures like APR record changes 
in income distribution compared to an alternative such as proportionality 
(Gemmell and Morrissey, 2005). It is generally agreed that a tax structure is 
progressive where effective tax rate (i.e. tax liability as a percentage of 
income) rises when we move up the income scale; regressive when effective 
tax rates falls as we move up the income distribution; and proportional when 
effective tax rates remain constant (Musgrave and Thin, 1948). According to 
Gemmell and Morrissey (2005), average rate of progression is the most 
common measure used to determine tax progressivity for developing 
countries. Although this measure provides useful information on the extent to 
which the tax system departs from proportionality, it cannot quantify the 
amount of redistribution that takes place through a tax system140.  
 
 
2. Distribution Measures 
 
 
Distributional measure on the other hand, assess if the tax in question 
increases or reduces a measure of inequality of incomes, poverty etc., of the 
overall population or some other grouping (Gemmell and Morrissey, 2005). 
One can generally distinguish between purely statistical measures and 
normative measures (that use explicit value judgements to ascertain adequacy, 
rightness and desirability of a tax).  
                                                 
140 For a comprehensive discussion regarding numerous structural and distributional measures 
of progressivity, see Musgrave and Thin (1948) and Kiefer (1984).  
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2.1 Lorenz Curve and Gini Coefficient 141 
 
 
One approach specifically focuses on the use of Lorenz curve or Gini 
coefficient. Lorenz curve shows the relationship between cumulative 
percentage of population ranked from lowest to highest on the vertical axis 
and cumulative percentage of income, placed on the horizontal axis. The 
Lorenz curve in other words maps the cumulative share of income received by 
bottom X percentage of population (Martinez-Vazquez, 2001). The more 
Lorenz curve slopes down; the more unequal is the underlying distribution of 
income. In terms of tax incidence analysis, the comparison of pre- and post- 
tax income distribution, where one curve wholly lies under the other, equality 
is said to be greater for the income distribution with a Lorenz curve that lies 
inside (Gemmell and Morrissey, 2005).  
 
However, the comparison of Lorenz curve may not always work if Lorenz 
curves cross; thus a simpler way to summarize this information is to use Gini 
coefficient that summarizes the same information. In this case the “before” and 
“after” comparison of Gini coefficient allows one to analyze whether the 
resultant tax will positively or negatively affect the distribution of income, 
henceforth its progressivity. These have been readily used for tax incidence 
analysis for developing countries142.  
 
                                                 
141 Where coefficient of equality or Gini coefficient (G) can be written as: 
G=1+1/n – (y1 + 2y2+…+nyn)*2/(n
2*µ), where n is the number of individuals, yi is the income 
of the ith individual, µ is the average income, and subscript 1 to n run from highest to lowest  
income.    
142 For application see Engel, Galetovic and Raddatz (1998) for Chile, El-Edel (1970) for 
Egypt, Jeetun (1978) for Pakistan, Chen et al. (2001) for Uganda, Munoz et al. (2003) for 
Ethiopia and Prasada et al. (2005) for Sri Lanka. 
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However, indexes based on Gini coefficient have been criticised for two main 
reasons. First, these indexes attach highest weight to income transfers from 
income brackets close to the mode of income distribution compared to either 
evenly distributing these weights or giving more weight to the tail of the 
distribution (Atkinson, 1973; Dasgupta, Sen and Starrett, 1973; and Sen, 
1973). Second, it is desirable for an index to attach most weight to improving 
the income distribution of the poor particularly when income distribution is 
very unequal but treat the improvements near the mean more symmetrically. 
But Gini has the same symmetric weighting irrespective of how equal or 
unequal the income distribution is (Blackorby and Donaldson, 1978).  
 
 
2.2 Concentration Curves  
 
 
A concentration curve is an idea similar to Lorenz curve. It depicts a 
relationship between the cumulative tax payment on the vertical axis and 
cumulative population ranked by pre-tax income on the horizontal axis. If a 
concentration curve of tax payment lies wholly outside the concentration curve 
of expenditures; the tax is clearly progressive. Application of this curve for tax 
incidence analysis is also frequent143. 
 
 
2.3 Indexes based on explicit value judgment: Atkinson index  
 
 
 Even a basic descriptive index such as Gini coefficient can be shown to make 
use of an implicit set of weights or giving relative importance to individuals at 
different income levels. For instance, Gini coefficient implicitly gives higher 
                                                 
143 For application see, Sahn and Younger (1998) for Cote d’Ivoire, Munoz et al. (2003) for 
Ethiopia, Prasada et al (2005) for Sri Lanka, and Chen et al. (2001) for Uganda. 
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importance to changes in income of individual is closer to the mode of the 
distribution. One way to get rid of this accidental choice of weights is by 
explicitly choosing these weights (Vazquez, 2001). Such an index is the 
Atkinson index, which uses explicit weights derived from an explicit social 
welfare function. The Atkinson index uses an “inequality aversion parameter” 
with the intention of capturing social aversion to inequality in the distribution 
of income (Atkinson, 1983)144. This can be written as A=1-ye/µ, where ye is 
the “equally distributed income” i.e. income if distributed equally will produce 
the same level of social welfare, µ is average actual income and e is inequality 
aversion parameter145.  The definition of ye uses an inequality aversion 
parameter z which is less or equal to one, as follows: ye = {[( y1)
ε + ( y2)
ε + 
………+ ( yn)
ε ]/n}1/ε (Vazquez, 2001).  
 
2.4 Welfare Dominance146 
 
 
The comparisons of Lorenz or concentration curves have given rise to the 
notion of dominance (Gemmell and Morrissey, 2005) which is another 
criterion that is used to determine tax progressivity. In this case when a curve 
dominates another curve definitely; this represents a more equal distribution of 
income or more dominant or progressive tax (Gemmell and Morrissey, 2005; 
Sahn and Younger, 1999). The statistical test used to measure this dominance 
is known as welfare dominance and this methodology is developed by 
Yitzhaki and Slemrod (1991).  
 
Intuitively, the term welfare dominance means that for any social welfare 
function that favours an equitable distribution of income, a revenue neutral tax 
change that reduces taxes on one good x but increases taxes on good y will 
                                                 
144 Atkinson index is a normative index.  
145 For application see Murty (1989) for India. 
146 Welfare dominance is a normative measure.  
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improve social welfare as long as the concentration curve for the tax on x lies 
above the concentration curve of y. Thus, the theory of welfare dominance for 
a broad class of social welfare functions, provides a general criterion to 
ascertain if one distribution of welfare is better than another (Saposnik, 1981; 
Shorrocks, 1983; Foster and Shorrocks, 1988; Yitzhaki and Slemrod, 1991; 
Lambert, 1993). In practice, the attraction of the welfare dominance criterion 
is that statistical tests can be used to determine dominance of one curve over 
the other (Younger et al., 1999). In many cases crossing of Lorenz curve 
makes it impossible to determine dominance; in such cases a more 
sophisticated approach such as generalized Lorenz curves can be used.147 
However, use of welfare dominance approach in tax incidence analysis for 
developing countries has largely focused African countries148.    
                                                 
147 The generalized Lorenz curve can be defined as: 
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Where N(i) is the generalized Lorenz ordinate and µ(w) is the mean of the distribution of W. 
The generalized Lorenz curve plots the cumulative share of individuals in the sample (indexed 
by i) on the x-axis against cumulative share of the welfare variable multiplied by its mean on 
the y-axis. The Lorenz curve is identical but not scaled by the mean (Sahn and Younger, 
2003). 
148 For application see Younger (1996), Younger et al. (1999), Sahn and Younger (1998), 
Munoz et al. (2003) for Ethiopia, and Chen et al. (2001) for Uganda. 
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Appendix 4.1: HIES Survey Design and Sampling Methods 
 
4.1 Sampling Frame 
 
 
The HIES 1990-91 and 2001-02 cover all urban and rural areas of the four 
provinces of Pakistan except some parts of northern areas and FATA149. The 
FBS uses separate sampling frames for urban and rural areas of Pakistan. For 
urban areas, FBS has developed a sample frame using quick count listing 
methods for households in major cities and town. Each area is subdivided into 
enumeration blocks based on 200 to 250 households. The list of enumeration 
blocks is updated using Census of Establishments conducted during 1988. For 
rural areas the list of village/mouzas/dehs published in population and housing 
census of 1981 and 1998 is used as a frame for HIES 1990-91 and 2001-02 
respectively (FBS, HIES 90-91, pp. 15; FBS, HIES 01-02, pp. 21; 
International Monetary Fund, 2004).  
 
 
4.2 Stratification Plan 
 
 
The FBS uses two stage sample design for HIES survey. In urban areas each 
large size city is treated as an independent stratum and further divided into 
low, middle, and high income sub-strata in the light of information from 
enumeration blocks. The remaining urban areas in all provinces are grouped 
together and treated as an independent stratum. In rural areas, the population 
of each district in Punjab, Sindh and NWFP province have been grouped 
together to make a stratum while for Balochistan province each of defunct 
administrative division is taken as a stratum (FBS, HIES 01-02, pp. 22). 
                                                 
149 FATA refers to Federal Administrated Tribal Area and this area constitutes around 3 
percent of total population. 
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4.3 Sample Design 
 
 
Enumeration blocks in the urban areas and mouzas/dehs/village in the rural 
areas were the primary sampling units (PSUs). The sample of PSUs was 
selected by probability to size (PPS) based on the number of households in the 
PSU. The households within PSU were taken as secondary sampling units 
(SSUs) and chosen using systematic sampling scheme with a random start. 
Sixteen and 13 households respectively are chosen from each rural PSU and 
12 and 10 households from each urban PSU are selected for HIES 1990-91 
and 2001-02 survey respectively. This sampling procedure implies that 
households living in different parts of the country have been selected for the 
PIHS surveys with differing probabilities of selection.  In order to derive 
representative statistics for each of the provinces, as well as for the country as 
a whole, raising factors (i.e. sampling weights) are applied.  These raising 
factors take into account the sampling strategy adopted in the survey and 
weight each household by a factor that is inversely proportional to its 
probability of selection 
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Appendix 4.2: HIES (1990-91) and (2001-02) Item by item comparison and 
coding 
HIES (2001-02) Item List 
 
HIES (01-
02) ITC 
Codes 
Freq. HIES (90-91) ITC 
Codes 
Freq. 
a: Milk and Milk Products 1100 Fortnightly  Monthly 
Milk (fresh & boiled) 1101  3041  
Lassi ( buttermilk) 1102  3042  
Milk (packed by milk plants) 1103  3043  
Milk, Powdered (for adults & children ) 1104  3044, 3045, 3046  
Butter, Margarine, Cream 1105  3048, 3053  
Cheese 1106  3049  
Curd / Yoghurt 1107  3052  
Ice cream, Kulfi 1108  3051  
Other like ferni, kheer, condensed milk, etc. 1109  3047, 3054  
b: Meat Poultry and Fish  1200 Fortnightly  Monthly 
Beef 1201  3072  
Mutton 1202  3071, 3073  
Chicken Meat ( fresh, frozen )  1203  3081, 3082  
Eggs 1204  3083  
Other poultry birds ( ducks, quail, turkey etc. ) 1205  3084  
Fish (fresh, frozen, dried) 1206  3074, 3075  
Prawns, Shrimps or Crabs ( fresh, frozen, canned ) 1207  3076, 3077  
c: Fresh Fruits: 1300 Fortnightly  Monthly 
Banana 1301  3091  
Citrus fruits (Mosummi, Malta, Kinno etc.) 1301  3092  
Apple 1303  3093  
Dates 1304  3102  
Grapes 1305  3095  
Mango 1306  3096  
Melon (Water, Garma, Sarda ) 1307  3097  
Guava 1308  3103  
Other fresh fruits ( Pomegranates, Apricot, Jamons, 
Lemon, Peer, Peach, Plum, Papaya etc.) 
1309  3094, 3098, 3099, 
3101, 3104 
 
Canned fruits 1310  3105  
d: Dry Fruits & Nuts 1400 Fortnightly  Monthly 
Raisin, Dates, Apricot (dried ) 1401  3116  
Other (Almond, Walnut, Chilgoza, Pistachio, Peanuts, 
Aniseed, Cashew, Coconut, Sesame seeds, etc.) 
1402  3111, 3112, 3113, 
3114, 3115, 3117 
 
e: Vegetables 1500 Fortnightly  Monthly 
Potato 1501  3121  
Onion 1502  3123  
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coding 
HIES (2001-02) Item List 
 
HIES (01-
02) ITC 
Codes 
Freq. HIES (90-91) ITC 
Codes 
Freq. 
Tomato 1503  3122  
Cabbage, Cauliflower 1504  3125, 3126  
Karaila, Lady finger, Brinjal, Cucumber 1505  3127, 3129, 3130  
Tinda, Pumpkin, Bottle Gourd 1506  3128, 3132, 3133  
Radish, Turnip, Carrot 1507  3124, 3134, 3138  
Peas, Moongra 1508  3135, 3137  
Other ( Green Chillies, Tural, Lettuce, Kulfa etc. ) 1509  3139, 3140, 3131, 
3136 
 
Canned vegetables 1510  3141  
f: Condiments & Spices (Whole & Powder ) 1600 Fortnightly  Monthly 
Salt Simple (rock and sea) 1601  3151, 3152  
Salt (Iodised ) 1602  N.A.  
Chillies, red 1603  3157  
Turmeric, Coriander seed 1604  3156, 3158  
Ginger 1605  3159  
Garlic 1606  3160  
Cinnamon, Caraway, Cardamom 1607  3153, 3154, 3155  
Salan Masalah/Other spices (Licorice root, Cumin 
seeds, Black pepper,Cloves, Mixed condiments) 
1608  3161, 3162  
g: Sugar, Honey and Sugar Preparations 1700 Fortnightly  Monthly 
Sugar (Desi or Milled ) 1701  3170, 3171  
Gur / Shakkar 1702  3172  
Honey ( fresh or processed ) 1703  3173  
Confectionery (Toffee, Chocolate, Chewing gum etc ) 1704  3175  
Barfi, Jaleebi, Halwa & other sweetmeats 1705  3176, 3177, 3178, 
3179 
 
Glucose, Energile etc. 1706  N.A.  
h: Non Alcoholic Beverages 1800 Fortnightly  Monthly 
Carbonated beverages 1801  3191  
Squashes & Syrups (not medicated) 1802  3174, 3192  
Sugarcane juices, Other fresh juices 1803  3193  
Fruit juices (packed), Mineral water etc. 1804  3194  
i: Readymade Food, Drinks etc. 1900 Fortnightly  Monthly 
Readymade meals, cooked food purchased from 
outside home (hotel & restaurant) but consumed at 
home 
1901  3211  
Readymade meals, snacks, tea, ice cream, drinks, 
purchased and consumed outside home or provided by 
employer  
1902  3212, 3213, 3214, 
3215 
 
Instant foods 1903  N.A.  
Cereals  Monthly - 
Female 
 Monthly 
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coding 
HIES (2001-02) Item List 
 
HIES (01-
02) ITC 
Codes 
Freq. HIES (90-91) ITC 
Codes 
Freq. 
Wheat and Wheat flour 2101  3001, 3002  
Rice and rice flour 2102  3003, 3004  
Maize, Barley, Jawar and Millet (Whole and Flour ) 2103  3005, 3006, 3007, 
3008 
 
Suji, Maida, Besan 2104  3009, 3010  
Other cereals products (Vermicellies, Corn flakes, 
Noodles, Macronis, Spageite) etc.) 
2105  3011  
b. Pulses - Split and Whole / Washed and Unwashed 2200 Monthly - 
Female 
 Monthly 
Gram Whole ( Black and White) 2201  3031, 3032  
Dal chana 2202  3037  
Mash 2203  3033  
Moong 2204  3034  
Masoor 2205  3035  
Other ( Arhar, chick / pigeon /garden peas, sunflower, 
soybean ) 
2206  3036, 3037  
c. Edible Oils and Fats 2300 Monthly - 
Female 
 Monthly 
Desi Ghee 2301  3050  
Vegetable Ghee 2302  3061  
Cooking Oils 2303  3063  
Other oils and fats 2304  3062, 3064  
d. Tea and Coffee 2400 Monthly - 
Female 
 Monthly 
Tea (black, green  loose & packed) 2401  3181, 3182, 3183, 
3184 
 
Coffee 2402  3185  
Other (ovaltine, harlics, Milo, Complan etc. ) 2403  3185  
 e: Baked and Fried Products 2500 Monthly - 
Female 
 Monthly 
Biscuits ( Sweet & Saltish ) 2501  3021  
Bread, Bun, Sheermal 2502  3022  
Cake, Bakerkhani 2503  3023  
Pastries, Patties, etc. 2504  3024  
Tandoori Roti, Nan, Kulcha, Puri, Paratha 2505  3025  
Other baked or fried products (Pakoras, Samosa, 
Qatlama, popcorn  etc.) 
2506  3026, 3027  
f. Miscellaneous Food Items 2600 Monthly - 
Female 
 Monthly 
Jams, Marmalades etc. 2601  3221  
Tomato Ketchup/pulp 2602  3222  
Pudding, Jelly etc. 2603  3223  
Pickles, Chatni etc.  2604  3225  
Vinegar, Yeast, Ice etc. 2605  3224, 3226, 3227  
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coding 
HIES (2001-02) Item List 
 
HIES (01-
02) ITC 
Codes 
Freq. HIES (90-91) ITC 
Codes 
Freq. 
Food and Grain milling/grinding charges 2606  N.A.  
B. FUEL AND LIGHTING 2700 Monthly - 
Female 
 Monthly 
Fire wood 2701  3231  
Kerosene oil 2702  3232  
Char coal 2703  3233  
Coal hard & soft peat 2704  3234  
Dung cake (dry) 2705  3235  
Gas (pipe) 2706  3236  
Gas (cylinder) 2707  3237  
Electricity 2708  3238  
Match box, Candles, Mantle etc. 2709  3239, 3240  
Beggasses, Agricultural wastes for fuel purposes 
(cotton sticks,sawdust, shrubs, weeds, tobacco sticks, 
etc.), 
2710  3241, 3242  
C. MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURES   a. 
Personal Care Articles 
2800 Monthly - 
Female 
 Monthly 
Bath /Toilet soap 2801  3251  
Shampoo 2802  3256  
Hair oil & creams, hair tonic & colour, Facial cream 
& powder etc. 
2803  3257, 3258, 3259  
Toothpaste & powder, Brush, Miswak 2804  3252, 3253, 3254  
Cosmetics such as nail polish, perfumes, lipsticks, 
colognes, lotions etc. 
2805  3255  
b. Personal Care Services 2900 Monthly - 
Female 
 Monthly 
Hair cutting & dressing etc. for men(include shaving 
material), women and children 
2901  3261  
Beauty parlor services 2902  3265  
Dry cleaning, washing, dying, darning 2903  3262, 3263, 3264  
c. Household laundry Cleaning and Paper Articles 3000 Monthly - 
Female 
 Monthly 
Laundry soap, bleaching and other laundry articles, 
Washing powder, Dishwashing articles etc. 
3001  3291, 3292  
Household cleaning articles like cleaners, brooms, 
dusters, sponges, cleaning wipers, mops polishes, 
waxes, buckets, etc.  
3002  3293  
Paper napkins, wax papers and other paper articles 
etc. 
3003  3294  
A: Tobacco and Chewing Products 4100 Monthly 
Male 
 Monthly 
Cigarettes and lighters 4101  3201  
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coding 
HIES (2001-02) Item List 
 
HIES (01-
02) ITC 
Codes 
Freq. HIES (90-91) ITC 
Codes 
Freq. 
Biri 4102  3202  
Tobacco Raw 4103  3203  
Pan prepared 4104  3204  
Pan leaves  4105  3204  
Katha, Choona 4106  3205, 3206  
Betel nut 4107  3207  
Sonf  Suparee 4108  3208  
Chewing Tobacco & Snuf 4109  3209  
B. Recreation & reading 4200 Monthly 
Male 
 Monthly 
Tickets for cinemas, musical concerts, spectacular 
sports, Lottery tickets,  
4201  3271, 3275  
Rent of TV/VCR/Video cassettes, CD's etc. 4202  N.A.  
Newspapers, magazines, novels, books (rented, 
purchased, not for education) 
4203  3273  
C. Personal Transport and Traveling      ( Not for 
commercial use) 
4300 Monthly 
Male 
 Monthly 
Petrol/ Diesel charges, lubricants & oils, punctures 4301  3281, 3282, 3283  
Expenses on travelling by road (bus, taxi, rickshaw 
etc.) 
4302  3285  
Expenses on travelling by train 4303  3286  
Other travelling charges like tongas, camels, donkeys, 
ferries, bicycles, Garage rent etc. 
4304  3288, 3284  
D. Other Miscellaneous Household Expenses on 
Goods and Services 
4400 Monthly 
Male 
 Monthly 
Wages & salaries paid to servants, gardeners, 
sweepers, chowkidars, aya, drivers, cleaners, Guards 
4401  3301  
Telephone, telegraph, postal, fax, E-mail, and Internet 
etc. charges 
4402  3302  
Storages, safe deposits and locker etc. charges. 4403  3303  
Pocket money to children 4404  3304  
Expenses on maintenance of pets, poultry and fish 
(curing) - for home use only 
4405  3305  
Other expenditures not elsewhere classified  4406  3305  
A. Apparel Textile, Footwear & Personal Effects     
a. Clothing, Clothing material and services 5100 Annual Non-
Durable 
 Annual 
Woolen cloth (suits, trousers, coats, etc.), Cotton cloth 
( shirts, shalwar, etc.), Mixed(nylon etc.),Dupatta  
5101  3321, 3322, 3323  
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HIES (01-
02) ITC 
Codes 
Freq. HIES (90-91) ITC 
Codes 
Freq. 
Wool for sweaters, socks, shawls, gloves etc. 5102  3324  
New ready-made & second hand garments/under 
garments (for males, females & children), Sweaters, 
Sari etc. 
5103  3325, 3326  
Burka, Chadar, Ajrak etc. 5104  3327  
Clothing supplies(threads, needles, pins, buttons, 
zipper, hangers etc.) 
5105  3328, 3329  
Tailoring, embroidery, alterations etc. charges 5106  3330  
b. Footwear and repair charges 5200 Annual Non-
Durable 
 Annual 
Footwear made of leather, synthetic or any other 
material (all types new or second hand) 
5201  3341, 3342, 3343, 
3344 
 
Repair charges of footwear, Polishes, shoe shining 
and cleaning brushes etc. 
5202  3351, 3352  
c. Personal effects and service and repair charges 5300 Annual Non-
Durable 
 Annual 
Brief cases, hand bags, watch straps, belts etc. (leather 
or plastic) 
5301  3361, 3362  
Imitation and plastic Jewellery & ornaments ( 
bangles, necklaces and earings, tie pins, cuff links, 
etc.) 
5302  3363  
Gloves, handkerchief, scarfs, hats, muffs, ties, etc. 5303  3364, 3365  
Repair charges of personal effects (watches, clocks, 
glasses,  etc. ) 
5304  3371  
B. Housing    a. House rent and housing expenses 5400 Annual Non-
Durable 
 Annual 
House rent (Market value) 5401  3381  
Subsidized house rent (Hiring, Self hiring) (Market 
value) 
5402  3388  
Rent free accommodation(Market value) 5403  3382  
Owner occupied accommodation(Market value) 5404  3383  
Summer cottage rent 5405  3387  
Minor repairs/maintenance & 
redecoration/addition/alteration 
5406  3384  
Other expenses (insurance, commission paid, 
water/conservancy/sewerage charges, Summer cottage 
etc.) 
5408  3388, 3386  
b. Chinaware, Earthenware, Plastic ware etc. for daily 
use and other household effects 
5500 Annual Non-
Durable 
 Annual 
Crockery & Cutlery for daily use 5501  3391, 3395  
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HIES (2001-02) Item List 
 
HIES (01-
02) ITC 
Codes 
Freq. HIES (90-91) ITC 
Codes 
Freq. 
Earthenware (ghara, sorahi etc.), Glassware, 
plasticware, woodware and lacquer 
5502  3392, 3393, 3394  
Other household effects (bulbs, tubes, switches, 
battery cells, lamp shades etc.) 
5503  3411, 3412, 3413, 
3414 
 
C. Miscellaneous Expenditure     a. Medical care 5600 Annual Non-
Durable 
 Annual 
Purchase of medicines & vitamins, medical apparatus, 
and other equipment / supplies etc. 
5601  3421  
Dental care, teeth cleaning, extraction, charges, eye 
glasses and all others, not elsewhere classified  
5604  3425, 3422  
b. Recreation, traveling & transport expenditure 5700 Annual Non-
Durable 
 Annual/ 
*Monthly 
Expenditure on hobbies, Cable installation 
recreational membership fee, toys, games, 
photography, lodging charges etc. 
5701  3432, 3272*, 3433, 
3274*, 3431 
 
Expenditure on by Air Travel 5705  3287*  
Other expenses on tyre, tube, spare parts, repairs of 
vehicle etc. and service charges 
5706  3444, 3445, 3446  
c. Educational and Professional Stationary Supplies 
expenditure 
5800 Annual Non-
Durable 
 Annual 
School/college fees and private tuition fees 5801  3451, 3454  
Books and exercise note books / copies, stationary etc. 5802  3452  
Hostel expenses 5803  3453  
Other education expenses (bags, professional society 
membership, transportation etc.) 
5804  3456, 3457  
Stationery supplies such as pen, pencils, stapling 
machine, pin etc. (other than education purpose) 
5805  3461  
d. Taxes & Fines and all other Miscellaneous 
expenditure 
5900 Annual Non-
Durable 
 Annual 
Legal expenses (not related to business) 5903  3483  
Insurance premium such as fire, accident and travel 
insurance (exclude life / housing/vehicle insurance). 
5904  3484  
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Appendix 5.1: Distributional Characteristics of Goods (HIES 2001-02) 
d  i Rank d  i Rank
beggasses, agri. waste 1.097 1 1.368 1
dung cake (dry) 1.058 2 1.150 4
biri 1.056 3 1.077 7
food grain milling charges 1.047 4 1.132 5
gur/shakkar 1.041 5 1.041 8
other oils and fats 1.036 6 1.185 3
wheat and wheat flour 1.033 7 1.085 6
other poultry bird (ducks,quail,etc) 1.024 8 0.988 12
chewing tobacco & snuf 1.021 9 0.979 14
salt (simple, rock or sea) 1.015 10 1.033 10
fire wood 1.015 11 0.960 16
chillies (red) 1.013 12 1.033 9
vegetable ghee 1.011 13 0.993 11
coal hard & soft peat 1.010 14 1.203 2
other pulses 1.009 15 0.952 17
tobacco raw 1.005 16 0.984 13
maize, barly, jawar etc. 0.998 17 0.843 37
potato 0.994 18 0.970 15
rice and rice flour 0.994 19 0.937 19
sugar (desi or milled) 0.988 20 0.918 24
dal chana 0.987 21 0.930 21
laundry soap, etc. 0.984 22 0.947 18
moong 0.983 23 0.928 22
cigarettes 0.982 24 0.932 20
onion 0.981 25 0.924 23
karaila, lady finger,brinjal,cocumber 0.978 26 0.902 25
tinda, pumpkin, bottle gourd 0.974 27 0.881 26
other (green chillies, turai, lettuce, kulfa 0.971 28 0.879 27
tea (black,green etc.) 0.969 29 0.863 28
vinegar, yeast,ice etc 0.968 30 0.848 35
char coal 0.968 31 0.836 41
cabbage,cauliflower 0.966 32 0.853 34
expenses on maintenance of pets 0.965 33 0.819 42
kerosene oil 0.963 34 0.844 36
garlic 0.960 35 0.862 29
radish, turnip, carrot 0.959 36 0.819 43
tailoring, embroidery charges 0.958 37 0.859 31
masoor 0.957 38 0.840 39
woolen/cotton/mixed clothes 0.957 39 0.858 32
lassi(buttermilk) 0.956 40 0.794 47
match box, candles, etc. 0.955 41 0.860 30
earthenware, glassware 0.951 42 0.841 38
hair oil & cream, etc. 0.950 43 0.855 33
hair cutting etc. 0.949 44 0.839 40
clothing supplies 0.943 45 0.781 48
bath/toilet soap 0.943 46 0.811 44
other travelling charges 0.939 47 0.737 55
footwear 0.936 48 0.797 45
pocket money to children 0.933 49 0.795 46
turmeric, corriander seed 0.933 50 0.764 50
beef 0.933 51 0.743 54
milk (fresh & boiled) 0.930 52 0.758 52
repair charges of footwear 0.929 53 0.766 49
cheese 0.928 54 0.673 69
betel nut 0.928 55 0.677 67
Social Weights Based on 
Low Inequality Aversion 
(v = 0.5)
High Inequality Aversion 
(v = 2.0)
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d  i Rank d  i Rank
other spices 0.926 56 0.748 53
mash 0.924 57 0.723 57
imitation and plastic jewellery 0.923 58 0.762 51
tomato 0.920 59 0.711 61
butter, margarine, cream 0.914 60 0.712 60
burka, chadar, ajrak etc 0.912 61 0.677 68
purchase of medicines 0.909 62 0.731 56
crockery & cutlery 0.908 63 0.712 59
other household 0.905 64 0.715 58
katha,choona 0.905 65 0.634 79
expense travelling by roads 0.904 66 0.681 66
other cereals product 0.898 67 0.699 62
gram whole 0.894 68 0.653 76
toothpaste & powder, 0.886 69 0.655 75
mango 0.886 70 0.659 73
peas, moongra 0.885 71 0.659 72
wool for sweaters, etc 0.885 72 0.690 63
fish (fresh, frozen, dried) 0.884 73 0.627 82
household cleaning articles 0.883 74 0.685 65
other expenditure 0.883 75 0.639 77
stationery supplies 0.881 76 0.626 83
pickles chatni etc 0.877 77 0.633 80
books and exercise books etc 0.877 78 0.639 78
melon (water, garma, sarda) 0.876 79 0.628 81
desi ghee 0.876 80 0.581 91
new and old ready-made, etc 0.876 81 0.685 64
electricity 0.870 82 0.656 74
curd/yogurt 0.869 83 0.563 95
biscuits (sweet & saltish) 0.868 84 0.591 89
eggs 0.866 85 0.615 85
dates 0.866 86 0.667 70
pan leaves 0.861 87 0.494 106
cinnamon, caraway, cardamom 0.859 88 0.568 92
suiji, maida, besan 0.858 89 0.606 86
ginger 0.858 90 0.566 94
other fresh fruits (pomgr,apri,jamon,lemon etc.)0.856 91 0.617 84
guava 0.854 92 0.591 90
glucose, energile etc. 0.854 93 0.557 96
cake, bakerkhani 0.848 94 0.599 87
raisin, dates, apricot (dired) 0.847 95 0.548 98
gloves, handkerchief, etc 0.847 96 0.567 93
other education expenses 0.845 97 0.593 88
pan prepared 0.842 98 0.482 109
citrus fruit (mosummi, malta, kinno) 0.841 99 0.543 99
canned fruits 0.830 100 0.667 71
salt (iodised) 0.823 101 0.528 101
banana 0.822 102 0.524 102
grapes 0.816 103 0.529 100
sonf suparee 0.816 104 0.466 112
chiken meat (fresh, frozen) 0.814 105 0.499 105
squashes and syrups (not medicated) 0.808 106 0.493 107
expense travelling by train 0.808 107 0.453 114
annual license fees tv/vcr etc. 0.803 108 0.484 108
gas (pipe) 0.802 109 0.464 113
gas (cylinder) 0.799 110 0.403 125
Appendix 5.1 (contd.): Distributional Charachteristics of Items 
Consumed in Pakistan (2001- 02)
Social Weights Based on 
Low Inequality 
Aversion (v = 0.5)
High Inequality 
Aversion (v = 2.0)
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d  i Rank d  i Rank
rent free accommodation 0.795 111 0.551 97
other (almond, walnut, chilghoza, pistacho etc.)0.791 112 0.452 116
minor repair/maintenance 0.790 113 0.473 111
barfi, jalebi, other sweetmeats 0.787 114 0.435 118
owner occupied accomodation 0.785 115 0.514 103
mutton 0.782 116 0.437 117
legal expenses 0.782 117 0.405 124
apple 0.781 118 0.453 115
confectionery (toffee, chocolate, chewing gum etc.)0.780 119 0.481 110
expenditure on hobbies etc. 0.775 120 0.507 104
other like ferni, kheer, etc 0.773 121 0.385 129
brief cases, handbags etc. 0.773 122 0.395 127
puri, paratha, nan, roti, samosa etc. 0.762 123 0.379 133
summercartage rent 0.760 124 0.376 135
repair of personal effects 0.757 125 0.430 121
house rent 0.756 126 0.389 128
shampoo 0.753 127 0.373 136
prawn, shrimps or crabs (fresh, frozen, canned)0.752 128 0.371 137
carbonated beverages 0.752 129 0.401 126
cooking oils 0.750 130 0.356 140
cosmetics 0.750 131 0.406 123
dental care, teethcleaning 0.746 132 0.423 122
other baked & fried products 0.742 133 0.431 120
milk, powdered(for adults & children) 0.740 134 0.377 134
honey (fresh or processed) 0.728 135 0.363 138
school/college fees 0.721 136 0.346 141
sugarcane juice, other fresh juices) 0.718 137 0.339 143
other expenses 0.716 138 0.346 142
ice crem, kulfi 0.715 139 0.434 119
readymade meals purchased from outside0.713 140 0.384 130
milk packed by milk plant 0.707 141 0.383 131
other expenses on tyre etc. 0.704 142 0.381 132
subsidized house rent 0.703 143 0.282 146
storages, safe deposits etc 0.697 144 0.359 139
tickets for cinemas, etc 0.695 145 0.335 144
pastries, patties etc. 0.690 146 0.315 145
hostel expenses 0.680 147 0.255 149
bread, bun, sheermal 0.666 148 0.275 147
telephone, telegraph, postal, etc 0.645 149 0.220 150
insurance premium on vehicle etc 0.637 150 0.270 148
petrol/diesel charges 0.624 151 0.203 153
rent of tv/vcr/video etc 0.616 152 0.209 151
newspaper magazine, books 0.610 153 0.199 155
expenditure on air travelling etc. 0.606 154 0.199 154
fruit juices (packed), mineral water etc.0.593 155 0.206 152
jams,marmalades etc 0.570 156 0.158 159
pudding, jelly etc 0.555 157 0.167 158
dry cleaning, washing 0.542 158 0.178 156
tomato ketchup/pulp 0.536 159 0.130 160
paper napkins, wax papers etc. 0.517 160 0.172 157
coffee 0.470 161 0.113 161
beauty parlour services 0.464 162 0.074 163
wages & salary paid to servants 0.440 163 0.087 162
other (ovaltine, horlics, milo, complan etc.)0.435 164 0.044 164
Source: Author's own calculation using HIES (2001-02)
Appendix 5.1 (contd.): Distributional Charachteristics of Items 
Consumed in Pakistan (2001- 02)
Social Weights Based on 
Low Inequality 
Aversion (v = 0.5)
High Inequality 
Aversion (v = 2.0)
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Appendix 6.1: Import Content within Domestic Consumption (IMPCON) 
estimates 
 Groups HIES Item Codes Aggregation 
 Level 
IMPCON 
(2001-02) 
IMPCON 
(1990-91) 
1. Milk & Milk 
Products 
 
1101 – 1104 
 
1105 – 1109  
 
 
Milk 
 
Diary Products 
 
 
0.0015 
 
0.0033 
 
0.009 
 
0.278 
2. All Kinds of 
Meat 
1201 – 1207 
 
Whole Group 0.00018 0.000026 
3. All Fruits & 
Nuts 
1301 – 1402 
 
Whole Group 
 
0.0461 0.0283 
4. All Vegetables 1501: Potato 
1502: Onion 
1503 – 1510: Other 
Vegetables. 
Potato 
Onion 
Whole Group 
 
0.0132 
0.0303 
0.0504 
 
 
0.0485 
 
5. All Spices  1601 – 1602, 1604 
- 1608 
1603 
Whole Group 
 
Chillies 
0.120 
 
0.027 
 
0.2640 
6.  Sugar & Sugar 
Products 
1701 – 1706: 
  
Whole Group 0.0381 0.1631 
7. Bev., spirit & 
vinegar 
1801 - 1804 
 
Whole Group 
 
0.0024 
 
0.00021 
8. Cereals 2101: Wheat & 
Wheat flour 
2102: Rice & Rice 
flour 
2103: Maize, 
Barley, Jawar and 
Miller 
2104: Suji, Maida, 
Besan 
2105: Other Cereal 
Products. 
 
Wheat 
 
Rice 
 
Maize/Barley 
 
 
Cereal Group 
 
Cereal Group 
 
0.027 
 
0.0013 
 
0.011 
 
 
0.021 
 
0.021 
0.0778 
 
0.0000008 
 
0.00048 
 
 
0.0573 
 
0.0573 
9. Pulses 2201 – 2205: 
Pulses 
2206: Other Pulses 
 
Whole Group 
 
0.158 
0.984 
0 
10. Edible Oils 2301 – 2304 
 
Whole Group 
 
0.351 0.4094 
11. Tea & Coffee 2401 – 2403 Whole Group 
 
1.0 1.0 
12. Bread & Bakery 
Products 
2501 – 2605 
 
Whole Group 0.00046 0 
13.  Cosmetics & 
Perfumes 
2801 – 2902 
 
Whole Group 0.406 0.0712 
14. Laundry 2903 – 3003   
 
Whole Group 
 
0.1765 0.0739 
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 Groups HIES Item Codes Aggregation 
 Level 
IMPCON 
(2001-02) 
IMPCON 
(1990-91) 
15.  Tobacco & 
Tobacco 
Manufactured 
4101 – 4109  
 
Whole Group 0.0011 0.0011 
16. Books, 
Newspaper & 
Magazine 
5802 & 4203 
 
Notebooks 
 
Newspaper 
etc. 
0.1032 
 
0.364 
0.0605 
 
0.0605 
17. Clothing/  
Footwear/ 
Accessories 
5101 – 5106,  5201 
– 5202, 5301 – 
5304 
 
Whole Group 0.0104 0.0002 
18. Crockery/Cutlery 5501 - 5503 
 
Whole Group 0.0466 0.0175 
19. Pharmaceutical 
Products 
5601, 5604 
 
Whole Group 0.2406 0.2502 
20. Petroleum 
Products 
4301-4303 Whole Group 
(except 4304) 
0.6286 0.9388 
Source : Author’s own calculations 
Note: ‘1’ here means item is fully imported while ‘0’ means it is fully domestically produced 
and consumed.  
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Appendix 6.2: Custom Duty Rates for 2001-02 & 1990-91 
 
HIES Codes 
 
Items Custom Duty 
Rates 
 2001-02  
1101-1109 Milk and Milk Products 0.30 
1201-1202 Beef & Mutton 0.10 
1206-1207 Fish & prawn, shrimps etc. 0.10 
1301-1310 Fresh Fruits: 0.30 
1401-1402 Dry Fruits & Nuts 0.30 
1501-1509 Vegetables 0.10 
1601-1602 Salt 0.30 
1604-1605 Turmeric, Coriander, Ginger, Garlic 0.40 
1607-1702 Cinnamon, Caraway, Cardamom, other spices, 
Sugar, Gur/Shakkar 
0.20 
1703-1804 Honey, Confectionery, Barfi (etc.), Glucose, 
Non-Alcoholic Bev. 
0.30 
1203 Chicken Meat ( fresh, frozen ) 0.30 
1204 Eggs 0.10 
1205 Other poultry birds ( ducks, quail, turkey etc. ) 0.15 
1510 Canned vegetables 0.30 
1603 Chillies, red 0.10 
1605 Ginger 0.20 
2101 Wheat and Wheat flour 0.20 
2102 Rice and rice flour 0.10 
2103 Maize, Barley, Jawar and Millet (Whole and 
Flour ) 
0.05 
2104 Suji, Maida, Besan 0.10 
2105 Other cereals products (Vermicellies, Corn 
flakes, Noodles, Macronis, Spageite) 
0.25 
2201 Gram Whole ( Black and White) 0.10 
2202-2205 Dal chana, Mash, Moong, Masoor 0.20 
2206 Other pulses 0.05 
2301 Desi Ghee* 0.30 
2302-2304 Vegetable Ghee, Cooking oil and other oils & 
fats* 
0.49 
2401-2605 Tea and Coffee,  Baked and Fried Products,  
and Miscellaneous Food Items 
0.30 
2701 Fire wood  0.10 
2702 Kerosene oil 0.05 
2703-2704 Char coal , Coal hard & soft peat &  0.10 
2706-2707 Gas (pipe) and Gas (cylinder) 0.10 
2708 Electricity 0.05 
2709 Match box, Candles, Mantle etc. 0.30 
2710 Beggasses, Agricultural wastes for fuel 
purposes (cotton sticks,sawdust, shrubs, weeds, 
tobacco sticks, etc.) 
0.10 
2801-3003 Personal Care Articles,  Personal Care Services 
and Household laundry Cleaning and Paper 
Articles 
0.30 
4101-4104 Cigarettes and lighters, Biri, Tobacco Raw and 0.30 
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HIES Codes 
 
Items Custom Duty 
Rates 
Pan prepared 
4106 Katha Choona 0.25 
4107-4109 Betel Nut, Sonf Suparee and Chewing Tobacco 
& Snuf 
0.30 
4301-4304 Personal Transport and Traveling* 0.30 
4203 Newspapers, magazines, novels, books 0.175 
5101 Woolen Cloth 0.30 
5103-5301 New Ready made & second hand garments, 
Burka, Chadar, ajrak, Clothing Supplies, 
Tailoring, footwear, Briefcase, hand bags, 
watch straps, belts etc. 
0.30 
5303-5304 Gloves, handkerchief, scarf, hats, ties, watches, 
clocks 
0.30 
5501-5503 Chinaware, Earthenware, Plastic ware etc. for 
daily use and other household effects 
0.30 
5601-5604 Pharmaceuticals* 0.10 
701-706 Refrigerator, freezer, AC, Air Cooler, Fans, 
Geyser 
0.30 
708-713 Camera (still & movie), Cooking stove (range), 
Microwave Oven, Heater, Bicycle 
0.30 
716 TV 0.30 
717-719 VCR, VCP, Receiver, De-coder, Radio, cassette 
player, compact disk player. 
0.20 
720 Vacuum cleaner 0.30 
721 Sewing/knitting machine 0.10 
722-723 Personal Computer and others 0.05 
 1990-91  
1105 Butter, Margarine, Cream 0.86 
1101-1104 Milk, Lassi, Milk (packed), Milk (powder) 0.60 
1106-1109 Cheese, Curd/Yogurt, Ice cream, Others 1.0 
1201-1203 Beef, Mutton and Chicken Meat 0.80 
1204 Eggs 1.0 
1205-1207 Other poultry birds, Fish, Prawns, Shrimps or 
Crabs 
0.80 
1301-1303 Banana, Citrus fruits, Apple 1.0 
1304 Dates 0.20 
1305-1402 Grapes, Mango, Melon, Guava, Other fresh 
fruits, canned fruits, and dry fruit 
1.0 
1501-1510 Vegetables 1.0 
1601-1606 Salt, Chillies (red), Turmeric, Coriander Seed, 
Ginger and Garlic) 
0.80 
1607 Cinnamon, Caraway, Cardamom 0.40 
1608 Salan Masalah/Other spices (Licorice root, 
Cumin seeds, Black pepper,Cloves, Mixed 
condiments) 
0.80 
1701-1705 Sugar, Honey and Sugar Preparations 1.0 
1706 Glucose, Energile 0.60 
1801-1802 Carbonated beverages and  Squashes & Syrups 
(not medicated) 
1.0 
1804 Fruit juices (packed), Mineral water etc. 0.90 
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HIES Codes 
 
Items Custom Duty 
Rates 
2101-2104 Cereals 0.40 
2105 Other Cereals products 0.45 
2301-2303 Edible Oils and Fats* 0.43 
2304 Other edible Oils and Fats* 0.80 
2401-2403 Tea and Coffee 1.0 
2501-2606 Baked and Fried Products & Miscellaneous 
Food Items 
1.0 
2801-3001 Personal Care Articles,  Personal Care Services 
and Laundry Soaps, bleach and other laundry 
articles 
1.0 
3003 Paper napkins, wax papers and other paper 
articles etc. 
1.0 
4101 Cigarettes and lighter 1.0 
4102 Biri 0.80 
4103 Tobacco Raw 0.50 
4104 Pan Prepared 0.80 
4106-4109 Katha Choona, Betel nut, Sonf Suparee and 
Chewing tobacco 
0.80 
4203 Newspapers, magazines, novels, books 1.0 
4301-4303 Personal Transport and Traveling* .086 
5101-5106 Clothing, Clothing material and services 1.0 
5201-5202 Footwear and repair charges 1.0 
5301-5304 Personal effects and service and repair charges 1.0 
5501 Crockery & Cutlery for daily use 0.45 
5502 Earthenware (ghara, sorahi etc.), Glassware, 
Plastic-ware, Woodware and lacquer 
.053 
5503 Other household effects (bulbs, tubes, switches, 
battery cells, lamp shades etc.) 
.045 
5601-5604 Pharmaceuticals* 0.34 
5802 Books and exercise note books / copies, 
stationary etc. 
1.0 
5805 Stationery supplies such as pen, pencils, 
stapling machine, pin etc. 
0.80 
708-709 Camera (movie & still) 0.50 
710 Cooking stove 0.80 
711 Cooking range & microwave oven 0.80 
716 TV 0.80 
717 VCR, VCP, Receiver, Decoder 0.80 
718 Radio Cassette 1.0 
720 Vacuum Cleaner 0.80 
* Effective duty rate is used. 
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Appendix 7.1: Price Elasticities: Estimates from First Stage (Unit Value and 
Share Equations) 
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Appendix 7.2: Estimates of Own- and Cross- Price Elasticities: Rural 
Pakistan (2001-02) 
 
 
Beef Wheat Rice Veg_ghee Sugar Milk Pulses
Beef -2.066 0.924 1.113 -0.863 -1.042 0.229 -0.346
Wheat -1.015 0.566 0.064 0.668 -1.282 0.705 0.120
Rice -1.416 2.590 -1.674 0.505 0.825 0.070 -0.522
Veg_ghee 0.356 0.101 0.374 -0.644 0.066 0.150 0.047
Sugar -0.930 -0.361 0.340 1.218 -0.770 -0.202 -0.036
Milk 0.021 0.426 -0.519 0.349 -0.264 -1.041 -0.017
Pulses -0.049 0.143 0.225 0.248 0.353 0.104 -0.477
Source : Author's calculation using Household Income and Expenditure Survey, (2001-02).
Note 1/ : The row shows the commodity being affected and the column the commodity whose price is changing. 
Bootstrapping standard errors are reported in parentheses and they are computed from 1,000 replication of the 
bootstrap using cluster specific information and are defined as half of the length of the interval around the bootstrap 
mean that contains 0.638 (the fraction of a normal random variable within two standard deviations of the mean) of 
the bootstrap replication [for example see Deaton (1997, p.71)].
2/ Figures in bold are greater in absloute value than twice their size of bootstrapped standard error (5% level of 
significance).
Appendix 7.2: Estimates of Own and Cross-Price Elasticities: Rural Pakistan (2001-02)
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